be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to feek it elsewhere in experiment, or obfervations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge. CHAP. VII. TH OF MAXIMS. 1. They are felf-evident. HERE are a fort of propofitions, which under the name of maxims and axioms have paffed for principles of fcience; and becaufe they are felf-evident, have been fuppofed innate, although nobody (that I know) ever went about to show the reafon and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may however be worth while to inquire into the reafon of their evidence, and fee whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge. § 2. Wherein that Self-evidence confifts. KNOWLEDGE, as has been shown, confifts in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of ideas : Now where that agreement or difagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is Self-evident. This will appear to be fo to any one who will but confider any of those propofitions, which, without any proof, he aflents to at firft fight; for in all of them he will find, that the reafon of his affent is from that agreement or difagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in thofe ideas anfwering the affirmation or negation. in the propofition. §3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received Axioms. THIS being fo, in the next place let us confider, whether this felf-evidence be peculiar only to thofe propofitions, which commonly pafs under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that feveral other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this felf-evidence. This we thall fee, if we go over thefe feveral forts of agreement or difagreement of ideas, which I have above mentioned, viz. identity relation, co-exiftence, and real exiftence; which will difcover to us, that not only thofe few propofitions, which have had the credit of maxims, are felf-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propofitions, are fuch. § 4. 1. As to Identity and Diversity, all Propofitions are equally felf-evident. FOR, first, the immediate perception of the agreement or difagreement of identity being founded in the mind's having diftinct ideas, this affords us as many felf-evi dent propofitions as we have diftin&t ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and diftinct ideas; and it is the first act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows alfo, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diftinctly and unconfufedly one from another; which always being fo (it being impoffible but that he should perceive what he perceives), he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two diftin&t ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the fame idea. So that all fuch affirmations and negations are made without any poffibility of doubt, uncertainty or hefitation, and must neceffarily be affented to as foon as understood; that is, as foon as we have in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the propofition ftand for; and therefore wherever the mind with attention confiders any propofition, fo as to perceive the two ideas fignified by the terms, and affirm ed or denied one of the other, to be the fame or different; it is prefently and infallibly certain of the truth of fuch a propofition, and this equally, whether thefe propofitions be in terms ftanding for more general ideas, or fuch as are lefs fo, v. g. whether the general idea of being be affirmed of itfelf, as in this propofition, whatfoever is, is; or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as a man is a man, or whatfoever is white, is white; or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not being, which is the only (if I may fo call it) idea different from it, as in this other propofition, it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as a man is not a borfe, red is not blue. The difference of the ideas, as foon as the terms are understood, makes the truth of the propofition presently visible, and that with an equal certainty and eafinefs in the lefs, as well as the more general propofitions, and all for the fame reason, viz. because the mind perceives in any ideas, that it has the fame idea to the fame with itself; and two different ideas to be different, and not the fame ; and this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas be more or lefs general, abstract and comprehenfive. It is not therefore alone to these two general propofitions, whatsoever is, is; and, it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; that this felf-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, fignified by the terms whatsoever and thing, than it does to any other ideas; these two general maxims amounting to no more, in fhort, but this, that the fame is the fame, and fame is not different, are truths known in more particular inftances, as well as in these general maxims, and known also in particular instances, before thefe general maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their force from the difcernment of the mind employed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible than that the mind, without the help of any proof, or relection on either of these general pro pofitions, perceives fo clearly, and knows fo certainly, that the idea of white is the idea of white, and not the idea of blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there, and is not abfent; that the confideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge. Juft fo it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in his mind: He knows each to be itfelf, and not to be another; and to be in his mind, and not away when it is there, with a certainty that cannot be greater; and therefore the truth of no ge. neral propofition can be known with a greater certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in refpect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas; and we are capable of making as many felfevident propofitions, as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind, whether this propofition, a circle is a circle, be not as felfevident a propofition, as that confifting of more general terms, whatfoever is, is: And again, whether this propofition, blue is not red, be not a propofition that the mind can no more doubt of, as foon as it unftands the words, than it does of that axiom, it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; and fo of all the like. $5. SECONDLY, As to co-existence, or fuch neceffary connection between two ideas, that in the subject where one of them is fuppofed, there the other must neceffarily be alfo Of fuch agreement or difagreement as this, the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them, and therefore in this fort we have but very little intuitive knowledge; nor are there to be found very many propofitions that are felf-evident, though fome there are, v. g. the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its fuperficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I think it is a felf evident propofition, that two bodies cannot be in the same place. 2. In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propofitions. 6. 3. In other Relations we may have. THIRDLY, As to the relations of modes, mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality; as, equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equals; which, with the rest of that kind, however, they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths; yet, I think, that any one who confiders them, will not find that they have a clearer felf-evidence than thefe, that one and one are equal to two; that if you take from the five fingers of one banl two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will be equal. Thefe and a thousand other fuch propofitions may be found in numbers, which at the very first hearing, force the affent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater clearness, than those mathematical axions. § 7. 4. Concerning real Existence we have none. FOURTHLY, As to real existence, fince that has no con nection with any other ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a first being, we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not fo much as demonftrative, much lefs a felf-evident knowledge; and therefore concerning those there are no maxims. § 8. Thofe Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge. In the next place, let us confider what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules eftablished in the fchools, that all reafonings are ex præcognitis et præconceffis, feem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in thefe maxims, and to fuppofe them to be præcognita; whereby, I think, are meant thefe two things: First, That thefe axioms are thofe truths that are first known to the mind; and, Secondly, That upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend. § 9. Because they are not the Truths we first knew. FIRST, That they are not the truths first known to the mind is evident to experience, as we have shown in another place, Book I. Chap. 2. Who perceives not that a |