117 terial; and then letting flide out of their minds, or the difcourfe, the demonftration whereby an eternal knowing being was proved neceffarily to exift, would argue all to be matter, and fo deny a God, that is, an eternal cogitative being whereby they are fo far from eftablishing, that they destroy their own hypothefis; for if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative being, they manifeftly separate matter and thinking, and fuppofe no neceffary connection of the one with the other, and so establish the neceffity of an eternal spirit, but not of matter, fince it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if thinking matter may be feparated, the eternal exiflence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative being, and they fuppofe it to no purpose. §14. Not material, 1. Becaufe every Particle of Matter is not cogitative. But now let us fee how they can fatisfy themselves or others that this eternal thinking being is material. First, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all matter, every particle of matter, thinks? This, I fuppofe, they will fcarce fay; fince, then, there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet if they will not allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reafons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may fo fpeak. § 15. SECONDLY, If all matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be only one atom that does fo? This has as many abfurdities as the other; for then this atom of matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the reft of matter; and fo we have 2. One Particle alone of Matter cannot be cogitative. the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at; for if they fuppofe one fingle thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot afcribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its thinking, the only fuppofed difference. But allow it to be by fome other way, which is above our conception, it must be ftill creation, and thefe men muft give up their great maxim, ex nihilo nil fit. If it be faid that all the reft of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom, it will be to fay any thing at pleafure, though never so abfurd; for to fuppofe all matter eternal, and yet one fmall particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the reft, is without any of the leaft appearance of reafon to frame any hypothefis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the fame figures and motions of any other; and I challenge any one in his thoughts to add any thing else to one above another. § 16. 3. A System of incogitative Matter cannot be cogitative. THIRDLY, If, then, neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking being, nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is fome certain fyftem of matter, duly put together, that is this thinking eternal being. This is that which I imagine is that notion which men are apteft to have of God, who would have him a material being, as most readily fuggefted to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no lefs abfurd than the other: For to fuppofe the eternal thinking being to be nothing elfe but a compofition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to afcribe all the wifdom and knowledge of that eternal being only to the juxta-pofition of parts; than which nothing can be more abfurd; for unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new rela tion of pofition, which it is impoffible fhould give thought and knowledge to them. 17. Whether in motion or at rest. BUT farther, this corporeal fyftem either has all its parts at reft, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking confifts. If it be perfectly at reft, it is but one lump, and fo can have no privileges above one atom. If it be the motion of its parts, on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited, fince all the particles that by motion caufe thought, being each of them in itself without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much lefs be regulated by the thoughts of the whole; fince that thought is not the caufe of motion (for then it must be antecedent to it, and fo without it), but the confequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wife thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that fuch a thinking being will be no better nor wifer than pure blind matter; fince to refolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the fame thing; not to mention the narrownefs of fuch thoughts and knowledge that muft depend on the motion of fuch parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more abfurdities and impoffibilities in this hypothefis (however full of them it be) than that before mentioned; fince, let this thinking fyftem be all, or a part of the matter of the univerfe, it is impoffible that any one particle fhould either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particular, and fo regulate its own thoughts or motions, or indeed have any thought refulting from fuch motion. § 18. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind. OTHERS would have matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial being. This, though it take not away the being of a God, yet fince it denies one and the first great piece. of his workmanship, the creation, let us confider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal; Why? Be cause you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not alfo think yourself eternal? You will answer, perhaps, because about twenty or forty years fince you began to be. But if I ask you what that you is, which began then to be, you can fcarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together in fuch a fashion and frame as makes up your body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing you are (for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking being, but would have unthinking matter eternal too); therefore when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity; the abfurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is fo void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing (as all things that are not eternal muft be), why alfo can you not allow it poffible for a material being to be made out of nothing, by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well confidered, creation of a spirit will be found to require no lefs power than the creation of matter. Nay, poffibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach, to a clofer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at fome dim and feeming conception how matter might at first be made, and begin to exift, by the power of that eternal firft Being; but to give beginning and being to a fpirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philofophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate fo far from them, or to inquire fo far as grammar itself would authorise, if the common fettled opinion oppofes it; especially in this place, where the received doctrine ferves well enough to our prefent purpose, and leaves this paft doubt, that the creation or beginning of any one fubftance out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other, but the Creator himself, may, with the fame ease, be supposed. $ 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind. BUT you will fay, is it not impoffible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, fince we cannot poffibly conceive it? I anfwer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite Being, because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, becaufe we cannot poffibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive how any thing but impulfe of body can move body; and yet that is not a reafon fufficient to make us deny it poffible, against the conftant experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: My right-hand writes, whilft my left-hand is till: What caufes reft in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right-hand refts, and the left-hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make ft intelligible, and then the next tep will be to understand creation; for the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits (which fome make ufe of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot; to alter the determination of motion, being in this cafe no eafier nor lefs, than to give motion itfelf; fince the new determination given to the animal fpirits, must be either immediately by thought, or by fome other body put in their way by thought, which was not in their way |