$2. 2. No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Difagreement.

SECONDLY, That we can have no knowledge farther than we can have perception of that agreement or difagreement. Which perception being, 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas: or, 2. By reafon, examining the agreement or difagree ment of two ideas, by the intervention of fome others: or, 3. By fenfation, perceiving the existence of particular things: Hence it alfo follows,

$3. 3. Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.

THIRDLY, That we cannot have an intuitive knowledge, that shall extend itself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them, because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another by juxta-pofition, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the ideas of an obtufe, and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or difagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: The difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore, there is need of fome intervening quantities to measure them by, which is demonftration, or rational knowledge.

§4. 4. Nor Demonftrative Knowledge.

FOURTHLY, It follows alfo, from what is above obferved, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas: Because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find fuch mediums, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come fhort of knowledge and demonftration.

$5. 5. Senfitive Knowledge narrower than either. FIFTHLY, Senfitive knowledge, reaching no farther

than the existence of things actually prefent to our fenfes, is yet much narrower than either of the for

mer.

§ 6. 6. Our Knowledge, therefore, narrower than our

Ideas.

FROM all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge comes not only fhort of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though thefe be very narrow bounds, in refpect of the extent of all being, and far fhort of what we may juftly imagine to be in fome even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information is to be received from fome few and not very acute ways of perception, fuch as are our fenfes; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever fhall be in this world refolved. Nevertheless, I do not queflion but that human knowledge, under the prefent circumftances of our beings. and conftitutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if men wonld fincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of difcovering truth, which they do for the colouring or fupport of falfehood, to maintain a fyftem, intereft or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might defire to know concerning thofe ideas we have; nor be able to furmount all the difficulties, and refolve all the questions that might arife concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a fquare, a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a fquare, and certainly know that it is fo. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but poffi. bly fhall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or no; it being impoffible for

us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to difcover, whether Omnipotency has not given to fome fyftems of matter fitly difpofed, a power to perceive and think, or elfe joined and fixed to matter fo difpofed, a thinking immaterial fubftance; it being, in respect of our notions not much more remote from our comprehenfion to conceive, that God can, if he pleafes, fuperadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he fhould fuperadd to it another fubftance, with a faculty of thinking; fince we know not wherein thinking confifts, nor to what fort of fubftances the Almighty has been pleafed to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I fee no contradiction in it, that the firit eternal thinking Being fhould, if he pleafed, give to certain fyftems of created fenfelefs matter, put together, as he thinks fit, fome degrees of fenfe, perception and thought: Though, as I think, I have proved, lib. 4. ch. 10. it is no lefs than a contradiction to fuppofe matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of fenfe and thought) fhould be that eternal first thinking Being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that fome perceptions, fuch as, v. g. pleafure and pain, should not be in fome bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they fhould be in an immaterial fubftance, upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to ftrike and affect body; and motion, according to the utmoft reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; fo that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or found, we are fain to quit our reafon, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleafure of our Maker. For fince we must allow he has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reafon have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a fubject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a fubje& we

cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I fay not this, that I would any way leffen the belief of the foul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the modesty of philo. fophy not to pronounce magifterially, where we want that evidence that can produce knowledge; but alfo, that it is of use to us to difcern how far our know. ledge does reach: for the ftate we are at present in, not being that of vifion, we muft, in many things, content ourselves with faith and probability; and in the prefent queftion, about the immateriality of the foul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough fecured, without philofophical proofs of the foul's immateria. lity fince it is evident, that be who made us at first begin to fubfift here, fenfible intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in fuch a ftate, can and will restore us to the like ftate of fenfibility in an other world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has defigned to men, according to their doings in this life; and therefore it is not of fuch mighty neceffity to determine one way or the other, as fome over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the foul, have been forward to make the world believe, who, either on the one fide, indulging too much their thoughts immerfed altogether in matter, can allow no existence to what is not material; or who, on the other fide, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a fubftance which has the modification of folidity. He that confiders how hardly fenfation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable to extended matter, or exiftence to any thing that hath no extenfion at all, will confefs, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his foul is. It is a point which feems to me to be put out of the reach of our

knowledge: And he who will give himself leave to confider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothefis, will fcarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the foul's materiality; fince on which fide foever he views it, either as an unextended substance, or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, ftill drive him to the contrary fide; an unfair way which fome men take with themfelves, who, becaufe of the unconceivableness of fomething they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothefis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiaffed understanding. This ferves not only to show the weakness and fcantiness of our knowledge, but the infignificant triumph of fuch fort of arguments, which, drawn from our own views, may fatisfy us that we can find no certainty on one fide of the queftion, but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the oppofite opinion, which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what fafety, what advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the feeming abfurdities, and to him unfurmountable rubs, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on fomething altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehenfion? It is paft controverfy, that we have in us fomething that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is; and it is as vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cafes to be pofitive against the being of any thing, becaufe we cannot comprehend its nature; for I would fain know what fubftance exifts, that has not fomething in, it which manifeftly baffles our understandings. Other fpirits, who fee and know the nature and inward conftitution of things, how much muft they exceed us in knowledge? To which if we add larger comprehenfion, which enables them at one glance to fee the connec