ened mis likely to be brought about by the unassisted powers [b] Threat of nature. 2. In the case of a threatened mischief; where it is such as appears likely to be brought about through the intentional and conscious agency of man.* chief; XII. low its de 6-or the bo- 6. Where (though the penal clause may exert a dily organs cannot fol- full and prevailing influence over the will of the termination: party) yet his physical faculties (owing to the preas under; dominant influence of some physical cause) are not in a condition to follow the determination of the will: insomuch that the act is absolutely involuntary. Physical com- Such is the case of physical compulsion or restraint, pulsion or by whatever means brought about; where the man's restraint. hand, for instance, is pushed against some object which his will disposes him not to touch; or tied down from touching some object which his will disposes him to touch. These are, XIII. 1. Where, in the sort of case in question, the punishment would produce more evil than the offence *The influences of the moral and religious sanctions, or, in would. other words, of the motives of love of reputation and religion, Why the influence of are other causes, the force of which may, upon particular occathe moral sions, come to be greater than that of any punishment which and religious sanctions is the legislator is able, or at least which he will think proper, to not mention- apply: These, therefore, it will be proper for him to have his ed in the eye upon. But the force of these influences is variable and different in different times and places: the force of the foregoing influences is constant and the same, at all times and every 1. Where, on the one hand, the nature of the same view. where. offence; on the other hand, that of the punishment, are, in the ordinary state of things, such, that when compared together, the evil of the latter will turn out to be greater than that of the former. XIV. Now the evil of the punishment divides itself into four branches, by which so many different sets of 1. The evil of coercion or persons are affected. Evil producible by a pu nishmentits four branches straint. hension. restraint: or the pain which it gives a man not to be viz. [a] Reable to do the act, whatever it be, which, by the apprehension of the punishment, he is deterred from doing. This is felt by those by whom the law is observed. 2. The evil of apprehension: or the pain [b] Appre which a man, who has exposed himself to punishment, feels at the thoughts of undergoing it. This is felt by those by whom the law has been broken, and who feel themselves in danger of its being executed upon them. 3. The evil of sufferance:* [c] Sufferor the pain which a man feels, in virtue of the punishment itself, from the time when he begins to undergo it. This is felt by those by whom the law is broken, and upon whom it comes actually to be executed. 4. The pain of sympathy, and the other [d] Deriva derivative evils resulting to the persons who are in tive evils. connection with the several classes of original sufferers just mentioned. Now of these four lots of evil, the first will be greater or less, according to the ance. where. These, therefore, it can never be proper to look upon as safe grounds for establishing absolute impunity: owing (as in the above-mentioned cases of infancy and intoxication) to the impracticability of ascertaining the matter of fact. * See ch. v. [Pleasures and pains]. See ch. xii. [Consequences] iv. (The evil of the offence ing to the nature of the offence, cannot be represented here). nature of the act from which the party is restrained: the second and third, according to the nature of the punishment which stands annexed to that offence. XV. The On the other hand, as to the evil of the offence, being differ- this will also, of course, be greater or less, accordent, according to the nature of each offence. The proportion between the one evil and the other will therefore be different in the case of each particular offence. cases, therefore, where punishment is unprofitable on this ground, can by no other means be discovered, than by an examination of each particular offence; which is what will be the business of the body of the work. 2.-Or in the individual case in reason of, XVI. 2. Where, although in the ordinary state of things, the evil resulting from the punishment is not question: by greater than the benefit which is likely to result from the force with which it operates, during the same space of time, towards the excluding the evil of the offence, yet it may have been rendered so by the influence of some occasional circumstances. In the [a] The mul- number of these circumstances may be, 1. The multitude of de-titude of delinquents at a particular juncture; being linquents. of a delin quent's service. such as would increase, beyond the ordinary measure, the quantum of the second and third lots, and thereby also of a part of the fourth lot, in the evil of the [b] The value punishment. 2. The extraordinary value of the services of some one delinquent; in the case where the effect of the punishment would be to deprive the community of the benefit of those services. 3. The displeasure of the people; that is, of an indefinite number of the members of the same community, in [c] The displeasure of the people. cases where (owing to the influence of some occasional incident) they happen to conceive, that the offence or the offender ought not to be punished at all, or at least ought not to be punished in the way in question. 4. The displeasure of foreign powers; [d] The dis that is, of the governing body, or a considerable number of members of some foreign community or communities, with which the community in question is connected. pleasure of foreign powers. § 5. Cases where punishment is needless. These are, Where the purpose of putting an end to the practice may be attained as effectually at a cheaper rate: by instruction, for instance, as well as by terror: by informing the understanding, as well as by exercising an immediate influence on the will. This seems to be. the case with respect to all those offences which consist in the disseminating pernicious principles in matters of duty; of whatever kind the duty be; whether political, or moral, or religious. And this, whether such principles be disseminated under, or even without, a sincere persuasion of their being beneficial. I say, even without: for though in such a case it is not instruction that can prevent the writer from endeavouring to inculcate his principles, yet it may the readers from adopting them: without which, his endeavouring to inculcate them will do no harm. In such a case, the sovereign will commonly have little need to take an active part: if it be the interest of one individual to inculcate principles that are pernicious, it will as surely be the interest of other 1. Where the .mischief is to be prevented at a cheaper rate: as, By instruc tion. individuals to expose them. But if the sovereign must needs take a part in the controversy, the pen proper weapon to combat error with, not the is the sword. Of the proportion between punishments and offences. Recapitula WE have seen that the general object of all laws tion. Four objects of punish ment. is to prevent mischief; that is to say, when it is worth while; but that, where there are no other means of doing this than punishment, there are four cases in which it is not worth while. II. When it is worth while, there are four subordinate designs or objects, which, in the course of his endeavours to compass, as far as may be, that one general object, a legislator, whose views are governed by the principle of utility, comes naturally to propose to himself. 1st Object to prevent III. 1. His first, most extensive, and most eligible ob all offences, ject, is to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever :* in other * By offences I mean, at present, acts which appear to him to have a tendency to produce mischief. |