3. This, though not fo certain as Demonftration, yet may
be called Knowledge, and proves the Exiftence of
Things without us.
4. Firft, Because we cannot have them but by the Inlet of
the Senfes.
5. Secondly, Because an Idea from actual Senfation, and
another from Memory, are very diftin&t Perceptions.
6. Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual
Senfation, accompanies not the returning of those
Ideas without the external Objects.
7. Fourthly, Our Senfes affift one another's Teftimony of
the Existence of outward Things..
8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.
9. But reaches no farther than actual Senfation.
10. Folly to expect Demonftration in every Thing.
11. Paft Exiftence is known by Memory.
12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable.
13. Particular Propofitions concerning Exiftence are know-
able.
14. And general Propofitions concerning abftra&t Ideas.