fpirations and delufions, truth and falfehood, will have the fame meafure, and will not be pollible to be diftinguilhed.

§ 15. Belief no Proof of Revelation.

IF this internal light, or any propofition which under that title we take for infpired, be conformable to the principles of reafon, or to the word of GOD, which is attested revelation, reafon warrants it, and we may fafely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our belief and actions; if it receive no teftimony nor evidence from either of thefe rules, we cannot take it for a revelation, or fo much as for true, till we have fome other mark that it is a revelation, befides our believing that it is fo. Thus' we fee the holy men of old, who had revelations from GOD, had fomething elfe befides that internal light of affurance in their own minds, to teftify to them that it was from GOD. They were not left to their own perfuafions alone, that thofe perfuations were from GOD, but had outward figns to convince them of the Author of thofe revelations; and when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their commiflion from Heaven, and by visible figns to affert the divine authority of a meflige they were fent with. Mofes faw the bufh burn without being confumed, and heard a voice out of it; this was fomething befides finding an impulfe upon his mind to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt, and yet he thought not this enough to authorite him to go with that meflage, till GOD, by another miracle of his rod turned into a ferpent, had aflured him of a power to testify his million, by the fame miracle repeated before them whom he was fent to. Gideon was fent by an angel to deliver Ifrael from the Midianites, and yet he defired a fign to convince him that this commiffion was from GOD. Thefe, and feveral the like initances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward feeing or perfuafion of their own minds, without any other proof, a fufficient evidence that it was from GOD, though the Scripture

does not every where mention their demanding or hav ing fuch proofs.

§ 16.

In what I have faid, I am far from denying that GOD can, or doth fometimes enlighten mens minds in the ap prehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary figns accompanying it; but in fuch cafes too we have reafon and the fcripture unerring rules to know whether it be from GOD or no. Where the truth embraced is confonant to the revelation in the written word of GOD, of the action conformable to dictates of right reafon or holy writ, we may be affured that we run no risk in entertaining it as fuch; because though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from GOD, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are fure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth. But it is not the ftrength of our private perfuafion within ourfelves, that can warrant it to be a light or motion - from Heaven; nothing can do that but the written word of GOD without us, or that standard of reason which is common to us with all men. Where reafon or fcripture is exprefs for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of divine authority; but it is not the ftrength of our own perfuafions which can by itself give it that ftamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we please, that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of Heaven, and of divine original.

K

CHAP. XX.

of wrong assent, or error.

$1. Caufes of Error.

NOWLEDGE being to be had only of vifible certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving affent to that which is not true.

But if affent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our affent be probability, and that probability confifts in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded, how men come to give their affents contrary to probability; for there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly difbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third fedfastly believes and firmly adheres to. The reafons whereof, though they may be very various, yet I fuppofe may be all reduced to these four:

1. Want of proofs.

2. Want of ability to use them.
3. Want of will to use them.
4. Wrong measures of probability.

§2. 1. Want of Proofs.

FIRST, By want of proofs, I do not mean only the want of those proofs which are no where extant, and so are no where to be had; but the want even of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and obfervations themfelves tending to the proof of any propofition; nor likewife the convenience to inquire into, and collect the testimonies of others; and in this ftate are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the neceffity of their mean condition, whofe lives are worn out only in the provifions for living. These mens opportunity of knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are but little inftructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out to fill the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a laborious trade, fhould be more knowing in the variety of things done in the world, than a pack-horfe, who is driven conftantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road only to mar→ ket, thould be skilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more poffible that he who wants leifure, books, and languages, and the opportunity of conversing

with a variety of men, fhould be in a condition to collec those testimonies and obfervations which are in being, and are neceffary to make out many, nay, most of the propofitions that, in the focieties of men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of affurance fo great as the belief of the points he would build on them is thought neceifary; fo that a great part of man kind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the conftitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of thole proofs on which others build, and which are neceffary to eftablish thofe opinions; the greatest part of men, hav ing much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries.

§3. Ob. What shall become of those who want them,

anfwered.

WHAT fhall we fay then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the neceflity of their condition, fubjected to unavoidable ignorance in thofe things which are of greateft importance to them? (for of thefe it is obvious to inquire.) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident, and biind chance, to conduct them to their happiness or mifery? Are the current opinions, and kcenfed guides of every country, fufficient evidence and fecurity to every man to venture his greatest concern. ments on, nay, his everlasting happinefs or mifery? Or, can those be the certain and infallible oracles and ftandards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom, and another in Turkey? Or, fhall a poor countryman be eternally happy for having the chance to be born in Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably loft, because he had the ill luck to be born in England? How ready fome men may be to fay fome of these things, I will not here examine; but this I am fure, that men must allow one or other of thefe to be true (let them choose which they pleafe), or else grant, that God has furnished men with faculties futhcient to direct them in the way they thouid take, if they will but feriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leifure.

No man is fo wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no fpare time at all to think of his foul, and inform himfelf in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none fo enflaved to the neceflities of life, who might not find many vacancies that might be hufbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.

$4. People hindered from Inquiry. BESIDES thofe whole improvements and informations are ftraitened by the narrownefs of their fortunes, there are others whofe largenefs of fortune would plentifully enough fupply books and other requifites for clearing of doubts, and difcovering of truth; but they are cooped in clofe by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of thofe whofe intereft it is to keep them ignorant, left, knowing more, they should believe the lefs in them. Thefe are as far, nay, farther from the liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than thofe poor and wretched labourers we before fpoke of; and, however they may feem high and great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that which thould be the free ft part of man, their understandings. This is generally the cafe of all thofe who live in places where care is taken to propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country, and must therefore fwallow down opinions, as filly people do empirics pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do but believe that they will do the cure; but in this are much more miferable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refufe fwallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone, or to choose the phyfician to whofe conduct they would truft themselves.

$5. 2. Want of Skill to use them.

SECONDLY, Thofe who want feill to use thofe evidences they have of probabilities, who cannot carry a train of confequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and teftimonies, making every circumflance its due allowance, may be eafily