2. 1. Names of fimple Ideas and Subftances intimate real Exiftence.

FIRST, The names of fimple ideas and fubftances, with the abstract ideas in the mind, which they immediately fignify, intimate alfo fome real exiftence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther; as we fhall fee more at large in the following chapter.

$3. 2. Names of fimple Ideas, and Modes fignify always both real and nominal Effence.

SECONDLY, The names of fimple ideas and modes, fignify always the real as well as nominal effence of their fpecies. But the names of natural fubftances fignify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal effences of thofe fpecies, we fhall fhow in the chapter that treats of the names of fubftances in particular.

§4. 3. Names of fimple Ideas undefinable. THIRDLY, The names of fimple ideas are not capable of any definitions; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet obferved by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occafion of great wrangling and obfcurity in mens difcourfes; whilft fome demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined, and others think they ought to reft fatisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art, by a genus and difference); when even after fuch definition made according to rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that the fhowing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein confifts a good definition, is not wholly befides our prefent purpose; and perhaps will afford fo much light to the nature of thefe figns, and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular confideration.

$5. If all were definable, it would be a procefs in infinitum. I WILL not here trouble myself, to prove that all terms

are not definable from that progrefs, in infinitum, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined; for if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last fhould we stop? But I fhall, from the nature of our ideas, and the fignification of our words, fhow, why fome names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

§ 6. What a Definition is.

I THINK it is agreed, that a definition is nothing else, but the fhowing the meaning of one word by feveral other not Synonymous terms; the meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to ftand for by him that uses them. The meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is defined, when by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to in the mind of the fpeaker, is as it were reprefented or fet before the view of another, and thus its fignification ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions, and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good definition.

7. Simple Ideas why undefinable.

THIS being premised, I say, that the names of fimple Ideas, and thofe only, are incapable of being defined; the reafon whereof is this, that the feveral terms of a definition, fignifying feveral ideas, they can altogether by no means reprefent an idea which has no compofition at all; and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the fhowing the meaning of one word by feveral others not fignifying each the fame thing, can in the names of fimple idea have no place.

§ 8. Inftances-Motion.

THE not obferving this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is fo eafy to be observed in the definitions they give us of fome few of thefe fimple ideas; for as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impoffibility they found in it. What more exquifite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition, the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power? which

would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous abfurdity, to guess what word it could ever be fuppofed to be the explication of. If Tully afking a Dutchman what beweeginge was, fhould have received this explication in his own language, that it was actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia; I ask, whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word beweeginge fignified, or have gueffed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would fignify to another, when he used that found?

$ 9.

NOR have the modern philofophers, who have endea voured to throw off the jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better fucceeded in defining fimple ideas, whether by explaining their caufes, or any otherwife. The atomifts, who define motion to be a paffage from one place to another, what do they more than put one fynonymous word for another? For what is paffage, other than motion? And if they were asked what paffage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is it not at least as proper and fignificant to fay, paffage is a motion from one place to another, as to fay, motion is a paffage, &c.? This is to tranflate and not to define, when we change two words of the fame fignification one for another; which when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for, but is very far from a definition ; unless we will fay every English word in the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it anfwers, and the motion is a definition of motus. Nor will the fucceffive application of the parts of the fuperficies of one body to those of another, which the Cartefians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

$10. Light.

THE act of perfpicuous, as far forth as perfpicuous, is another peripatetic definition of a fimple idea; which, though not more abfurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its ufeleffness and infignificancy more plainly, because experience will eafily convince any one, that it cannot

153: make the meaning of the word light (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind man. But the definition of motion appears not at firft fight so useless, because it escapes this way of trial; for this fimple idea, entering by the touch as well as fight, it is impoffible to fhow an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Those who tell us, that light is a great number of little globules, ftriking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than the fchools; but yet thefe words ever fo well understood would make the idea the word light stands for, no more known to a man that understands it not before, than if one fhould tell: him, that light was nothing but a company of little tennis balls, which fairies all day long ftruck with racketsagainst fome mens foreheads, whilft they paffed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the cause of light, if we had it ever fo exact, would no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is fuch a particular perception in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a fharp piece of fteel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us: for the caufe of any fenfation, and the fenfation itself, in all the fimple ideas of one fenfe, are two ideas;: and two ideas fo different and distant one from another,. that no two can be more fo. And therefore should Des Cartes's globules ftrike ever fo long on the retina of a. man who was blind by a gutta ferena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or any thing approaching it, though he understood what little globules were, and what ftriking on another body was, ever so well; and therefore the Cartefians very well diftinguish between: that light which is the cause of that fenfation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explained. SIMPLE ideas, as has been fhown, are only to be got by: thofe impreffions objects themselves make on our minds,, by the proper inlets appointed to each fort. If they are. not received this way, all the words in the world, made

ufe of to explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it ftands for; for words being founds, can produce in us no other fimple ideas than of thofe very founds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection which is known to be between them and those fimple ideas which common ufe has made them figns of. He that thinks otherwife, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true idea of the relifh of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any taftes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by fenfible objects, not strangers to his palate, fo far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by definition, but exciting in us other fimple ideas, by their known names, which will be ftill very different from the true tafte of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other fimple ideas, it is the fame thing; for the fignification of founds is not natural, but only impofed and arbitrary. And no definition of light or redness is more fitted, or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the found light or red by itfelf; for to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a found, however formed, is to expect that founds fhould be vifible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other fenfes; which is all one as to say, that we might tafte, fmell and fee by the ears; a fort of philofophy worthy only of Sancho Pancha, who had the faculty to fee Dulcinea by hearfay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the fimple idea which any word ftands for, can never come to know the fignification of that word by any other words or founds whatfoever put together, according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to his fenfes the proper object, and fo producing that idea in him for which he has learned the name already. A ftudious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand thofe names of light and colours which often came in