they have clear and distinct ideas; and that they can think on space, without any thing in it that refifts, or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure fpace, which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the extenfion of body, the idea of the distance between the oppofite parts of a concave fuperficies, being equally as clear without as with the idea of any folid parts between; and, on the other fide, they perfuade themselves, that they have, diftinct from that of pure fpace, the idea of fomething that fills space, that can be protruded by the impulfe of other bodies, or refift their motion. If there be others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not how men, who have the fame idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name, can in that cafe talk with one another, any more than a man, who, not being blind or deaf, has diftinct ideas of the colour of fcarlet, and the found of a trumpet, could difcourfe concerning fcarlet colour with the blind man I mentioned in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the found of a trumpet.

§ 6. What it is.

If any one asks me, What this folidity is? I fend him to his fenfes to inform him: Let him put a flint or a foot-ball between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a fullcient explication of folidity, what it is, and wherein it confifts, I promife to tell him what it is, and wherein it confifts, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it confifts, or explains to me what extenfion or motion is, which perhaps feems much eafier. The fimple ideas we have, are fuch as experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we fhall fucceed no better than if we went about to clear up the darknets of a blind man's mind by talking, and to difcourfe unto him the ideas of light and colours. The reafon of this I fhall fhow in another place.

THE

CHAP. V.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES.

and

HE ideas we get by more than one sense, are of Space, or extenfion, figure, reft, and motion; for these make perceivable impreffions, both on the eyes touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extenfion, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occafion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.

1. Simple Ideas are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas.

HE mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the

foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and obferves its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of thofe it received from foreign things.

2. The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Reflection.

THE two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently confidered, and which are so frequent, that every one that pleafes may take notice of them in himself, are thefe two:

Perception, or thinking, and
Volition, or tvilling.

The power of thinking is called the underflanding, and the power of volition is called the will, and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. Of fome of the modes of thefe fimple ideas of reflection,

fuch as are remembrance, difcerning, reafoning, judging, knowledge, faith, &c. I fhall have occafion to fpeak here

after.

T

HERE be other fimple ideas which convey themfelves into the mind by all the ways of fenfation and reflection, viz.

Pleafure, or delight, and its opposite.
Pain, or uneasiness.

Power.

Existence.

Unity.

§ 2. Pleasure and Pain.

DELIGHT, or uneafinefs, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection; and there is fcarce any affection of our fenses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By pleasure and pain I would be underflood to fignify whatfoever delights or molefts us, whether it arifes from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies; for whether we call it fatiffaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c. on the one fide, or uneafinefs, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, mifery, &c. on the other, they are ftill but different degrees of the fame thing, and belong to the ideas of pleafure and pain, delight or uneafinefs; which are names I fhall most commonly use for those two forts of ideas.

THE infinitely wife Author of our being having given us the power over feveral parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at reft as we think fit, and alfo, by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which confift all the actions of our body; having alfo given a power to our minds, in feveral in

Book II. ftances, to choofe, among its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that fubject with confideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of; has been pleased to join to feveral thoughts and several fenfations a perception of delight. If this were wholly feparated from all our outward fenfations and inward thoughts, we fhould have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another, negligence to attention, or motion to reft; and fo we fhould neither ftir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may fo call it) run adrift, without any direction or design, and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded fhadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them; in which state man, however furnished with the faculties of underftanding and will, would be a very idle inactive creature, and pafs his time only in a lazy lethargic dream. It has therefore pleafed our wife Creator to annex to feveral objects, and to the ideas which we receive from them, as alfo to feveral of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in feveral objects to feveral degrees, that thofe faculties which he had endued us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.

$4.

PAIN has the fame efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to purfue this; only this is worth our confideration, that pain is often produced by the fame objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us. This their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the fenfations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occafion of admiring the wifdom and goodness of our Maker, who, defigning the prefervation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he not defigning our prefervation barely, but the prefervation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cafes, annexed pain to thofe very ideas which

delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordinary torment; and the moft pleafant of all fenfible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful fenfation; which is wifely and favourably fo ordered by nature, that when any object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the inftruments of fenfation, whofe ftructures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order, and fo be unfitted for its proper functions for the future. The confideration of thofe objects that produce it may well persuade us that this is the end or use of pain; for though great light be insufferable to our eyes, yet the.. highest degree of darkness does not at all difeafe them, because that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unharmed in its natural state. But yet excefs of cold, as well as heat, pains us, because it is equally destructive to that temper which is neceffary to the prefervation of life and the exercife of the feveral functions of the body, and which confifts in a moderate degree of warmth, or, if you please, a motion of the infenfible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds.

§ 5.

BEYOND all this, we may find another reafon why God hath fcattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and fenfes have to do with, that we, finding imperfection, diffatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleafures for evermore.

§ 6.

THOUGH what I have here faid may not perhaps make the ideas of pleafure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are ca