OF THE

CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum fapientis gravitate atque conftantia, quam aut falfum fentire, aut quod non fatis explorate perceptum fit et cognitum fine ulla dubitatione defendere? Cic. de Natura Deorum, lib. 1.

ΤΗ

HE laft refort a man has recourfe to in the conduct of himself, is his understanding; for though we diftinguish the faculties of the mind, and give the fupreme command to the will, as to an agent, yet the truth is, the man, which is the agent, determines himself to this or that voluntary action, upon fome precedent knowledge, or appearance of knowledge, in the underftanding. No man ever fets himself about any thing. but upon fome view or other, which ferves him for a reafon for what he does: and whatsoever faculties he employs, the understanding, with fuch light as it has, well or ill informed, conftantly leads; and by that light, true or falfe, all his operative powers are directed. The will itfelf, how abfolute and uncontroulable foever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding. Temples have their facred images, and we fee what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind; but in truth, the ideas and images in mens minds are the invifible powers that conftantly govern them, and to thefe they all univerfally pay a ready fubmiffion. It is therefore of the highest concernment, that great care fhould be taken of the understanding, to conduct it right in the fearch of knowledge, and in the judgments it makes.

The logic now in ufe has fo long poffeffed the chair, as the only art taught in the schools for the direction of the mind in the ftudy of the arts and sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affectation of novelty to fufpect that rules that have ferved the learned world thefe two or three thoufand years, and which, without any complaint of defects, the learned have rested in, are not fufficient to guide the understanding; and I fhould not doubt but this attempt would be cenfured as vanity or prefumption, did not the great Lord Verulam's autho rity juftify it; whe, not fervilely thinking learning could not be advanced beyond what it was, because for many ages it had not been, did not reft in the lazy approbation and applaufe of what was, because it was, but enlarged his mind to what might be. In his preface to his Novum Organum concerning logic, he pronounces thus: Qui fummas dialectica partes tribuerunt, atque inde fidifh ma fcientiis præfidia comparari putarunt, veriffime et optime viderunt intellectum humanum fibi permiffum merito fufpec tum effe debere. Verum infirmior omnino eft malo medicina; nec ipfa mali expers. Siquidem dialectica, quæ recepta eft, licet ad civilia et artes, quæ in fermone et opinione pofita funt, rectiffime adhibeatur; naturæ tamen fubtilitatem lango intervallo non attingit, et prenfando quod non capit, ad errores potius ftabiliendos et quafi figendos, quam ad viam vritati aperiendam valuit.

"They, fays he, who attributed fo much to logic, "perceived very well and truly, that it was not fafe to "truft the understanding to itself, without the guard "of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil, "but became a part of it: For the logic which took "place, though it might do well enough in civil af"fairs, and the arts which confifted in talk and opi"nion, yet comes very far fhort of fubtilty in the real "performances of nature; and catching at what it can "not reach, has ferved to confirm and establish errors, "rather than to open a way to truth." And therefore a little after he lays, "That it is abfolutely neceffary "that a better and perfecter use and employment of the "mind and understanding should be introduced." NA

ceffario requiritur ut melior et perfectior mentis et intellectus bumani ufus et adoperatio introducatur.

§ 2. Parts.

THERE is, it is vifible, great variety in mens understandings, and their natural conftitutions put fo wide a difference between fome men in this refpect, that art and induftry would never be able to master, and their very natures feem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men eafily attain unto. Amongst men of equal education, there is great inequality of parts; and the woods of America, as well as the fchools of Athens, produce men of feveral abilities in the fame kind. Though this be fo, yet I imagine most men come very fhort of what they might attain unto in their several degrees, by a neglect of their understandings: A few rules of logic are thought fufficient in this cafe for those who pretend to the highest improvement; whereas, I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment, which are overlooked and wholly neglected; and it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercife and improvement of this faculty of the mind, which hinder them in their progrefs, and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives. Some of them I fhall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for, in the following discourse.

$3. Reafoning.

BESIDES the want of determined ideas, and of fagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate ideas, there are three mifcarriages that men are guilty of in reference to their reafon, whereby this faculty is hindered in them from that fervice it might do and was defigned for; and he that reflects upon the actions and difcourfes of mankind, will find their defects in this kind very frequent, and very obfervable.

1. The first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbours, ministers, or who else they are pleafed to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for

the faving of themfelves the pains and trouble of thinking and examining for themfelves.

2. The fecond is of thofe who put paffion in the place of reason, and being refolved that fhall govern their ac tions and arguments, neither use their own nor hearken to other people's reafon, any farther than it fuits their humour, intereft, or party; and thefe, one may obferve, commonly content themfelves with words which have no diftinct ideas to them, though, in other matters that they come with an unbiaffed indifferency to, they want not abilities to talk and hear reason, where they have no fecret inclination that hinders them from being tractable to it.

3. The third fort is of thofe who readily and fincerely follow reafon, but for want of having that which one may call large, found, round-about fenfe, have not a full view of all that relates to the question, and may be of moment to decide it. We are all fhort-fighted, and very often fee but one fide of a matter; our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this defect I think no man is free. We fee but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might inftruct the proudeft efteemer of his own parts how useful it is to talk and confult with others, even fuch as come short of him in capacity, quickness and penetration; for fince no one fees all, and we generally have different profpects of the fame thing, according to our different, as I may fay, pofitions to it, it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notions of things which have efcaped him, and which his reafon would make use of if they came into his mind. The faculty of reafoning feldom or never deceives those who truft to it; its confequences from what it builds on are evident and certain; but that which it ofteneft, if not only, misleads us in is, that the principles from which we conclude, the grounds upon which we bottom our reafoning, are but a part, fomething is left out which fhould go into the reckoning to make it juft and exact. Here we may

imagine a vaft and almost infinite advantage that angels and feparate fpirits may have over us, who, in their feveral degrees of elevation above us, may be endowed with more comprehenfive faculties, and fome of them perhaps have perfect and exact views of all finite beings that come under their confideration, can, as it were, in the twinkling of an eye, collect together all their feattered and almost boundless relations. A mind fo furnifhed, what reafon has it to acquiefce in the certainty of its conclufions?

In this we may fee the reason why fome men of ftudy and thought, that reafon right, and are lovers of truth, do make no great advances in their difcoveries of it. Error and truth are uncertainly blended in their minds, their decifions are lame and defective, and they are very often mistaken in their judgments; the reafon whereof is, they converfe but with one fort of men, they read but one fort of books, they will not come in the hearing but of one fort of notions; the truth is, they canton out to themselves a little Gofben in the intellectual world, where light fhines, and, as they conclude, day bleffes them; but the reft of that vaft expanfum they give up to night and darkness, and fo avoid coming near it. They have a pretty traffic with known correfpondents in fome little creek, within that they confine themselves, and are dexterous managers enough of the wares and products of that corner with which they content themfelves; but will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge, to furvey the riches that nature hath stored other parts with, no lefs genuine, no lefs folid, no lefs ufeful, than what was fallen to their lot in the admired plenty and fufficiency of their own little fpot, which to them contains whatfoever is good in the univerfe. Those who live thus mewed up within their own contracted territories, and will not look abroad beyond the boundaries that chance, conceit, or lazinefs, has fet to their inquiries, but live fepatate from the notions, difcourfes, and attainments of the rest of mankind, may not amifs be reprefented by the inhabitants of the Marian iflands, who being feparated by a large track of fea from all