ledge of this truth confifts in knowing what ideas the words ftand for, and the perception of the agreement or difagreement of thofe ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

§ 10.

General Propofitions to be treated of more at

large.

Bur because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reafoning about it, we make use of words and propofitions, I fhall more at large inquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propofitions, confiits, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to fhow in what fort of univerfal propofitions we are capable of being certain of their real truth or falsehood.

I fhall begin with general propofitions, as thofe which moft employ our thoughts, and exercife our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind, as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehenfiveness, fatisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and fhorten our way to knowledge.

§ 11. Moral and metaphyfical Truth.

BESIDES truth taken in the ftrict fenfe before mentioned, there are other forts of truths; as, 1. Moral truth, which is fpeaking of things according to the perfuafion of our own minds, though the propofition we fpeak agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphyfical truth, which is nothing but the real exiftence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it feeins to confist in the very beings of things, yet when confidered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit propofition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before fettled with a name to it. But thefe confiderations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our prefent purpose, it may fuffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS, THEIR TRUTH AND
CERTAINTY.

TH

§ 1. Treating of Words neceffary to knowledge. HOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid afide, be the best and fureft way to clear and diftin& knowledge; yet through the prevailing cuftom of ufing founds for ideas, I think it is very feldom practifed. Every one may obferve how common it is for names to be made ufe of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reafon within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of fimple ones. This makes the confideration of words and propofitions fo neceffary a part of the treatife of knowledge, that it is very hard to fpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propofitions.

ALL the knowledge we have being only of particular or general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with reafon is most fought after, can never be well made known, and is very feldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreffed in words. It is not

therefore out of our way, in the examination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of univerfal propofitions.

§2. Certainty twofold, of Truth and of Knowledge. Bur that we may not be misled in this cafe, by that which is the danger every where, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to obferve, that certainty is twofold; certainty of truth, and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is when words are fo put together in propofitions as exactly to express the agreement or difagreement of the ideas they ftand for,

as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any propofition. This we ufually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any propofition.

$4. No Propofition can be known to be true, where

the Effence of each Species mentioned is not known. Now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general propofition, unless we know the precife bounds and extent of the fpecies its terms ftand for, it is neceffary we should know the effence of each Species, which is that which conftitutes and bounds it. This in all fimple ideas and modes is not hard to do; for in thefe the real and nominal effence being the fame, or, which is all one, the abftract idea which the general term ftands for, being the fole effence and boun dary that is or can be fuppofed of the fpecies, there can be no doubt how far the fpecies extends, or what things are comprehended under each term ; which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it ftands for, and no other. But in fubftances wherein a real effence diftinct from the nominal is fuppofed to conftitute, determine, and bound the fpecies, the extent of the general word is very uncertain; becaufe not knowing this real ef fence, we cannot know what is or is not of that Species, and confequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus fpeaking of a man or gold, or any other fpecies of natural fubftances, as fuppofed conftituted by a precife real effence, which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that fpecies, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it: For man or gold taken in this fenfe, and used for fpecies of things conftituted by real effences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker, ftand for we know not what ; and the extent of thefe fpecies, with fuch boundaries, are fo unknown and undetermined, that it is impoffible with any certainty to affirm, that all men are ra. tional, or that all gold is yellow. But where the no

minal effence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend the application of any general term no farther than to the particular things in which the complex idea it ftands for is to be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each. Species, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any propofition be true or no. 1 have chofe to explain this uncertainty of propofitions in this fcholaftic way, and have made ufe of the terms of effences and Species, on purpose to show the abfurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other fort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To fuppofe that the fpecies of things are any thing but the forting of them under general names, according as they agree to feveral abstract ideas, of which we make thofe names the figns, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertainty into all general propofitions that can be made about them. Though therefore these things might, to people not poffeffed with fcholaftic learning, be perhaps treated of in a better and clearer way, yet those wrong notions of effences or fpecies having got root in moft people's minds, who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and removed, to make way for that use of words which fhould convey certainty with it.

$5. This more particularly concerns Subftances. THE names of fubftances then, whenever made to ftand for fpecies, which are supposed to be conftituted by real efences, which we know not, are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truth of general propofitions made up of fuch terms, we cannot be fure; the reafon whereof is plain; for how can we be fure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an effence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and fo cannot be fure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this fenfe gold; being incurably ignorant, whether it has or has not

:

Book IV. that which makes any thing to be called gold, i. e. that real effence of gold whereof we have no idea at all this being as impoffible for us to know, as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a panfie is or is not to be found, whilft he has no idea of the colour of a panse at all. Or if we could (which is impoffible) certainly know where a real effence, which we know not, is; v. g. in what parcels of matter the real effence of gold is; yet could we not be fure, that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold; fince it is impoffible for us to know, that this or that quality or idea has a neceffary connection with a real effence, of which we have no idea at all, whatever fpecies that fuppofed real effence may be imagined to conftitute.

§ 6. The Truth of few univerfal Propofitions concerning Subftances is to be known.

On the other fide, the names of fubftances, when made ufe of, as they should be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a clear and determinate fignification with them, will not yet ferve us to make many univerfal propofitions, of whose truth we can be certain; not becaufe in this ufe of them we are uncertain what things are fignified by them, but because the complex ideas they ftand for, are fuch combinations of fimple ones, as carry not with them any difcoverable connection or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas.

97. Because co-existence of Ideas in few cafes is to

be known.

THE complex ideas, that our names of the fpecies of fubftances properly ftand for, are collections of fuch qualities as have been obferved to co-exist in an unknown fubftratum, which we call fubftance: but what other qualities neceffarily co-exift with fuch combinations, we cannot certainly know, unlefs we can difcover their natural dependence; which in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their fecondary qualities, we can difcover no connection at all, for the reafons mentioned, chap. 3.