least amount of degeneracy, was exhibited in the formation of woman-the original type of man not having included diversity of sex. By farther steps of degradation, in different ways, the inferior animals were formed-birds, quadrupeds, and fishes.* In each of these, the rational soul became weaker and worse; its circular rotations ceased with the disappearance of the spherical cranium, and animal appetites with sensational agitations were left without control. As man, with his two emotional souls and body joined on to the rational soul and cranium, was a debased copy of the perfect rational soul and spherical body of the divine Kosmos, so the other inhabitants of the Kosmos proceeded from still farther debasement and disrationalization of the original type of man. Such is the view of Psychology given by Plato in the Timæus; beginning with the divine Kosmos, and passing downwards from thence to the triple soul of man, as well as to the various still lower successors of degenerated man. It is to be remarked that Plato, though he puts soul as prior to body in dignity and power, and as having for its functions to control and move body, yet always conceives soul as attached to body, and never as altogether detached, not even in the divine Kosmos. The soul, in Plato's view, is self-moving and self-moved: it is both Primum Mobile in itself, and Primum Movens as to the body; it has itself the corporeal properties of being extended and moved, and it has body implicated with it besides. The theory above described, in so far as it attributes to the soul-rational constituent elements (Idem, Diversum), continuous magnitude, and circular rotations, was peculiar to Plato, and is criticised by Aristotle as the peculiarity of his master. But several other philosophers agreed with Plato in considering selfmotion, together with motive causality and faculties perceptive and cognitive, to be essential characteristics of soul. Alkmæon declared the soul to be in perpetual motion, like all the celestial bodies; hence it was also immortal, as they were.‡ Herakleitus described it as the subtlest of elements, and as perpetually fluent; hence it was enabled to know other things, all of which were in flux and change. Diogenes of Apollonia affirmed that • Plato, Timæus, p. 91; Grote's Plato, p. 281-282. Aristot. De Animâ, I. 2, 405, a. 32. ANCIENT THEORIES OF THE SOUL. 615 the element constituent of soul was air, at once mobile, allpenetrating, and intelligent. Demokritus declared that among the infinite diversity of atoms, those of spherical figure were the constituents both of the element fire and of the soul; the spherical atoms were by reason of their figure the most apt and rapid in moving; it was their nature never to be at rest; and they imparted motion to everything else.* Anaxagoras affirmed Soul to be radically and essentially distinct from every thing else; but to be the great primary source of motion, and to be endued with cognitive power, though at the same time not suffering impressions from without.† Empedokles considered Soul to be a compound of the four elements--fire, air, water, earth; with Love and Hatred as principles of motion, the former producing aggregation of elements, the latter, disgregation; by means of each element, the soul became cognizant of the like element in the Kosmos. Some Pythagoreans looked upon the soul as an aggregate of particles of extreme subtlety, which pervaded the air and were in perpetual agitation. Other Pythagoreans, however, declared it to be an harmonious or proportional mixture of contrary elements and qualities; hence its universality of cognition, extending to all.‡ A peculiar theory was delivered by Xenokrates (who, having been fellow-pupil with Aristotle, under Plato, afterwards conducted the Platonic school, during all the time that Aristotle taught at the Lyceum), which Aristotle declares to involve greater difficulty than any of the others. Xenokrates described the soul as "a number-(a Monad or Indivisible Unit)-moving itself."§ He retained the self-moving property which Plato had declared to be characteristic of the soul, while he departed from Plato's doctrine of a soul with continuous extension. He thus fell back upon the Pythagorean idea of Number as the fundamental essence. Aristotle impugns, as alike untenable, both the two properties here alleged-number and self-motion. If the Monad both moves and is moved (he argues), it cannot be indivisible; if it be moved, it must have position, or must be a point; but the motion of a point is a line, without any of that variety • Aristot. De Animâ, I. p. 404, a. 8, 405, a. 22, 406, b. 17. + Aristot. De Animâ, I. p. 405, a. 13, b. 22. Aristot. De Animâ, I. p. 404, a. 17, 407, b. 28. § Aristot. De Animâ, I. 4, 408, b. 32, 4C9, b. 12. that constitutes life. How can the soul be a Monad? or if it be, what difference can exist between one soul and another, since Monads cannot differ from each other except in position? How comes it that some bodies have souls and others not? and how, upon this theory, can we explain the fact that many animated bodies, both plants and animals, will remain alive after being divided-the monadic soul thus exhibiting itself as many and diverse? Besides, the Monad set up by Xenokrates is hardly distinguishable from the highly attenuated body or spherical atom recognized by Demokritus as the origin or beginning of bodily motion. These and other arguments are employed by Aristotle to refute the theory of Xenokrates. In fact, he rejects all the theories then current. After having dismissed the self-motor doctrine, he proceeds to impugn the views of those who declared the soul to be a compound of all the four elements, in order that they might account for its percipient and cognitive faculties upon the maxim then very generally admitted*—That like is perceived and known by like. This theory, the principal champion of which was Empedokles, appears to Aristotle inadmissible. You say (he remarks) that like knows like; how does this consist with your other doctrine, that like cannot act upon, or suffer from, like, especially as you consider that both in perception and in cognition the percipient and cognizant suffers or is acted upon? + Various parts of the cognizant Subject, such as bone, hair, ligaments, &c., are destitute of perception and cognition; how then can we know anything about bone, hair, and ligaments, since we cannot know them by like? Suppose the Soul to be compounded of all the four elements; this may explain how it comes to know the four elements, themselves, but not how it comes to know all the combinations of the four; now innumerable combinations of the four are comprised among the Cognita. We must assume that the Soul contains in itself not merely the four elements, but also the laws or definite proportions wherein they can combine; and this is affirmed by no one.§ Moreover, Ens is an equivocal, or at least a multivocal, term; there are Entia Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 409, a. 29. ANCIENT THEORIES OF THE SOUL 617 belonging to each of the ten Categories. Now, the Soul cannot include in itself all the ten, for the different categories have no elements in common; in whichever category you rank the soul, it will know (by virtue of likeness) the Cognita belonging to that category, but it will not know the Cognita belonging to the other nine.* Besides, even if we grant that the Soul includes all the four elements, where is the cementing principle that combines all the four into one? The elements are merely matter; and what holds them together must be the really potent principle of soul; but of this no explanation is given. † Some philosophers have assumed (continues Aristotle) that Soul pervades the whole Kosmos and its elements; and that it is inhaled by animals in respiration along with the air. They forget that all plants, and even some animals, live without respiring at all; moreover, upon this theory, air and fire also, as possessing Soul, and what is said to be a better Soul, ought (if the phrase were permitted) to be regarded as animals. The Soul of air or fire must be homogeneous in its parts; the Souls of animals are not homogeneous, but involve several distinct parts or functions. § The Soul perceives, cogitates, opines, feels, desires, repudiates; farther, it moves the body locally, and brings about the growth and decay of the body. Here we have a new mystery-Is the whole Soul engaged in the performance of each of these functions, or has it a separate part exclusively consecrated to each? If so, how many are the parts? Some philosophers (Plato among them) declare the Soul to be divided, and that one part cogitates and cognizes, while another part desires. But upon that supposition, what is it that holds these different parts together? Certainly not the body (this is Plato's theory); on the contrary, it is the Soul that holds together the body; for as soon as the Soul is gone, the body rots and disappears. If there be any thing that keeps together the divers parts of the Soul as one, that Something must be the true * Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 410, a. 20. + Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 410, b. 12. Aristot. De Animâ, I. 2, 404, a. 10. τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν avarvony, &c. Compare the doctrine of Demokritus. § Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 411, a. 1-8-16. Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 411, a. 30. ¶ Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 411, b. 8. and fundamental Soul; and we ought not to speak of the Soul as having parts, but as essentially One and Indivisible, with several distinct faculties. Again, if we are to admit parts of the Soul, does each part hold together a special part of the body, as the entire Soul holds together the entire body? This seems impossible; for what part of the body can the Nous or Intellect (e.g.) be imagined to hold together? And besides, several kinds of plants and of animals may be divided, yet so that each of the separate parts shall still continue to live; hence it is plain that the Soul in each separate part is complete and homogeneous.* Aristotle thus rejects all the theories proposed by antecedent philosophers, but more especially the two following-That the Soul derives its cognitive powers from the fact of being compounded of the four elements; That the Soul is self-moved. He pronounces it incorrect to say that the Soul is moved at all.t He farther observes that none of the philosophers have kept in view either the full meaning or all the varieties of Soul; and that none of these defective theories suffices for the purpose that every good and sufficient theory ought to serve, viz., not merely to define the essence of the Soul, but also to define it in such a manner that the concomitant functions and affections of the Soul shall all be deducible from it. Lastly, he points out that most of his predecessors had considered that the prominent characteristics of Soul were-To be motive-To be percipient : § while, in his opinion, neither of these two characteristics was universal or fundamental. Aristotle requires that a good theory of the Soul shall explain alike the lowest vegetable soul, and the highest functions of the human or divine soul. And in commenting on those theorists who declared that the essence of soul consisted in movement, he remarks that their theory fails altogether in regard to the Nous (or cogitative and intellective faculty of the human soul); the operation of which bears far greater analogy to rest or suspension of movement, than to movement itself. || Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 411, b. 15-25. + Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 411, a. 25. ‡ Aristot. De Animâ, I. 1, 402, b. 18, seq.; I. 4, 408, a. 4; I. 5, 509, b. 15. § Aristot. De Animâ, I. 2. 403, b. 30. | Aristot. De Anima, I. 3, 407, a. 32. ἔτι δ' ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ ἢ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει, |