before, and fo must owe its motion to thought; either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, it is an over-valuing ourselves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and to conclude all things impoffible to be done, whofe manner of doing exceeds our comprehenfion. This is to make our comprehenfion infinite, or God finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not underftand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it ftrange, that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.

CHAP. XI.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.

T

§ 1. It is to be bad only by Senfation.

HE knowledge of our own being, we have by intuition: The exiftence of a God, reafon clearly makes known to us, as has been shown.

The knowledge of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by Jenfation: for there being no ne ceffary connection of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory, nor of any other exilence but that of God, with the existence of any particular man, no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him: For the having the idea of any thing in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the vifions of a dream make thereby a true history.

§ 2. Inftance-Whiteness of this Paper. IT is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence of other

things, and makes us know that fomething doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor confider how it does it; for it takes not from the certainty of our fenfes, and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced; v. g. whilft I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which, whatever object caufes, I call white; by which I know that that quality or accident (i. e. whose appearance before my eyes always caufes that idea) doth really exift, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest affurance I can poffibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the teftimony of my eyes, which are the proper and fole judges of this thing, whofe teftimony I have reason to rely on as fo certain, that I can no more doubt, whilft I write this, that I fee white and black, and that fomething really exifts, that causes that fenfation in me, than that I write or move my hand: which is certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the exiftence of any thing, but a man's felf alone, and of God. §3. This, though not fo certain as Demonftration, yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the exiftence of things without us.

THE notice we have by our fenfes, of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether fo certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reafon, employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds, yet it is an affurance that deferves the name of knowledge. If we perfuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right, concerning the existence of thofe objects that affect them, it cannot pafs for an ill-grounded confidence; for I think nobody can, in earnest, be fo fceptical, as to be uncertain of the existence of thofe things which he fees and feels; at leaft, he that can doubt fo far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts), will never have any controverfy with me, fince he can never be fure I fay any thing contrary to his opinion. As to my felf,

I think God has given me affurance enough of the existence of things without me, fince by their different application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my préfent ftate. This is certain, the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest affurance we are capable of, concerning the existence of material beings; for we cannot act any thing, but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is. But befides the affurance we have from our fenfes themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this affurance by other concurrent reasons.

$4. 1. Because we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senfes.

FIRST, It is plain thofe perceptions are produced in us by exterior caufes affecting our fenfes; because thofe that want the organs of any fenfe, never can have the ideas belonging to that fenfe produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted; and therefore we cannot but be affured, that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them; for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nofe fmell rofes in the winter: but we fee nobody gets the relish of a pine-apple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.

$5. 2. Because an Idea from actual Senfation, and another from Memory, are very diftinét Percep

tions.

SECONDLY, Because fometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having thofe ideas produced in my mind. For though, when my eyes are thut, or windows faft, I can at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the fun, which former fenfations had lodged in my memory; fo I can at pleasure lay by that idea, and take into my view that of the fmell of a rofe, or tafte

of fugar. But if I turn my eyes at noon towards the fun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light, or fun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifeft difference between the ideas laid up in my memory (over which, if they were there only, I fhould have conftantly the fame power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure), and thofe which force themfelves upon me, and I cannot avoid having; and therefore it must needs be fome exterior caufe, and the brisk acting of fome objects without me, whofe efficacy I cannot refift, that produces thofe ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Befides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the fun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his perception is fo diftinct, that few of his ideas are more diftinguishable one from another; and therefore he hath certain knowledge, that they are not both memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only within him, but that actual feeing hath a caufe with

out.

$6. 3. Pleasure or Pain which accompanies actual Senfation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.

THIRDLY, Add to this, that many of thofe ideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance, which, when felt, was very troublefome, and is again, when actually repeated; which is occafioned by the diforder the external object caufes in our bodies when applied to it; and we remember the pain of hunger, thirst, or the bead-ache, without any pain at all, which would either never disturb us, or elfe conftantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas float. ing in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The fame may be faid of pleasure, accompanying feveral actual fenfations: and though

mathematical demonftration depends not upon fenfe, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our fight, and feems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself; for it would be very strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure, which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram, fhould be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the existence of thofe lines and angles, which, by looking on, he makes ufe of to measure that by.

§ 7. 4. Our Senfes affift one another's Teftimony of the Existence of outward Things. FOURTHLY, Our fenfes in many cafes bear witness to the truth of each other's report, concerning the exiftence of fenfible things without us. He that fees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare fancy, feel it too, and be convinced, by putting his hand in it; which certainly could never be put into fuch exquifite pain, by a bare idea or phartom, unless that the pain be a fancy too; which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raifing the idea of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I fee, whilft I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper; and by defigning the letters, tell beforehand what new idea it fhall exhibit the very next moment, barely by drawing my pen over it; which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will), if my hands ftand still, or though I move my pen, if my eyes be fhut; nor when thofe characters are once made on the paper, can I choose afterwards but fee them as they are; that is, have the ideas of fuch letters as I have made; whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the fport and play of my own imagination, when I find that the characters, that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them, nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my fenfes constantly and regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we will add, that the fight of those shall, from another man, draw fuch founds, as I beforehand