23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits. HENCE we may take notice how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our fenfes; for how fpirits, feparate from bodies (whofe knowledge and ideas of thefe things are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all; the whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception; though yet it be not to be doubted that fpirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh, may have as clear ideas of the radical conftitution of fubftances as we have of a triangle, and fo perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence; but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions. 24. Ideas alfo of Substances must be conformable to things. BUT though definitions will ferve to explain the names of fubftances as they ftand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they ftand for things; for our names of fubftances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made ufe of ultimately to reprefent things, and fo are put in their place, their fignification mult agree with the truth of things as well as with mens ideas. And therefore in substances we are not always to reft in the ordinary complex idea commonly received as the fignification of that word, but must go a little farther, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect as much as we can our ideas of their diftinct species; or elfe learn them from fuch as are used to that fort of things, and are experienced in them; for fince it is intended their names fhould ftand for fuch collections of fimple ideas as do really exift in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea in other mens minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they ftand for, therefore to define their names right, natural history is to be inquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in difcourfes and arguings about 261 natural bodies and fubftantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common but confufed or very imperfect idea to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our ute of them; but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that fort of things, rectify and fettle our complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in difcourfe with others (if we find them miftake us), we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make fuch a name ftand for. This is the more néceffary to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philofophical verity, in that children being taught words whilft they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and feldom frame determined ideas to be fignified by them; which cuftom (it being eafy, and ferving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and converfation) they are apt to continue when they are men, and fo begin at the wrong end, learning words firft and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply thofe words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pafs, that men fpeaking the proper language of their country, i. e. according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themfelves; and by their arguing one with another, make but fmall progrefs in the difcoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called. $25. Not eafy to be made fo. IT were therefore to be wifhed, that men verfed in phyfical inquiries, and acquainted with the feveral forts of natural bodies, would fet down thofe fimple ideas, wherein they obferve the individuals of each fort conftantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confufion which comes from feveral perfons applying the fame name to collection of a smaller or greater number of fenfible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or lefs acquainted with, or accurate in examining the qualities of any fort of things which come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this fort, containing, as it were, a natural history, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, coft, pains, and fagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with fuch definitions of the names of substances, as explain the fenfe men use them in; and it would be well, where there is occafion, if they would afford us fo much. This yet is not usually done; but men talk to one another, and difpute in words, whofe meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake that the fignification of common words are certainly established, and the precife ideas they stand for perfectly known, and that it is a fhame to be ignorant of them; both which fuppofitions are falfe, no names of complex ideas having fo fettled determined fignifications, that they are conftantly used for the fame precife ideas. Nor is it a fhame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the neceffary ways of attaining it; and so it is no difcredit not to know what precife idea any found ftands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by fome other way than barely using that found, there being no other way, without fuch a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the neceflity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the fignification of common words within fome tolerable latitude, that may ferve for ordinary conversation; and fo a man cannot be fuppofed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common ufe, in a language familiar to him. But common ufe, being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itself at laft to the ideas of particular men, proves often but a very variable ftandard. But though fuch a dictionary as I have above mentioned, will require too much time, cost, and pains, to be hoped for ins this age, yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propofe, that words ftanding for things, which are known and diftinguished by their outward fhapes, fhould be expreffed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fafhion would perhaps with more eafe, and in lefs time, teach the true fignification of many terms, efpecially in languages of remote countries or ages, and fettle truer ideas in mens minds of feveral things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalifts, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way; and he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer idea of apium, or ibex, from a little print of that herb or beaft, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And fo no doubt he would have of ftrigil and fiftrum, if instead of a curry-comb and cymbal, which are the English names dictionaries render them by, he could fee ftamped in the margin fmall pictures of thefe inftruments, as they were in ufe amongst the ancients. Toga, tunica, pallium, are words eafily tranflated by gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of thofe habits amongft the Romans, then we have · of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as thefe, which the eye diftinguishes by their fhapes, would be beft let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the fignification of fuch words, than any other words fet for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the by. 26. By Conftancy in their Signification. FIFTHLY, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all difcourfes, wherein one man pretends to inftruct or convince another, he fhould use the fame word conftantly in the fame fenfe. If this were done (which nobody can refufe without great difingenuity), many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controverfies in difpute would be at an end; feveral of thofe great volumes, fwoln with ambiguous words, now used in one fenfe, and by and by in another, would fhrink into a very narrow compafs; and many of the philofophers (to mention no other), as well as poets works, might be contained in a nut-shell. 27. When the Variation is to be explained. BUT after all, the provifion of words is fo fcanty in refpect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to fuit their precife notions, will, notwithftanding their utmoft caution, be forced often to use the fame word in fomewhat different fenfes. And though, in the continuation of a difcourfe, or the pursuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digrefs into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the fignification of any term, yet the import of the difcourfe will, for the most part, if there be no defigned fallacy, fufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not fufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and fhow in what fenfe he there uses that term. END OF VOLUME SECOND. Printed by MUNDELL & SON 2 UNIVERSIDAD CENTR (BIBLIOTECA A FACULTAD DE JURISPRUDENS |