tainty; and he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his affent to this propofition, that two are equal to trvo, will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that what is is. He that needs a probation to convince him, that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c. or any other two determined diftin&t ideas are not one and the fame, will need also a demonstration to convince him that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be,

and not to be.

§ 20. Their Ufe dangerous where our Ideas are con

fused.

AND as these maxims are of little ufe, where we have determined ideas, fo they are, as I have showed, of dangerous ufe, where our ideas are not determined, and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas, but fuch as are of a loose and wandering fignification, fometimes standing for one, and fometimes for another idea; from which follows miftake and error, which thefe maxims (brought as proofs to establish propofitions, wherein the terms tand for undetermined ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

1. Some Propofitions bring no Increase to our know

WH

ledge.

HETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter, be of that use to real knowledge, as is generally fuppofed, I leave to be confidered. This I think may confidently be affirmed, that there are univerfal propofitions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are,

§2. As firft, Identical Propofitions. FIRST, All purely identical propofitions. Thefe obvi ously, and at first blush, appear to contain no instruc

tion in them; for when we affirm the faid term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it fhows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether fuch a propofition be either made by or proposed to us. Indeed that most general one, what is is, may ferve fometimes to fhow a man the abfurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the fame thing of itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common fense, as to affirm vifible and direct contradictions in plain words; or if he does, a man is excufed if he breaks off any farther difcourfe with him. But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical propofition, teaches us any thing; and though in fuch kind of propofitions, this great and magnified maxim, boafted to be the foundation of demonftration, may be, and often is made ufe of to confirm them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, that the fame word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the truth of any fuch propofition, and let me add alfo, without any real knowledge.

$3.

FOR at this rate, any very ignorant perfon who can but make a propofition, and knows what he means when he fays, ay or no, may make a million of propofitions, of whofe truths he may be infalliby certain, and yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v. g. what is a foul is a foul; or a foul is a foul; a Spirit is a fpirita feitiche is a feitiche, &c. Thefe all being equivalent to this propofition, viz. what is is, i. e. what hath exiflence hath exiflence; or, who hath a foul bath a foul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey fhifting his oyfler from one hand to the other; and had he had but words, might, no doubt, have faid, oyfler in right hand is fubject, and ovfter in left hand is predicate; and fo might have made a self-evideat propofition of oyster, i, e. oyle y cyfoe; and yer, with all this,

not have been one whit the wifer or more knowing : and that way of handling the matter would much at once have fatisfied the monkey's hunger, or a man's understanding; and they two would have improved in knowledge and bulk together.

I know there are fome, who because identical propofitions are felf-evident, fhow a great concern for them, and think they do great fervice to philofophy by crying them up, as if in them was contained all knowledge, and the understanding were led into all truth by them only. I grant, as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and felf-evident. I grant, farther, that the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the fame idea to be the fame, and of difcerning it from those that are different, as I have shown in the foregoing chapter. But how that vindicates the making use of identical propofitions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of trifling, I do not fee. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the will is the will, or lay what strefs on it he thinks fit, of what use is this, and an infinite the like propofitions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound as much as the plenty of words which he has will permit him in fuch propofitions as thefe; a law is a law, and obligation is obligation; right is right, and wrong is wrong will these and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with ethics? or inftruct him or others in the knowledge of morality? Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is right and what is wrong, nor the measures of them, can with as much affurance make, and infallibly know the truth of thefe and all fuch propofitions, as he that is best inftructed in morality can do. But what advance do fuch propofitions give in the knowledge of any thing neceffary, or useful for their conduct?

He would be thought to do little less than trifle, who, for the enlightening the understanding in any part of knowledge, fhould be bufy with identical propofitions, and infift on fuch maxims as these : fub

ftance is fubftance, and body is body; a vacuum is a vacuum, and a vortex is a vortex; a centaur is a centaur, and a chimera is a chimera, &c.; for thefe and all fuch are equally true, equally certain, and equally felf-evident; but yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made ufe of as principles of instruction, and stress laid on them, as helps to knowledge; fince they teach nothing but what every one, who is capable of difcourfe, knows without being told, viz. that the fame term is the fame term, and the fame idea the fame idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do Itill think, the offering and incul cating fuch propofitions, in order to give the underftanding any new light or inlet into the knowledge of things, no better than trifling.

Inftruction lies in fomething very different; and he that would enlarge his own, or another's mind, to truths he does not yet know, muft find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in fuch order one by another, that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of thofe in queftion. Propofitions that do this are inftructive; but they are far from fuch as affirm the fame term of itself; which is no way to advance one's self or others in any fort of knowledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have fuch propofitions as thefe inculcated to him, an A is an A, and a B is a B; which a man may know as well as any schoolmaster, and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives. Nor do thefe, or any fuch identical propofitions, help him one jot forward in the fkill of reading, let him make what use of them he can.

If thofe who blame my calling them trifling prop fitions, had but read, and been at the pains to underftand what I had above writ in very plain English, they could not but have feen that by identical propofitions, I mean only fuch wherein the fame term importing the fame idea, is affirmed of itself; which I take to be the proper fignification of identical propofitions; and concerning all such, I think I may continue fafely

to fay, that to propose them as inftructive, is no better than trifling; for no one who has the ufe of reafon can miss them, where it is neceffary they should be taken notice of, nor doubt of their truth, when he does take notice of them.

But if men will call propofitions identical, wherein the fame term is not affirmed of itself, whether they speak more properly than I, others muft judge. This is certain, all that they fay of propofitions that are not identical in my fenfe, concerns not me, nor what I have faid; all that I have said relating to those propofitions wherein the fame term is affirmed of itself; and I would fain fee an inftance, wherein any fuch can be made ufe of, to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge. Initances of other kinds, whatever ufe may be made of them, concern not me, as not being fuch as I call identical.

§ 4. Secondly, When a Part of any Complex Idea is predicated of the whole.

SECONDLY, Another fort of trifling propofitions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole, a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propofitions wherein the genus is predicated of the fpecies, or more compre henfive or less comprehenfive terms; for what information, what knowledge carries this propofition in it, viz. lead is a metal, to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead ftands for? all the fimple ideas that go to the complex one fignified by the term metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended, and fignified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man that knows the fignification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a fhorter way to explain the fignification of the word lead, by faying it is a metal, which at once expreffes feveral of its fimple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fufible and malleable.

$5. As Part of the Definition of the Terms defined. ALIKE trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one o£