that a number of soldiers found a watery grave in their impatience to reach the opposite side. The fresh troops lately arrived were stationed partly on the left to oppose Tchitchagoff, and partly on the right to withstand the assault of Wittgenstein. The safety of the portion that escaped was owing to the resistance, or rather to the sacrifice, of these corps; and no words can describe the confusion, when the Russians, having at last overthrown these protecting divisions, began to draw near to the bridge. Those who succeeded in crossing the river were destined to fall by cold or hunger in the tedious march to Wilna. An eye witness reported the manner of expiring from cold to be nearly as follows: "When the frame began to be affected in a fatal manner, the unhappy victim was obliged to stop short, and his distorted features appeared like those of a man deprived of intellect, and unconscious whether he should yield to a tear or to a convulsive laugh. Aware that he could not longer maintain an upright posture, the hands were mechanically placed before the body, while the knees tottered, and the miserable sufferer, falling with his face on the earth, was soon deprived of motion and life." "I dreaded," said another witness of these calamities, "the return of night, not only as an aggravation of our sufferings, but as giving rise to melancholy alarms from the fate of our comrades. On making a halt, we were accustomed to draw together, and even to press one against the other. In this situation, and through the silence produced by dejection and despair, our ears were often assailed by the recurrence of slight noises, which took place in succession, and occasionally in several places at a time. What was the cause of them?-the fall on the frozen ground of men and of horses, sinking under the excess of cold and hunger. Never shall I forget the impression of this melancholy scene. It continues to haunt my imagination, together with the terrible circumstances that accompanied it; and often, in the midst of night, I start from my slumbers, because my terrified fancy again assails my ears with those melancholy sounds." The present writer treats very cursorily the question how far the Russians participated in the dreadful sufferings which destroyed the French army: but, from the nature of the season and the country, as well as from the limited numbers who were found capable of taking a share in the operations in Saxony in the month of May, it is apparent that their loss in the pursuit must have been very considerable. That it was not much greater was no doubt owing to the men and horses being accustomed to the climate, to the friendly disposition of the surrounding peasantry, and, above all, to the difference of situation between a flying and a pursuing force :- not forgetting the important consideration that the fresh corps of Tchitchagoff relieved the troops of Kutusoff in the midst of the pursuit, and was enabled to accomplish the destruction of the French without any other co-operation than that of the Cossacks; who, from circumstances sufficiently known, are steeled against against the inclemency of winter. With regard to another melancholy calculation, we mean the number who perished on the side of the French, and which is generally computed to have been, from the beginning to the end of the campaign, between 3 and 400,000 men, this pamphlet is as uninstructive as on other topics, on which precision is to be obtained only by a careful research into documents that are not open to ordinary readers. ART. IX. Bonaparte peint par lui-même, &c.; i. e. Bonaparte delineated by himself, in his Military and Political Career. By M. C ***, avocat à la cour royale. 8vo. PP. 554. Paris. 1814. THE THE reader who opens this volume in the expectation of finding in it any thing new with regard to Bonaparte will be much disappointed, since it falls exactly under the description of the book-selling compilations which are so common in Paris, and consists only of an abstract of the public life of the late ruler of France, taken from the news-papers and government publications. In order to accommodate it to the general feeling, the author has been indefatigable in infusing a large portion of abuse on Bonaparte and of encomium on the Bourbons: but he has failed in throwing any new light on the secret motives of the policy of the usurper. He divides the volume into three parts; the first treating of the history of Napoleon while he was a General Officer; the second, of his consulship, viz. from November 1799 to May 1804; and the third, of the ten years that have elapsed since he assumed the title of Emperor. It would have been interesting to have introduced, into a work of this nature, some account of the education and early habits of this singular man: but, as the materials did not offer themselves readily to the compiler, he has been contented to dismiss the subject in a couple of pages, and to enter at once on the life of Bonaparte after the 13th Vendemiaire 1795; or, in other words, on that part which may be read in every magazine or newspaper. The campaign of Italy is passed over without any of those observations which indicate a disposition or an ability to analyze the combinations of a commander. The account of the Egyptian expedition is equally superficial, and has scarcely any prominent characterstic, except the introduction (p. 115) of a pretended dialogue between Bonaparte and two disciples of Mohammed. We come next to the sudden revolution of 18th Brumaire, which, by an inconsistency that would have surprized any other people than the French, rendered a baffled and fugitive General the absolute absolute master of the government: but here, as in other places, we meet with no attempt to explain the secret manœuvres which were preparatory to so remarkable a change. The preface conveys a sufficient idea of the views of the writer: A man who had risen from a low rank in society placed himself on the throne of our kings, and France groaned during ten years under his iron yoke. His name must reach posterity, because so scandalous an usurpation is without example in our history: but let it be handed down as a repulsive example of the effects of the ambition of one man, seconded by the power of events, and perhaps also by our own weakness. Bonaparte was the child of the Revolution, and was enabled by means of it to overleap the immense space which separates a subject from a sovereign. The same delirium, which made us proscribe as a tyrant the father of his people, could alone induce us to call to the throne a foreigner, who was impatient to shed our blood. His elevation shewed to Europe that the hand of Providence was stretched out for our punishment: but the iron rod, which the usurper wielded in anger, has been broken like a slender twig. Strange association! Louis XVI. expires, and all is overthrown! Bonaparte descends from the throne in full health, and all remains tranquil! The fall of an usurper is a natural event, foreseen only by the sage, but desired by every one, while the slightest infraction on the hereditary right of legitimate sovereigns announces political disorganization, and presages all the misfortunes which are found to arise out of such convulsions. The dethroned tyrant is now only a man, whose life we have all at present a right to examine. No life ever furnished so many materials for its own history. May it be my lot to succeed in making a proper use of them. The progressive rise of Bonaparte is an awful lesson for the nation that is not yet instructed by actual experience; and his fall is a frightful warning to daring innovators, who presume to raise a sacrilegious hand against the institutions which have been consecrated by the wisdom of ages.' These fluent passages afford a specimen of the dexterity with which French book-makers contrive to introduce their works to the public: but, to whatever part of the volume we turn, whether the campaign in Germany, or the fatal invasion of Russia, we find reason to repeat the charge already made, of mere compilation from the journals of the day. The merit of the work consists in making these abstracts within a moderate compass, and in avoiding unmeaning repetitions. It may accordingly be of some use to those who wish to have beside them a short notice of the dates and circumstances of the leading events of Bonaparte's career, and who are prepared for the absence of research into original documents, as well as on their guard against the partiality of the writer. He represents. himself in his preface as having suffered under the usurper's tyranny tyranny the loss of his dearest friends, but as still determined to write his life with an unprejudiced pen;-or, to use his own expression, like a Frenchman and a friend of truth.' Of this high-sounding declaration we may be permitted to say what the world has often said of Bonaparte's speeches; that they less expressed what he really knew, or intended, than what he wished his good natured audience to believe. ART. X. Campagne de Paris en 1814, &c.; i. e. The Campaign of Paris in 1814, preceded by a Sketch of that of 1813; or an histori. cal and impartial Account of the Events which occurred between the Invasion of France by the Allies, the Capitulation of Paris, and the Abdication of Bonaparte; containing Observations on his Character, and on the Causes of his Rise; compiled from authentic Documents and the Report of Eye-witnesses. With a Map of the Scene of Operations. By P. F. F. I. GIRAUD. 3rd Edition, containing the Treaty of 11th April between the Allies and Bonaparte, respecting the Island of Elba. 8vo. pp. 120. Paris. 1814. W ITHOUT possessing any particular claim to attention on the grounds either of novelty or profundity, this tract is on the whole superior to the mass of pamphlets which issue with so much rapidity from the Parisian presses. It begins with a preliminary view of the exertions of Bonaparte to meet the campaign of 1813, and offers a remarkable specimen of the extravagance of the attempts of the late French government to impose on the credulity of the people. Men of property (p. 13) were surprized to read in the papers the offer to government of horses with which they did not intend to part; while conscripts, driven along frequently in chains and in carts, were startled to see in print that they had quitted their families with enthusiasm to fly to the defence of their country.' The author then proceeds to give a short abstract of the principal events of the last year's campaign in Germany, and comes subsequently to the invasion of the French territory by the allied powers. Entering now on the proper object of his work, he becomes more circumstantial, and details particular actions, such as the battle of La Rothiere, on 30th January, with considerable clearness. Bonaparte's design, he observes, was to overpower Blucher's army at Brienne, and his manoeuvres were at first successful: but they led only to his proceeding too far, and engaging such a number of the allies as were able to repulse him, even without waiting for the support of all their divisions. The uncertainty of the public mind in this country, with regard to the expected issue of the operations of this spring-campaign, is still fresh in our recollection, and seems to call for a few obser observations. That uncertainty was of a two-fold nature; consisting of, first,a distrust of the politics of Austria; and, secondly, a doubt whether, even if she were sincere, the allies would be completely successful. We were always of opinion that the degree of doubt and anxiety was too great, and that the nation did not make the deduction justified by the consideration that the editors of news-papers have an interest in disseminating reports, with a view to keep public sollicitude on the stretch. History has every where shewn us that marriage-connections, such as the one in question, have little effect on political combinations; and it was very clear that, during the autumn of 1813, Austria was the power which had dealt the most deadly blows to Bonaparte. If, then, in a political view, little ground of apprehension existed, much less was the issue to be doubted on military calculation. Bonaparte had thrown away in the deserts. of Russia the efficient parts of that engine, which compressed the European commonwealth; and his remaining portion of disciplined troops, whether stationed in Germany or drawn from Spain, had evidently been sacrificed in the sanguinary conflicts of May, September, and October. Levies in larges numbers, indeed, were still decreed to him by the Senate: but they were as little capable of performing the duty of soldiers, as a raw country-labourer is qualified for the business of an artiAccordingly, he was unable to bring into the field, in a collective shape, during the present year, above 130,000 men, against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, who were superior both in numbers and in discipline. The temporary advantage gained by him in February arose merely from the sudden direction of a mass of force against a particular point. While reading his vapouring bulletins, the public were not told how many thousand lives he lost by fatigue in his forced marches; nor were they called to compare the insignificance of the result with the brilliant consequences of similar movements in the days in which he found himself at the head of an army of veterans. In examining the different actions of the last campaign, we find only two that are intitled to the name of battles; viz. that of La Rothiere already mentioned, and that of Laon on the 9th March. Both were fought between Bonaparte and Blucher, and in both the superior firmness of a disciplined force was triumphant, without much difficulty, over the furious efforts of the French. It is true that the imprudent project of Bonaparte, of placing himself at the end of March in the rear of the Austrians, led to an accelerated decision of the contest: but the result would evidently have been the same in the course of another month, had he committed no such blunder, and had he been supported by all the success that the force under his controul could gain for him. APP, REV. VOL. LXXIV. Ll The |