and disappointments, as well as their success this might contribute materially to the improvement of the art of education; at present, we can judge of them only by the imperfect representations of their biographers: from these we learn, that they have generally been persons of profligate characters, and wayward tempers, incapable of directing themselves with common sense, frequently without common honesty, and shamelessly insolent and ungrateful to their benefactors. From Savage and Chatterton to Morland and Dermody, this, with few exceptions, has been their history. And after all, their talents have seldom risen to the first rank of excellence; the same conceit and wilfulness, which spoiled their moral characters, prevented their submitting, even in their chosen pursuits, to that steady course of perseverance, which alone can carry any design to perfection; they would work only how and when they pleased; they would admit no criticism, listen to no rules, and follow no judgment but their own. What would be the consequence of admiring and following such examples? If, in-. · stead of impressing by education the belief, that it is necessary to refer to the experience of age and the wisdom of preceding generations, each ignorant youth were suffered to fancy, that he could best instruct himself, human beings, instead of making any further progress in knowledge, must reiterate experiments to arrive at the same

conclusions, and die before they had time to advance one step. So much for the system of absolute freedom and self-taught genius. It may be thought, that such extravagances did not require a serious refutation; but, without being distinctly avowed, these opinions have gained ground with many.

There are others, who, though they do not object to the restraints of education altogether, nor yet believe in the innate force of genius, object to leaving the choice of a child's profession to a parent, because they think that the child would apply with more vigour and success to any pursuit of his own choosing, than to one predetermined for him even by the most judicious parent. In support of this opinion they cite instances of celebrated men, who, in direct opposition to the will and judgment of their parents, have risen to eminence in pursuits of their own selection, whilst they never could, or would make any progress in the professions to which they had been destined by parental authority. So that allowing that the poet might with equal application, and a different direction of his powers, have made a mathematician, or the mathematician a poet, the lawyer a physician, or the physician a lawyer, yet, if the will were wanting, the capability would be fruitless; and it comes to the same thing in the end, whether the youth would not, or could not succeed in a given profession.

C

In examining this objection, it is just to guard with equal care against the wilfulness of children, and the despotism of parents. The pleasure of acting in opposition to the will of others appears, undoubtedly, from several examples, to be a very strong motive; it has induced many to undergo great labour, and to make astonishing exertions; but it would be the height of imprudence to allow such wilfulness to become a governing motive. It is not a power that can be directed with certainty, or applied with facility; it is a force dangerous in its exertion, and dangerous in its recoil. It is only when the will is regulated by reason, that it possesses uniformly salutary power. Consequently it is the principal business of education to bring the will under the control of reason, and why not in the choice of a profession, as in all other cases? And if reason decides, no matter whose that reason may be, whether it be the parent's or the child's it will have the same effect, and will be equally conclusive and agreeable to the pupil. As far as the desire to follow any pursuit, merely because it is his own will to do so, appears in a child, it is a vice of temper, which, instead of being yielded to, or considered. as a proof of genius, should be carefully, but gently corrected. As to the general question, it is an error in reasoning to argue from individual instances, as from a universal rule, that young people never feel the same ardour in the pursuit

of any object which their friends have suggested or approved, as is shown by theu ndisciplined and perverse, in following their own fancies. When the conviction of the understanding supports the wishes and advice of friends, and where affection and reason both tend to one and the same object, surely there is a probability of its being pursued with all the constancy as well as ardour of which the youthful mind is capable. The examples, in fact, are full as numerous on this side of the question as on the other. The caprice of the will in a diseased condition should not be taken as the history of the human mind in its healthy state. Virtuous enthusiasm, that enthusiasm which has in all ages animated men to the greatest exertions; that enthusiasm which has made patriots and orators, has not been raised by the wretched spirit of contradiction, but appears to have been the strong, resolute, permanent action of the will in obedience to the impulse of moral conviction, or to the dictates of the understanding. It would be a fatal error to set the idea of liberty and of reason in opposition to each other in education: in reality, all the pleasures of liberty can best be enjoyed in the course of a judicious education; for youth, who are not taught to yield to reason, must, in opposing it, expose themselves to more restraint and coercion from external circumstances, and from the crossing interests and wills

of different persons, than they would endure by rational submission to parental authority.

It is impossible that children, who are ignorant of the difficulties that occur in different professions, of the talents, knowledge, labour requisite in each, can be competent judges of what would probably suit even their tastes when they grow up to be men, A boy, who at eight years old might choose to be a lawyer, might change his mind when he found himself in a special pleader's laborious office; and what is then to be done? If the child choose, and choose ill in the first instance, is a parent to permit him to change, and how often to change his profession? It will not surely, on considering these difficulties, be further contended, that the first symptoms of childish inclination should be followed; and if, instead of letting boys decide for themselves in childhood, parents wait till their sons are of an age to compare different professions, and then to make their choice, much time must have been lost which might have formed the habits and furnished the knowledge essential to future success. The determining early in childhood on the choice of a profession would, in this point of view, be highly advantageous, because, supposing abilities and opportunities nearly equal, time becomes the measure of acquirements, and consequently affords an estimate of any individual's chance of