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the fimple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea; as all gold is fufible; for fuhbility being one of the fimple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the found gold ftands for, what can it be but playing with founds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received fignification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I fee not how it is any jot more material to fay, it is fufible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the found gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What inftruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is fuppofed to know before? For I am fuppofed to know the fignification of the word another ufes to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold ftands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fufible, malleable, it will not much inftruct me to put it folemnly afterwards in a propofition, and gravely fay, all gold is fufible. Such propofitions can only ferve to fhow the difingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the fignification of words, however certain they be.

§ 6. Infance-Man and Palfry,

EVERY man is an animal, or living body, is as certain a propofition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to fay, a palfry is an ambling horfe, or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the fignification of words, and make me know but this, that body, fenfe, and motion, or power of fenfation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and fignify by the word man, and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing; and fo of the other, that body, fenfe, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are fome of thofe ideas which I always comprehend, and fignify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found to

103 gether, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is just the fame, and to the fame purpose, when any term ftanding for any one or more of the fimple ideas that altogether make up that complex idea which is called a man, is affirmed of the term man; v. g. suppose a Roman fignified by the word homo, all these diftinct ideas, united in one fubject, corporietas, fenfibilitas, potentia, fe movendi, rationalitas, rifibilitas; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, univerfally affirm one, more, or all of these together, of the word homo, but did no more than fay that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its fignification all thefe ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by the word palfry fignified thefe ideas; body of a certain figure, four-legged, with fenfe, motion, ambling, neighing, white, ufed to have a woman on his back, might with the fame certainty univerfally affirm alfo any or all of these of the word palfry; but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his or romance language, ftood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of these was wanting. But he that fhall tell me, that in whatever thing fenfe, motion, reafon, laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of GOD, or would be caft into a fleep by opium, made indeed an inftructive propofition, because neither having the notion of GOD, nor being caft into fleep by opium, being contained in the ideas fignified by the word man, we are by fuch propofitions taught fomething more than barely what the word man ftands for, and therefore the knowledgecontained in it is more than verbal.

§ 7. For this teaches but the Signification of Words. BEFORE a man makes any propofition, he is fuppofed to understand the terms he ufes in it, or elfe he talks like a parrot, only making a noife by imitation, and framing certain founds which he has learnt of others, but not as a rational creature, ufing them for figns of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer alfo is fuppofed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintel

ligible noife; and therefore he trifles with words, who makes fuch a propofition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was fuppofed to know before; v. g. a triangle hath three fides, or faffron is yellow. And this is no farther intolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is fuppofed, or declares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the fignification of that word, and the use of that fign.

$8. But no real Knowledge.

WE can know then the truth of two forts of propofitions with perfect certainty; the one is, of thofe trifling propofitions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, not inftructive. And, fecondly, we can know the truth, and fo may be certain in propofitions which affirm fomething of another, which is a neceffary confequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it; as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the oppofite internal angles; which relation of the outward angle to either of the oppofite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea fignified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it inftructive real knowledge.

$9. General Propofitions concerning Subftances are often trifling.

We have little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of fimple ideas exifting together in subftances, but by our fenfes; we cannot make any univerfal certain propofitions concerning them, any `farther than our nominal effences lead us, which being to a very few and inconfiderable truths, in refpect of thofe which depend on the real conftitutions, the general propofitions that are made about fubftances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling, and if they are inftructive are uncertain, and fuch as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much foever conftant obfervation and analogy may affift our judgments in gueffing. Hence it comes to pass, that

one may often meet with very clear and coherent difcourses, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that names of fubftantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative fignifications affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in propofitions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be fo joined; and propofitions confifting of fuch terms, may, with the fame clearness, be deduced one from another, as thofe that convey the moft real truths; and all this, without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things exifting without us. By this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propofitions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things; v. g. he that having learnt thefe following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. fubftance, man, animal, form, foul, vegetative, fenfitive, rational, may make several undoubted propofitions about the foul, without knowing at all what the foul really is; and of this fort, a man may find an infinite number of propofitions, reasonings, and conclufions, in books of metaphyfics, fchool-divinity, and fome forts of natural philofophy, and, after all, know as little of GOD, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he fet out.

$ 10.

And why.

He that hath liberty to define, i. e. determine the fig-nification of his names of fubftances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them ftand for his own. ideas), and makes their fignifications at a venture,. taking them from his own or other mens fancies, and. not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves, may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to thofe feveral refpects and mutual relations he has given them. one to another; wherein,, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing. but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon them; but thereby no more increases his own: knowledge, than he does his riches, who taking a bag.

of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a filling, and a third in a third place a penny; and fo proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and caft up a great fum, according to his counters fo placed, and ftanding for more or lefs as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, fhilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve; which a man may alfo do in the fignification of words, by making them, in refpect of one another, more or lefs, or equally comprehenfive.

§ 11. Thirdly, Using Words variously is trifling with

them.

THOUGH yet concerning moft words used in difcourfes, efpecially argumentative and controverfial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst fort of trifling, and which fets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that most writers are fo far from inftructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by using them conftantly and steadily in the fame fignifications, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their difcourfes coherent and clear (how little foever it were inftructive), which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to fhelter their ignorance or obftinacy under the obfcurity and perplexedness of their terms; to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute.

§ 12. Marks of verbal Propofitions.

To conclude; barely verbal propofitions may be known by these following marks:

1. Predication in abstract.

FIRST, All propofitions, wherein two abftract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the fignification of founds. For fince no abftract idea can be the fame with any other but itself, when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can fignify no

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