miled to affent to propofitions that are not probable. There are some men of one, fome but of two fyllogifms, and no more, and others that can but advance one step farther. These cannot always difcern that fide on which the strongest proofs lie, cannot conftantly follow that which in itfelf is the more probable opinion. Now that there is fuch a difference between men, in respect of their understandings, I think nobody who has had any conversation with his neighbours will question, though he never was at Westminster-hall, or the Exchange, on the one hand, nor at Alms-houses, or Bedlam, on the other. Which great difference in mens intellec tuals, whether it rifes from any defect in the organs of the body, particularly adapted to thinking, or in the dullness or untractableness of those faculties for want of ufe, or, as fome think, in the natural differences of mens fouls themselves, or fome or all of thefe toge ther, it matters not here to examine; only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in mens understandings, apprehenfions, and reasonings, to fo great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, afhrm, that there is a greater diftance between fome men and others, in this refpect, than between fome men and fome beafts, But how this comes about is a fpeculation, though of great confequence, yet not neceffary to our prefent purpose.

§6. 3. Want of Will to use them.

THIRDLY, There are another fort of people that vent proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but be caufe they will not use them; who, though they have riches and leifure enough, and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages fome mens thoughts elsewhere: Laziness and of citany in general, or a particular averfion for books, ftudy, and meditation, keep others from any ferious thoughts at all; and fome out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour thofe opinions which beft fuit their prejudices, lives, and defigns, content themselves without examination to take upon truft what they find

213 convenient and in fashion. Thus moft men, even of thofe that might do otherwife, pafs their lives without an acquaintance with, much lefs a rational affent to probabilities they are concerned to know, though they lie fo much within their view, that to be convinced of them they need but turn their eyes that way. But we know fome men will not read a letter which is fuppofed to bring ill news; and many men forbear to caft up their accounts, or fo much as think upon their eftates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good pofture. How men, whofe plentiful fortunes allow them leifure to improve their underftandings, can fatisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell : But methinks they have a low opinion of their fouls, who lay out all their incomes in provifions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and fplendid outfide, and would think themselves miferable in coarfe clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly fuffer their minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald livery of coarfe patches, and borrowed fhreds, fuch as it has pleafed chance, or their country tailor (I mean the common opinion of thofe they have converfed with), to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreafonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes; nor fhall I take notice what a fhame and confufion it is, to the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this at least is worth the confideration of thofe who call themfelves gentlemen, that however they may think credit, refpect, power, and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet they will find all thefe ftill carried away from them, by men of lower condition who furpass them in know ledge. They who are blind will always be led by those that fee, or elfe fall into the ditch; and he is certainly the most fubjected, the most enslaved, who is fo in his understanding. In the foregoing inftances, fome of the caufes have been shown of wrong affent, and how it

comes to pafs, that probable doctrines are not always received with an affent proportionable to the reafons which are to be had for their probability; but hitherts we have confidered only fuch probabilities whofe proofs do exift, but do not appear to him that embraces the

error.

§ 7. 4. Wrong Measures of Probability, whereof. FOURTHLY, There remains yet the laft fort, who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifeft reafons, but do either iixu, fufpend their affent, or give it to the lefs probable opinion: And to this danger are thofe expofed, who have taken up wrong meafures of probability; which are,

1. Propofitions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and falfe, taken up for Principles. 2. Received Hypothefes.

3. Predominant Passions or Inclinations.

4. Authority.

$8. 1. Doubtful Propofitions taken for Principles. FIRST, The first and firmest ground of probability, is the conformity any thing has to our own knowledge; efpecially that part of our knowledge which we have em braced, and continue to look on as principles. Thefe have fo great an influence upon our opinions, that it is ufually by them we judge of truth, and measure proba bility to that degree, that what is inconfiftent with our principles, is fo far from palling for probable with us, that it will not be allowed poffible. The reverence borne to these principles is fo great, and their authority fo paramount to all other, that the teftimony not only of other men, but the evidence of our own fenfes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to thefe cftablifhed rules. How much the doctrine of innate principles, and that principles are not to be proved or queftioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another; but withal I take leave alfo to fay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it ftrictly, and ice

215 whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself by its own evidence, or whether he does only with affurance believe it to be fo upon the authority of others; for he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his affent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the atthority of any opinion in itself not evidently true.

§ 9.

THERE is nothing more ordinary, than that children fhould receive into their minds propofitions (efpecially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurfes, or those about them, which being infinuated into their unwary as well as unbiaffed understandings, and faftened by degrees, are at laft (equally, whether true or falfe) rivetted there by long cuftom and education, beyond all poffibility of being pulled out again; for men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding thofe of this fort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having obferved their early infinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as facred things, and not to fuffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: They look on them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by GOD himfelf, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falfehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controverfies.

§ 10.

THIS opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any propofition fhall find, how clearly foever proved, that fhall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with thefe internal oracles; whereas the grofleft abfurdities and improbabilities, bcing but agreeable to fuch principles, go down glibly, and are easily digefted. The great obftinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally abfurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable confequence of this way of reafoning

from received traditional principles; fo that men wil difbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence di their fenfes, and give their own experience the lie, r ther than admit of any thing difagreeing with these f ered tenets. Take an intelligent Romanit, that from the very first dawning of any notions in his underftanding hath had this principle conftantly inculcated, viz. the he muft believe as the church (i. e. thofe of his com munion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never so much as heard queftioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles: how is he prepared eafily to fwallow, not only again all probability, but even the clear evidence of his fenfes. the doctrine of tranfubftantiation? This principle has fuch an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh which he fees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with fome philofphers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, that he muft believe his reafon (for fo men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles) against his fenfes ? Let an enthufiaft be principled, that he or his teacher is infpired, and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reafons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconfiftent with these principles, to be moved by the moft apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are fo candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be perfuaded to examine even thofe very principles, which many never fuffer themselves to do.

11. 2. Received Hypothefes.

SECONDLY, Next to thefe are men whofe understandings are caft into a mould, and fashioned juft to the fize of a received hypothefes. The difference between thefe and the former is, that they will admit of matter of fact, and agree with diffenters in that, but differ only in affigning of reafons, and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance with their fenfes as the former; they can endure to hearken