217 to their information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things, nor be prevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the fame manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned profeffor, and that which his fcarlet would blufh at, to have his authority of forty years ftanding, wrought out of hard rock, Greek and Latin, with no finall expence of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturned by an upftart novelist? Can any one expect that he fhould be made to confefs, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake, and that he fold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate? What probabilities, I fay, are fufficient to prevail in fuch a cafe? And who ever by the moft cogent arguments will be prevailed with to difrobe himself at once of all his old opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which with hard ftudy he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himself out ftark naked, in queft a-frefh of new notions? All the arguments can be ufed will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothefis, may be reduced the errors that may be occafioned by a true hypothefis, or right principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The inftances of men contending for different opinions, which they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the text, that fays Merano, to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty; but yet however erroneous will one of their practices be, who understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with one tranflation to be repentez vous, repent; or with the other faitiez penitence, do penance.

12. 3. Predominant Paffions. THIRDLY, Probabilities which crofs mens appetites and

prevailing paffions, run the fame fate. Let never fo much probability hang on one fide of a covetous man's reafoning, and money on the other, it is eafy to forefee which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud-walls, refift the ftrongest batteries, and though perhaps fometimes the force of a clear argument may make fome impreffion, yet they nevertheless stand firm, keep out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or difturb them. Tell a man paffionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of witneffes of the falfehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words of hers fhall invalidate all their teftimonies. Quod volumus, facile credimus; what fuits our wifbes, is forwardly believed; is, I fuppofe, what every one hath more than once experimented; and though men cannot always openly gainfay or refift the force of manifeft probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding conftantly to close with the more probable fide; but yet a man hath a power to fufpend and reftrain its inquiries, and not permit a full and fatisfactory examination, as far as the matter in queftion is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities.

13. The means of evading Probabilities; 1. Suppofed

Fallacy.

FIRST, That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them; and the confequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be fome of them incoherent. There are very few difcourfes fo fhort, clear, and confiftent, to which moft men may not, with fatisfaction enough to themselves, raife this doubt, and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of difingenuity or unreafonablenefs, fet themfelves free with the old reply, Non perfuadebis, etiamfi perfuaferis; though I cannot an fwer, I will not yield.

§14. 2. Suppofed Arguments for the contrary. SECONDLY, Manifcft probabilities may be evaded, and the affent withheld, upon this fuggeftion, that I know

not yet all that may be faid on the contrary fide; and therefore though I be beaten, it is not neceffary I fhould yield, not knowing what forces there are in referve behind. This is a refuge against conviction fo open and fo wide, that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.

15. What Probabilities determine the Affent. BUT yet there is fome end of it; and a man having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness, done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly, and caft up the fum total on both fides, may in moft cafes come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter, on which fide the probability rests; wherein fome proofs in matter of reafon, being fuppofitions upon univerfal experience, are fo cogent and clear, and fome teftimonies in matter of fact fo univerfal, that he cannot refuse his affent: So that I think we may conclude, that in propofitions, where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet there are fufficient grounds to fufpect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as confiderable to be produced on the contrary fide, there affent, fufpenfe, or diffent, are often voluntary actions; but where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to fufpect that there is either fallacy of words (which fober and serious confideration may dif cover), nor equally valid proofs, yet unditcovered, latent on the other fide (which alfo the nature of the thing may, in fome cafes, make plain to a confiderate man), there, I think, a man who has weighed them, can fearce refufe his affent to the fide on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promifcuous jumble of printing letters fhould often fall into a method and order, which fhould stamp on paper a co herent difcourfe; or that a blind fortuitous concourfe of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, thould frequently conftitute the bodies of any fpecies of anmals; in thefe and the like cafes, I think nobody that confiders them can be one jot at a stand which fide to take, nor at all waver in his affent. Laftly, When

there can be no fuppofition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the teftimony of witnefles) that there is as fair tellimony against as for the matter of fact attested, which by inquiry is to be learned, v. g. whether there was 1700 years ago fuch a man at Rome as Julius Cafar; in all fuch cafts, I fay, I think it is not in any rational man's power to refufe his affent, but that it neceffarily follows, and clofes with fuch probabilities. In other lefs clear cafes, I think it is in a man's power to fufpend his affent, and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that fuits with his inclination or intereft, and fo ftop from farther fearch; but that a man fhould afford his affent to that fide on which the lefs probability appears to him, feems to me utterly impracticable, and as impoffible as it is to believe the fame thing probable and improbable at the fame time.

16. Where it is in our power to fufpend it. As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception, fo, I think, affent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately, or by the affiftance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid feeing thofe objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on in day-light; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my affent to. But though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived, nor our aflent, where the probability manifestly appears upon due confideration of all the measures of it, yet a can hinder Loth knowledge and affent, by flopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the fearch of any truth. If it were not fo, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could not in any cafe be a fault. Thus in fome cafes we can prevent or fufpend our affent; but can a man, verfed in modern or ancient hiftory, doubt whe ther there be tuch a place as Rome, or whether there was íuch a man as Julius Cæfar? Indeed there are millions of ruths that a man is not or may not think himfelf concerned to know; as, whether our King Richard

the Third was crook-backed or no, or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or a magician. In these and fuch like cafes, where the affent one way or other is of no importance to the intereft of any one, no action, no concernment of his following or depending thereon, there it is not ftrange that the mind fhould give itself up to the common opinion, or render itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of fo little weight and moment, that, like motes in the fun, their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of; they are there as it were by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty; but where the mind judges that the propofition has concernment in it, where the affent or not affenting is thought to draw confequences of moment after it, and good or evil to depend on choofing or refusing the right fide, and the mind fets itself seriously to inquire and examine the probability; there, I think, it is not in our choice to take which fide we please, if manifeft odds appear on either. The greater probability, I think, in that cafe will determine the affent; and a man can no more avoid affenting or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement or difagreement of any two ideas.

If this be fo, the foundation of error will lie in wrong' measures of probability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good.

§17. 4. Authority.

FOURTHLY, 'The fourth and laft wrong measure of probability I fhall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter; I mean, the giving up our affent to the common receiv ed opinions, either of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the fuppofed honesty, or learning, or number of hole or the fame profeffion? as if honest or bookih men could not err, or truth were to be establifhed by the vote of the multitude: yet this with most. men ferves the turn. The tenet has had the atteftation.