itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say, should be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses. I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination. Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct and where men have got such determined leas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others. Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the association of ideas, the other of enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this essay had the second impression. In the sixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition. 3. Universal consent proves nothing innate.. 4. What is, is; and, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be not universally assented to. 5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. 6, 7. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. 8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. 9--11. It is false that reason discovers them. 12. The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these maxims. 13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. 14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate. 15, 16. The steps by which the mind attains several truths, 17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood proves them not innate. 18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three; that sweetness is not bitterness; and a 19. Such less general propo- 20. One and one equal to 21. These maxims not being 26. And so not innate. 28. Recapitulation. CHAP. III. but because profitable. 8. Conscience no proof of morse. 10. Men have contrary prac- 11-13. Whole nations reject se- 14. Those who maintain in- 21. Contrary principles in 22-26. How men commonly CHAP. IV. Other considerations about SECT. 1. Principles not innate, un- 6. Whole and part, not in- 7. Idea of worship not innate. ness, that all men should 13-16. Ideas of God various 17. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can 19. No propositions can be 21. Principles not innate, be- 22. Difference of men's dis- 2. All ideas come from sen- sation or reflection. 5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these. nished with these, accord- 10. The soul thinks not al- 11. It is not always conscious of it. 12. If a sleeping man thinks remembering it, in vain 15. Upon this hypothesis the 18. How knows any one that retain it the next mo. 20-23. No ideas but from sensa- tion, or reflection, evi. |