as we paffionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the unealinefs that fits fo heavy upon us; and because the abstinence from a prefent pleasure that offers itself is a pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the defire being inflamed by a near and tempting object, it is no wonder that that operates after the fame manner pain does, and leffens in our thoughts what is fucure, and fo forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

$65.

ADD to this, that abfent good, or, which is the fame thing, future pleasure, efpecially if of a fort we are unacquainted with, feldom is able to counterbalance any uneafinefs, either of pain or defire, which is prefent; for its greatnefs being no more than what ihall be really tafted when enjoyed, men are apt enough to leffen that, to make it give place to any prefent defire, and conclude with themfelves, that when it comes to trial, it may poffibly not answer the report or opinion that generally paffes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themfelves have enjoyed with great pleasure and delight at one time, has proved infipid or nauseous at another; and therefore they fee nothing in it for which they should forego a prefent enjoyment. But that this is a falfe way of judging, when applied to the happiness of another life, they must confefs, unless they will fay, God cannot make those happy he defigns to be fo; for that being intended for a flate of happinefs, it must certainly be agreeable to every one's with and defire. Could we fuppofe their relishes as different there as they are here, yet the manna in heaven will fuit every one's palate. Thus much of the auring judgment we make of prefent and future pleasure and pain when they are compared together, and fo the abfent confidered as future.,

§ 66. In confidering confequences of Actions. II. As to things good or bad in their confequences, and by the aptnefs in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge amifs jeveral ways.

1. When we judge that fo much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does.

2. When we judge, that though the confequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty but that it may otherwife fall out, or else by fome means be avoided, as by industry, addrefs, change, repentance, &c. That thefe are wrong ways of judging, were easy to fhow in every particular, if I would examine them at large fingly; but I shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a lefs, upon uncertain gueffes, and before a due examination be made proportionable to the weightiness of the matter, and: the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every one must confefs, especially if he confiders the ufual causes of this wrong judgment, whereof these following are fome.

§67. Caufes of this.

I. IGNORANCE. He that judges without informing, himself to the utmoft that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amifs.

II. Inadvertency: when a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and prefent ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an ac-. count, and determining on which fide the odds lie. If therefore either fide be huddled up in haste, and several of the fums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy caufes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance. That which most commonly caufes this, is the prevalency of fome prefent pleasure or pain, heightened by our feeble paffionate nature, moft ftrongly wrought on by what is prefent. To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reafon was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search and fee, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty, the understanding would be to no purpofe; and without understanding, liberty (if it could be) would fignify nothing. If a man fees what would do him good or harm, what would

make him happy or miferable, without being able to move himself one step towards or from it, what is he the better for feeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better than if he were driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulfe from without or from within is little odds. The first, therefore, and great ufe of liberty, is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exercife of freedom is to and ftill, open the eyes, look about, and take a view. of the confequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires. How much, floth and negligence, heat and paflion, the pres valency of fashion or acquired indifpofitions, do feverally contribute on occafion to thefe wrong judgments, I` fhall not here farther inquire; I fhall only add one other falfe judgment, which I think neceffary to men-" tion, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, though of great influence.

$68. Wrong Judgment of what is neceffary to our Happiness.

ALL men defire happiness, that is paft doubt; but, as has been already obferved, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endeared to them, to reft fatisfied in that; and fo being happy, till fome new defire, by making them uneafy, difturbs that happiness, and frows them that they are not fo, they look no farther; nor is the will determined to any action in purfuit of any other known or apparent good; for fince we find that we cannot enjoy all forts of good, but one excludes another, we do not fix our defires on every apparent greater good, unless it be judged to be neceffary to our happiness; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occafion to men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be neceffary to their happinefs which really is fo. This mittake mifleads us both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it

where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not neceffary to it, when a man miles, his great end, happiness, he will acknowledge he judged not right. That which contributes to this mistake is the real or fuppofed unplea fantnefs of the actions which are the way to this end, it feeming fo prepofterous a thing to men to make themfelves unhappy in order to happinefs, that they do not easily bring themfelves to it.

§69. We can change the Agreeablenefs or Difagreeable,, nefs in Things.

THE laft inquiry, therefore, concerning this matter, is, Whether it be in a man's power to change the pleafant nefs and unpleafantnefs that accompanies, any fort of action? And to that it is plain in many cafes he can. Men, may and fhould correct their palates, and give a, relish to what either has, or they fuppofe has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered, and it is a miftake to think that men cannot change the displeasingnefs or indifferency that is in actions in pleafare and defire, if they will do but what is in their power.' ¡A. due confideration will do it in fome cafes, and prac tice, application, and cuitom, in moft. Bread or tobac co may be neglected, where they are fhown to be ufeful to health, becaufe of au indifferency or difrelish to them; reafon and confideration at first recommends,. and begins their trial, and ufe finds, or cultom makes. them pleafant. That this is fo in virtue too is very certain. Actions are pleafing or difpleating, either in themselves, or confidered as a means to, a greater and more defirable end. The eating of a well-feasoned dith, fuited to a man's palate, may inove the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end;, to which the confidera tion of the pleasure there is in health and frength (to which that meat is fubfervient) may add a new gufto, able to make us fwallow an ill-relifhed potion. In the latter of thefe, any action is rendered more or less pleafing only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or lefs perfuaded of its tendency to it,

or neceffary connection with it; but the pleasure of the action itself is beft acquired or increased by use and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that which at a diftance we looked on with averfion, and by repeti tions wear us into a liking of what poffibly in the first effay difpleafed us. Habits have powerful charms, and put fo ftrong attractions of cafinefs and pleasure into what we accuftom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be eafy in the omiffion of actions which habitual practice has fuited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very visible, and every one's experience hows him he can do, yet it is a part in the conduct of men towards their happiness, neglected to a degree that it will be poffibly entertained as a paradox, if it be faid that men can make things or actions more or lefs pleafing to themselves, and thereby remedy that to which one may juftly impute a great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common opinion having fettled wrong notions, and education and cuftom ill habits, the juft values of things are misplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains fhould be taken to rectify thefe; and contrary habits change our pleafures, and give a relifh to that which is neceffary or conducive to our happiness. This every one must confefs he can do; and when happiness is loft, and mifery overtakes him, he will confeis he did amifs in neglecting it, and condemn himfelf for it: And I afk every one, Whether he has not often done fo?

§70. Preference of Vice to Virtue, a manifeft wrong Judgment.

I SHALL not now enlarge any farther on the wrong judgments, and neglect of what is in their power, whereby men mislead themselves. This would make a volume, and is not my bulinefs. But whatever falfe notions and fhameful neglect of what is in their power may put men out of their way to happiness, and distract them, as we fee, into fo different courfes of life, this yet is certain, that morality, eftablished upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one