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the feelings of pleasure and pain, appetite and aversion.* The movements connected with these feelings, as with all sensation, begin and close with the central organ-the heart.+ Upon these are consequent the various passions and emotions; yet not without certain faculties of memory and phantasy accompanying or following the facts of sense.

Aristotle proceeds by gradual steps upward from the sentient Soul to the Noëtic (cogitant or intelligent) Soul-called in its highest perfection, Nous. While refuting the doctrine of Empedokles, Demokritus, and other philosophers, who considered cogitation or intelligence to be the same as sensible perception, and while insisting upon the distinctness of the two as mental phenomena, he recognizes the important point of analogy between them, that both of them include judgment and comparison; and he describes an intermediate stage called phantasy or imagination, forming the transition from the lower of the two to the higher. We have already observed that in the Aristotelian psychology, the higher functions of the Soul presuppose and are built upon the lower as their foundation, though the lower do not necessarily involve the higher. Without nutrition, there is no sense; without sense, there is no phantasy; without phantasy, there is no cogitation or intelligence.§ The higher psychical phenomena are not identical with the lower, yet neither are they independent thereof; they presuppose the lower as a part of their conditions. Here, and indeed very generally elsewhere, Aristotle has been careful to avoid the fallacy of confounding or identifying the conditions of a phenomenon with the phenomenon itself. (Mill's System of Logic, Book V. ch. 3, § 8.)

He proceeds to explain Phantasy or the Phantastic department of the Soul-the Phantasms that belong to it. It is not sensible perception, nor belief, nor opinion, nor knowledge, nor cogitation. Our dreams, though affections of the Sentient

* Aristot. De Animâ, II. 3, 414, b. 3-15; III. 7, 431, a. 9; De Somno et Vigil., c. 1, 454, b. 29.

+ Aristot. De Partibus Animalium, III. 4, 666, a. 12. Aristot. De Animâ, III. 3, 427, a. 25. § Aristot. De Animâ, III. 3, 427, b. 15. αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας.-ΙΙΙ. 7, 431, a. 16. ματος ἡ ψυχή -De Memoriâ et Reminiscent, ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος.

Pavraoía yàp čтepov kai οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσο c. 1, 449, b. 31. νοεῖν οὐκ

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Soul, are really phantasms in our sleep, when there is no visual sensation; even when awake, we have a phantasm of the Sun, as of a disk one foot in diameter-though we believe the Sun to be larger than the Earth.* Many of the lower animals have sensible perception without any phantasy; even those among them that have phantasy, have no opinion; for opinion implies faith, persuasion, and some rational explanation of that persuasion -to none of which does any animal attain.† Phantasy is an internal movement of the animated being (body and soul in one); belonging to the Sentient Soul, not to the Cogitant or Intelligent; not identical with the movement of sense, but continued from, or produced by that, and by that alone; accordingly, similar to the movement of sense and relating to the same matters. Since our sensible perceptions may be either true or false, so also may be our phantasms. And since these phantasms are not only like our sensations, but remain standing in the soul long after the objects of sense have passed away, they are to a great degree the determining causes both of action and emotion. They are such habitually to animals, who are destitute of Nous; and often even to intelligent men, if the Nous be overclouded by disease or drunkenness. §

In the Chapter now before us, Aristotle is careful to discriminate Phantasy from several other psychological phenomena wherewith it is liable to be confounded. But we remark with some surprise, that neither here, nor in any other part of his general Psychology, does he offer any exposition of Memory, the phenomenon more nearly approaching than any other to Phantasy. He supplied the deficiency afterwards by the short but valuable tract on Memory and Reminiscence; wherein he recognizes, and refers to, the more general work on Psychology. Memory bears on the past, as distinguished both from the present and

* Aristot. De Animâ, III. 3, 428, a. 5, b. 3; De Somno et Vig., c. 2, 456, 8.25. κινοῦνται δ ̓ ἔνιοι καθεύδοντες καὶ ποιοῦσι πολλὰ ἐγρηγορικά, οὐ μέντοι ἄνευ φαντάσματος καὶ αἰσθήσεώς τινος· τὸ γὰρ ἐνύπνιόν ἐστιν αἴσθημα τρόπον τινά.-Ibid., c. 1, 454, b. 10.

+ Aristot. De Animâ, III. 3, 428, a. 10-22-25.

Aristot. De Animâ, III. 3, 428, b. 10-15; De Somniis, c. 1, 459, a. 15. ? Aristot. De Animâ, III. 3, 428, b. 17. kai worλà Kar' avtηv (i, e. κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν) καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον.—ΙΙΙ. 3, 429, 8. 5. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι τὰς φαντασίας) ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ ̓ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, &c.

future. Memory and Phantasy are in some cases so alike, that we cannot distinguish clearly whether what is in our minds is a remembrance or a phantasm.* a phantasm. Both of them belong to the same psychological department—to the central Sentient principle, and not to the cogitant or intelligent Noûs. Memory as well as Phantasy are continuations, remnants, or secondary consequences, of the primary movements of sense; what in itself is a phantasm, may become an object of remembrance directly and per se; matters of cogitation, being included or implicated in phantasins, may also become objects of remembrance, indirectly and by way of accompaniment. † We can remember our prior acts of cogitation and demonstration; we can remember that, a month ago, we demonstrated the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles; but as the original demonstration could not be carried on without our having before our mental vision the phantasm of some particular triangle, so neither can the remembrance of the demonstration be made present to us without a similar phantasm. In acts of remembrance, we have a conception of past time, and we recognize what is now present to our minds as a copy of what has been formerly present to us, either as perception of sense or as actual cognition;§ while in phantasms, there is no conception of past time, nor any similar recognition, nor any necessary reference to our own past mental states; the phantasm is looked at by itself, and not as a copy. This is the main point of distinction between phantasm and remembrance; || what is remembered is a present phantasm assimilated to an impression of the past. Some of the superior animals possess both memory and phantasy. But other animals have neither; their sensations disappear, they

Aristot. De Memor. et Remin., c. 1, 451, a. 5, 449, a. 10.

+ Aristot. De Memor. et Remin., c. 1, 450, a. 23. Tivos μèv oùv tŵv τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἔστιν ἡ μνήμη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φαντασία· καὶ ἔστι μνημονευτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐστί φανταστά, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δ' ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας.

dei yàp oτav éveprý ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο

Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 1, 449, b. 20-450, a. 12. § Aristot. De Memor, et Rem., c. 1, 449, b. 22. κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.452, b. 28.

Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 1, 450, a. τὸ μνημονεύειν, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις. De Memoriâ, p. 240, ed. Spengel.

28, b. 30, 451, a 15. Themistius ad Aristot



have no endurance; while endurance is the basis both of phan

tasy and memory.*

But though some animals have Memory, no animal except man has Reminiscence. Herein man surpasses them all.† Aristotle draws a marked distinction between the two; between the (memorial) retentive and reviving functions, when working unconsciously and instinctively, and the same two functions, when stimulated and guided by a deliberate purpose of our own--which he calls Reminiscence. This last is like a syllogism or course of ratiocinative inference, performable only by minds capable of taking counsel and calculating. He considers Memory as a movement proceeding from the centre and organs of sense to the soul, and stamping an impression thereupon; while Reminiscence is a counter-movement proceeding from the soul to the organs of sense. In the process of Reminiscence, movements of the soul and movements of the body are conjoined, § more or less perturbing and durable according to the temperament of the individual. The process is intentional and deliberate, instigated by the desire to search for and recover some lost phantasm or cognition; its success depends upon the fact, that there exists by nature a regular observable order of sequence among the movements of the system, physical as well as psychical. The consequents follow their antecedents either universally, or at least according to customary rules, in the majority of cases.||

The consequent is (1) either like its antecedent, wholly or partially; or (2) contrary to it; or (3), has been actually felt in juxtaposition with it. In reminiscence, we endeavour to regain the forgotten consequent by hunting out some antecedent whereupon it is likely to follow; taking our start either from the present

* Aristot. Analyt. Poster. II. 99, b. 36. μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος. It may be remarked that in the Topica, Aristotle urges a dialectic objection against this or a similar doctrine—Topic., IV. 4, 125, b. 6-18—and against his own definition cited in the preceding note, where he calls μvýuŋ an ëğıs. Compare the first Chapter of the Metaphysica.

Aristot. De Memor. et Rem. c. 2, 453, a. 8. He draws the same distinction in Hist. Animal., I. 1, 488, b. 26.

Aristot. De Animâ, I. 4, 408, b. 19; De Memor. et Remin., c. 1, 450, 8. 30, 453, 8. 9-14. τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν οἷον συλλογισμός τις, § Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 2, 453, a. 14-23.

|| Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 2, 451, b. 10-17. ovuẞaívovor & ui ἀναμνήσεις, ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε.

moment or from some other known point.* We run over many phantasms until we hit upon the true antecedent; the possibility of reminiscence depends upon our having this within our mental reach, among our accessible stock of ideas; if such be not the case, reminiscence is impracticable, and we must learn over again.† We are most likely to succeed, if we get upon the track or order wherein events actually occurred; thus, if we are trying to recollect a forgotten verse or sentence, we begin to repeat it from the first word; the same antecedent may indeed call up different consequents at different times, but it will generally call up what has habitually followed it before.

The movements of Memory and of Reminiscence are partly corporeal and partly psychical, just as those of Sensation and Phantasy are. We compare in our remembrance greater and less, (either in time or in external magnitudes) through similar internal movements differing from each other in the same proportion, but all on a miniature scale.§ These internal movements often lead to great discomfort, when a person makes fruitless efforts to recover the forgotten phantasm that he desires; especially with excitable men, who are much disturbed by their own phantasms. They cannot stop the movement once begun; and when their sensitive system is soft and flexible, they find that they have unwittingly provoked the bodily movements belonging to anger or fear, or some other painful emotion. These movements, when once provoked, continue in spite of the opposition of the person that experiences them. He brings upon him

Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 2, 451, b. 18. diò kai τò épegîs Oŋpevομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου τινός, καὶ ἀφ ̓ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ συνεγγύς.

About the associative property of contraries, see again De Somno et Vigil., c. 1, 453, b. 27.

+ Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 2, 452, a. 5-12. woλλákis dè ñôŋ μèv ἀδυνατεῖ ἀναμνησθῆναι, ζητεῖν δὲ δύναται καὶ εὑρίσκει. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται κινοῦντι πολλὰ, ἕως ἂν τοιάυτην κινήθη κίνησιν, ἢ ἀκολουθήσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαί ἐστι τὸ ἐνεῖναι δυνάμει την κινοῦσαν· τοῦτο δὲ, ὥστ' εξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὧν ἔχει κινήσεων κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., c. 2, 452, a. 2-25.

§ Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., 452, b. 12. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ ὅμοια σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ ἀνάλογον καὶ

τὰ ἐκτός.

|| Aristot. De Memor. et Rem., 453, a. 22. ò ȧvaμipvŋokóμevos, kai θηρεύων σωματικόν τι κινεῖ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πάθος.

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