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more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name, or that these two names fignify the fame idea. Thus fhould any one fay that parfimony is frugality, that gratitude is juftice, that this or that action is or is not temperance, however fpecious these and the like propofitions may at first fight feem, yet when we come to prefs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we thall find that it all amounts to nothing but the fignification of those terms.

§ 13. 2. A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.

SECONDLY, All propofitions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term ftands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal, v. g. to say that gold is a metal or heavy. And thus all propofitions, wherein more comprehenfive words, called genera, are affirmed of fubordinate or lefs comprehenfive, called Species, or individuals, are barely verbal.

When, by these two rules, we have examined the propofitions that make up the difcourfes we ordinarily meet with both in and out of books, we fhall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them than is ufually fufpected, are purely about the fignification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of thefe figns.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible rule, that wherever the diftinct idea any word ftands for is not known and confidered, and fomething not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts stick wholly in founds, and are able to attain no real truth or falfehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might fave us a great deal of ufelels amufement and difpute, and very much shorten our trouble and wandering, in the fearch of real and true knowledge.

E6

CHAP. IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

§1. General certain Propofitions concern not Exift

H

ence.

ITHERTO we have only confidered the effences of things, which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular exiftence (that being the proper operations of the mind, in abstraction, to confider an idea under no other exiftence but what it has in the understanding), gives us no knowledge of real exiftence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propofitions, of whofe truth or falfehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence; and farther, that all particular affirmations or negations, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or feparation of ideas in things exifting, which in their abftract natures, have no known neceffary union or repugnancy.

§2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence.

BUT leaving the nature of propofitions, and different ways of predication, to be confidered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the exifience of things, and how we come by it. I fay then, that we have the knowledge of our own exiflence by intuition; of the exiftence of God by demonftration; and of other things by fenfation.

§ 3. Our Knowledge of our own Exiflence is intui

tive.

As for our oavn exiftence, we perceive it fo plainly, and fo certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof; for nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, 1 reafon, I feel pleafure and pain; can any of these be more evident to

me than my own exiftence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not fuffer me to doubt of that; for if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own exiftence as of the existence of the pain I feel; or, if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reafoning or thinking, we are confcious to ourselves of our own being, and, in this matter, come not fhort of the highest degree of certainty..

CHAP. X.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD..

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is

TH

a God.

HOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself, though he has ftamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with thofe faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himfelf without witnefs, fince we have fenfe, perception and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourfelves about us; nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, fince he has fo plentifully provided us with the means to difcover, and know him, fo far as is neceffary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reafon difcovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty, yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from fome part of our intuitive knowledge, or elfe we fhall.

be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propofitions, which are in themfelves capable of clear demonftration. To fhow, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i. e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourfelves, and that undoubt ed knowledge we have of our own existence.

§ 2. Man knows that he himself is.

I THINK it is beyond quellion, that man has a clear perception of his own being; he knows certainly that he exifts, and that he is fomething. He that can doubt whether he be any thing or no, I fpeak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince non-entity, that it were fomething. If any one pretends to be fo fceptical as to deny his own existence (for really to doubt of it is manifeftly impoffible), let him for me enjoy his beloved happincfs of being nothing, until hunger or fome other pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge affures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is fomething that actually exists.

§3. He knows alfo that nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore fomething eternal.

In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real ber ing, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the abfence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impoffible 'he fhould know any demonftration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is fome real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonftration, that from eternity there has been fomething, fince what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by fomething else.

§4. That eternal Being must be most powerful. NEXT, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is

in and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has muft be owing to and received from the fame fource. This eternal fource, then, of all being, must also be the fource and original of all power; and fo this eternal Being must be also the most powerful.

§ 5. And most knowing.

AGAIN, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now that there is not only fome being, but fome knowing intelligent being in the world.

There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or elfe there has been alfo a knowing being from eternity. If it be faid there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all understanding, I reply, that then it was impoffible there fhould ever have been any knowledge; it being as impoffible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, fhould produce a knowing being, as it is impoffible that a triangle fhould make itself three angles bigger than two right ones; for it is as repugnant to the idea of fenfelefs matter, that it should put into itself fenfe, perception and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

§ 6. And therefore GOD.

THUS, from the confideration of ourfelves, and what we infallibly find in our own conftitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being, which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this idea duly confidered, will eafily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to afcribe to this eternal Being. If, nevertheless, any one should be found fo fenfelefsly arrogant, as to fuppofe man alone knowing and wife, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the uni

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