fifts, and fo acquaint ourfelves with the nature of it, as to obferve how the mind diftinguishes it from falfe

hood.

§ 2. A right joining or feparating of Signs; i. e. Ideas or Words.

TRUTH then feems to me, in the proper import of the word, to fignify nothing but the joining or feparating of figns, as the things fignified by them do agree or difagree one with another. The joining or feparating of figns here meant, is what by another name we call propofition; fo that truth properly belongs only to propofitions; whereof there are two forts, vis. mental and verbal, as there are two forts of figns commonly made use of, viz. ideas and words.

§3. Which make mental or verbal Propofitions. To form a clear notion of truth, it is very neceffary to confider truth of thought, and truth of words, di- ftinctly one from another; but yet it is very difficult to treat of them afunder; because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propofitions, to make ufe of words; and then the inftances given of mental propofi tions ceafe immediately to be barely mental, and become verbal. For a mental propofition being nothing but a bare confideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds ftripped of names, they lofe the nature of purely mental propofitions, as foon as they are put into

words.

§ 4. Mental Propofitions are very hard to be treat

ed of.

AND that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propofitions Separately, is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reafonings. within themselves, make ufe of words inftead of ideas; at least when the fubject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas; which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made ufe of, ferve for a mark to show us what are thofe things we have clear and perfect established ideas of, and what not; for if we will curiously obferve the way our mind

names.

takes in thinking and reasoning, we fhall find, I fuppofe, that when we make any propofitions within our own thoughts about white or black, fweet or bitter, a triangle or a circle, we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the But when we would confider, or make propofitions about the more complex ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, we ufually put the name for the idea; because the ideas these names ftand for being for the most part imperfect, confufed, and undeter mined, we reflect on the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain and distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas; and fo we make use of these words inftead of the ideas themfelves, even when we would meditate and reafon within ourselves, and make tacit mental propofitions. In fubftances, as has been already noted, this is occafioned by the imperfection of our ideas; we making the name ftand for the real effence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is occafioned by the great number of fimple ideas that go to the making them up; for many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier than the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impoffible to be done by thofe, who, though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of their language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their lives to confider what precise ideas the most of them ftood for. Some confused or obfcure notions have ferved their turns; and many who talk very much of religion and conScience, of church and faith, of power and right, of obftructions and humours, melancholy and choler, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations, if one fhould defire them to think only of the things themselves, and lay by thofe words, with which they fo often confound others, and not feldom themfelves alfo.

§ 5. Being nothing but the joining or feparating Ideas without Words.

Bur to return to the confideration of truth; we must, 1 fay, obferve two forts of propofitions that we are capable of making.

First, Mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the ufe of words put together, or separated by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement.

Secondly, Verbal propofitions, which are words, the figns of our ideas, put together or separated in affirmative or negative fentences. By which way of affirming or denying, thefe figns, made by founds, are as it were put together or feparated one from another. So that propofition confifts in joining or feparating figns, and truth confifts in the putting together or feparating thofe figns, according as the things which they ftand for agree or difagree.

§ 6. When mental Propofitions contain real Truth,

and when verbal.

EVERY one's experience will fatisfy him, that the mind, either by perceiving or fuppofing the agreement or difagreement of any of its ideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of propofition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the terms, putting together and feparating; but this action of the mind, which is fo familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is eafier to be conceived by reflecting on what paffes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his mind the idea of two lines, viz. the fide and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the divifion of that line into a certain number of equal parts; v. g. into five, ten, an hundred, a thousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch-line being divisible or not divisible, into fuch equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the fide-line. Now, whenever he perceives, believes, or fuppofes such a kind of divifibility to agree or difagree to his idea of

that line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of divifibility; and fo makes a mental propofition, which is true or falfe, according as fuch a kind of divifibility, a divifibility into fuch aliquot parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are fo put together, or feparated in the mind, as they, or the things they ftand for, do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, mental truth; but truth of words is fomething more, and that is, the affirming or denying of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or difagree; and this again is twofold, either purely verbal and trifling, which I fhall speak of, chap. 10., or real and instructive, which is the obje& of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already.

$7. Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

BUT here again will be apt to occur the fame doubt about truth, that did about knowledge; and it will be objected, that if truth be nothing but the joining or feparating of words in propofitions, as the ideas they stand for agree or difagree in mens minds, the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and time men employ to the fearch of it; fince by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of mens brains. Who knows not what odd notions many mens heads are filled with, and what ftrange ideas all mens brains are capable of? But if we reft here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the vifionary world in our own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much. concerns harpies and centaurs, as men and horses; for thofe and the like may be ideas in our heads, and have their agreement and disagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and fo have as true propofitions made about them; and it will be altogether as true a propofition to fay, all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certain.

ty of one as great as the other. For in both the propofitions, the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds; and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur, is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and fo these two propofitions are equally true, equally certain. of what ufe is all fuch truth to us?

But

§ 8. Answered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing

to things.

THOUGH what has been faid in the foregoing chapter, to distinguish real from imagiuary knowledge, might fuffice here, in anfwer to this doubt, to diftinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you pleafe) barely nominal, they depending both on the fame foundation; yet it may not be amifs here again to confider, that though our words fignify nothing but our ideas, yet being defigned by them to fignify things, the truth they contain, when put into propofitions, will be only verbal, when they ftand for ideas in the mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And therefore truth, as well as knowledge, may well. come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they ftand for, without regarding whether our ideas are fuch as really have, or are capable of having an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when these figns are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are fuch, as we know are capable of having an existence in nature; which in fubftances we cannot know, but by knowing that fuch have exifted. 99. Falsehood is the joining of Names otherwife than their Ideas agree.

TRUTH is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is; Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or difagreement of ideas otherwife than it is; and fo far as thefe ideas, thus marked by founds, agree to their archetypes, fo far only is the truth real. The know