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complex idea he annexes to that name, is the more diftinct, the more particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up; for the more it has of these, the more has it ftill of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and diftinct from all ideas belonging to other names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confufion with them is avoided.

$11. Confufion concerns always two Ideas. CONFUSION, making it a difficulty to feparate two things that fhould be feparated, concerns always two ideas; and those most, which most approach one another: Whenever therefore, we fufpect any idea to be confufed, we muft examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be feparated from; and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name, and fo fhould be a different thing; from which yet it is not fufliciently diftinct, being either the fame with it, or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and fo keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different names import.

12. Caufes of Confufion.

THIS, I think, is the confufion proper to ideas, which fill carries with it a fecret reference to names: At least if there be any other confufion of ideas, this is that which most of all diforders mens thoughts and difcourfes, ideas as ranked under names, being thofe that for the most part men reafon of within themselves, and always those which they commune about with others; and therefore where there are fuppofed two dif ferent ideas marked by two different names, which are not as diftinguishable as the founds that ftand for them, there never fails to be confufion: And where any ideas are diftinct, as the ideas of thofe two founds they are marked by, there can be between them no confufion. The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex idea, as precifely as is poffible, all thofe ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them fo united in a determinate number and order, ap

ply fleadily the fame name; but this neither accommodating mens eafe or vanity, or ferving any defign but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, fuch exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for. And fince the loofe application of names to undetermined, variable, and almoft no ideas, ferve both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and fuperiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that most men fhould ufe it themselves, whilft they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no fmall part of the confufion to be found in the notions of men, might by care and inge. nuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some ideas are fo complex, and made up of fo many parts, that the memory does not eafily retain the very fame precife combination of fimple ideas under one name; much lefs are we able conftantly to divine for what precife complex idea fuch a name ftands in another man's ufe of it. From the first of thefe follows confufion in a man's own reafonings and opinions within himfelf; from the latter, frequent confufion in difcourfing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuses in the following book, I fhall here fay no more of it.

§ 13. Complex Ideas may be diftinct in one part, and confufed in another.

OUR complex ideas being made up of collections, and fo variety of fimple ones, may accordingly be very clear and diftinct in one part, and very obfcure and confused in another. In a man who fpeaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thousand fides, the idea of the figure may be very confufed, though that of the number be very diftinct; so that he being able to discourse and demonftrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number of a thoufand, he is apt to think he has a diftinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain he has no precife idea of its figure, fo as to diftinguish it by that, from one that has but 999 fides; the

not obferving whereof, caufes no fmall error in mens thoughts, and confufion in their discourses.

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§ 14. This, if not heeded, caufes Confufion in our Arguings. HE that thinks he has a diftinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron, let him for trial-fake take another parcel of the fame uniform matter viz. gold or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of 999 fides; he will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish thefe two ideas one from another, by the number of fides, and reafon and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his thoughts and reafoning to that part only of thefe ideas, which is contained in their numbers, as, that the fides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them diftinct from the other, by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold, as he could, if the fame parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five fides; in which incomplete ideas, we are very apt to impofe on ourselves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar names: For being fatisfied in that part of the idea which we have clear, and the name which is familiar to us being applied to the whole, containing that part alfo which is imperfect and obfcure, we are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obfcure part of its fignification, as confidently as we do from the other.

$15. Inftance in Eternity.

HAVING frequently in our mouths the name eternity, we are apt to think we have a pofitive comprehenfive idea of it, which is as much as to fay, that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea: It is true, that he that thinks fo may have a clear idea of duration; he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one with still a greater; but it not being poffible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the

whole extent together of a duration where he fuppofes no end, that part of his idea, which is ftill beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts, is very obfcure and undetermined. And hence it is that in difputes and reafonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifeft abfurdities.

§ 16. Divifibility of Matter.

IN matter we have no clear ideas of the fmallness of parts much beyond the fmalleft that occur to any of our fenfes; and therefore when we talk of the divifibility of matter in infinitum, though we have clear ideas of divifion and divifibility, and have alfo clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by divifion; yet we have but very obfcure and confufed ideas of corpufcles, or minute bodies fo to be divided, when by former divifions they are reduced to a fmallness much exceeding the perception of any of our fenses; and fo all that we have clear and distinct ideas of, is of what divifion in general or abstractly is, and the relation of totum and pars: But of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progreffions, I think, we have no clear nor distinct idea at all: For I ask any one, whether taking the smallest atom of duft he ever saw, he has any diftinct idea (bating still the number which concerns not extension) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1,000,000 part of it; or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without lofing fight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of fmallness is not unreasonable to be fuppofed, fince a divifion carried on so far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite divifion, than the first divifion into two halves does. I must confefs, for my part, I have no clear diftinct ideas of the diffe rent bulk or extenfion of these bodies, having but a very obfcure one of either of them; fo that I think, when we talk of divifion of bodies in infinitum, our idea of their diftinct bulks, which is the fubject and foundation of divifion, comes, after a little progreffion, to be confounded, and almost loft in obfcurity: For that idea, which is to represent only bigness, must be very obfcure

and confused, which we cannot diftinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number; fo that we have clear distinct ideas, we may fay, of ten and one, but no diftinct ideas of two fuch extenfions. It is plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite divifibility of body, or extenfion, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers; but the clear diftinct ideas of extenfion, after fome progrefs of divifion, is quite loft, and of fuch minute parts we have no diftinct ideas at all; but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added, but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able still to add new numbers to any affigned number we have; endless divifibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endless addibility (if I may fo fpeak) gives us a clear and diftinct idea of an actually infinite number; they both being only in a power still increafing the number, be it already as great as it will: So that of what remains to be added (wherein confists the infinity) we have but an obfcure, imperfect, and confufed idea, from or about which we can argue or reafon with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of which we have no fuch diftinct idea as we have of 4 or 100, but only this relative obfcure one, that, compared to any other, it is ftill bigger: And we have no more a clear positive idea of it when we fay or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we fhould fay it is bigger than 40 or 4; 400,000,coo, having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4: For he that adds only 4 to 4, and fo proceeds, fhall as foon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And fo likewife in eternity, he that has an idea of but four years, has as much a pofitive complete idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years; for what remains of eternity beyond either of

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