108 RIGHT AND OBLIGATION. for me to exact it from the industrious father of a sinking and industrious family. There is therefore a difference between a legal right and a moral rightness. A claim may rightfully belong to me, and I can therefore prosecute it at law, and yet it may be extremely right in me to postpone, if not altogether to relinquish it. I may have a right to prosecute, and yet it may not be right in me to enter on the prosecution. It may thus be altogether wrong to insist upon a right. 244. The existing jurisprudence of society ought not to be complained of because there are many things morally right which it has not made legally binding, and many things most offensively wrong which it does not punish: because there would be no scope for the generosities of our nature, if man were not left at liberty, either to insist upon his claims, or to forbear them at his pleasure. It would supersede the need of compassion, if, upon every occasion when it were right for it to come forth with its willing dispensations, law also came forth with the authoritative declaration that they were altogether due; thereby turning that which ought to be a matter of free indulgence, into a matter of strict and legal necessity, and thereby also destroying motives to industry and economy in the poor, and the feeling of gratitude when relieved by law. 245. But while the right and the rightness are separable in regard to the holder of the right, they are not so in regard to the other party. Though it be sometimes right for the creditor to forbear the prosecution of a debt, yet it is right for the debtor to strain his labor and his frugality to the utmost, in order to make out the payment. I may have a right over another man which it might be very wrong for me to act upon. But if another man have a right over me, it is never wrong, it is right, for me to act upon it. It is not at all times right in a man to proceed to the very uttermost of law upon his own right; but at all times right in him to defer the very uttermost to the rights of others. 246. The counterpart of a right upon one side, is an obligation on the other. If a man have a right to my services, I am under an obligation to render them. The counterpart again of a rightness, is not obligation, but DUTY AND OBLIGATION. approbation. If a man show a right obligation and my part to submit to it. a rightness before me, it is my part to it is my duty to do it. 109 over me, it is my If any man show approve of it, and 247. Duty is a wider term than obligation; just as right, the adjective, is wider than right, the substantive; as when we say that a poor man has no right to relief, yet it is right he should have it. My obligation is to give another man his right; my duty is to do what is right. The word obligation is not, however, used always in so narrow a sense, but is extended to the same limits as duty. It is our duty to observe all rectitude, though there existed no being in the universe who had a right to enjoin the performance of it. It may be our duty to give to a needy person, though the thing given is in no way his due. It may be my duty to forgive a guilty person, though to say that forgiveness was his due would be a contradiction in terms. The terms right and rightness, though distinct, appear to be closely associated in the minds of men. It may be that I ought to give to another a sum of money which I do not owe him. We do not owe a man forgiveness, when at the same time we ought to forgive him. There is a distinction then between duty regarded in the light of moral propriety or rectitude, and duty regarded in the light of moral obligation. If we look to morality only as it operates in human society and without reference to the Supreme Being, then we have many a rightness without a corresponding right; many duties which on my part should be performed, but not one of which is due to any living creature; many actions that may be the object of praise, and yet are not at all the matters of obligation. They are virtuous, and yet I am not bound to do them. But God, who has an absolute property in us, and an absolute power over us, and whose will is on the side of virtue, has by his rightful authority turned proprieties and moralities into precepts: he has commanded them to be observed, and has thus brought them within the limits of moral obligation. What our moral faculty recommends as so many proprieties, the law of God enjoins as so many precepts. In 110 DUTY AND OBLIGATION. virtue of our particular relationship to God, all whose commandments are infallibly right, there is naught in the shape of duty, which is not also due to the Being who made us; there is nothing that we ought to do, which we do not also owe to the Master who claims it in the shape of obedience to himself; there is naught which is simply becoming because of its moral goodness, which is not also legally binding because of a law from heaven that authoritatively requires it. It is thus and thus alone, as far as we can perceive, that moral approbation and moral obligation have come to be coextensive with each other; and that each is alike applicable to virtue throughout the whole length and breadth of its territory. It is because of God's interposing this authority in behalf of what is right, that, though before a mere propriety, and therefore simply the object of approbation, it now becomes a precept, and is therefore a matter of actual obligation. Yet, apart from the authority of God, and without any reference, at the time, of our thoughts to him at all, we are accustomed to talk, not merely of the rectitude of morality, but also of the obligations of morality, because it belongs to the office of conscience to act the part of a judge, and condemn us when we refuse to do what is conceived to be right, and to reward us for a contrary course. We are so constituted as to feel that we ought to do a thing which we conceive to be right, simply because we conceive it to be right. There is an inherent sense of obligation to do what is right. If it be asked, why must I do what is right? the answer is, because it is right. Why should I do what I ought? Because I ought. This is the ultimate answer, and to the unsophisticated and honest mind is a sufficient answer. A man's 248. The opposite of rights, are wrongs. rights may be infringed, transgressed by the actions of other men. Thus a man infringes my right to personal safety, by striking me; my right to my property, by stealing it. He who thus violates a man's rights does him a wrong. 249. The terms applied to actions, the opposite of right, are, violations of duties, transgressions, offenses, crimes, vices, sins. 250. The law assigns to each person his rights; but the law also aims at giving to each person what it is right that he should have. That which is legally fixed is also intended to be morally right. Hence the law must depend on morality, and hence the rules and definitions of law may change from time to time, to become more nearly conformed to what is right in itself. In the progress of society men endeavor to determine their rights more rightly; to make laws more just. Thus law must ultimately be regulated by morality. 251. The systems of law especially worthy of our study are the Roman, the English, and our own-which is founded on the latter. [Whewell, vol. i.; Chalmers' Works.] 240. What is the origin and meaning of the term right, as a substantive? 241. What is natural jurisprudence? 242. What is the object of civil law? 243. What ambiguity is there in the use of the word right? 244. Is the existing jurisprudence of society to be complained of, because there are many things morally right which it has not made legally binding, and many things most offensively wrong which it does not punish? 245. While the right and the rightness are separable in regard to the holder of the right, are they so in regard to the other party? 246. What are the counterparts of right and rightness? 247. How are obligation and duty then to be distinguished? 248. What is the opposite of rights? 249. What terms are applied to actions which are the opposite of right? 250. What relation do the laws of a state bear to morality? 251. What systems of law especially deserve our notice and study? CHAPTER II. PERSONAL RIGHTS. 252. DR. PALEY, in treating upon personal rights, considers them (1.) as natural or adventitious; (2.) as alienable or unalienable; (3.) as perfect or imperfect. 253. Natural rights are such as would belong to a man although there subsisted in the world no civil government whatever. Such, for example, as a man's right to his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of his personal labor; to the use, in common with others, of air, light, and water. 254. Adventitious rights are dependent on the laws and institutions of civil government: such as the right of a king over his subjects; of a general over his soldiers; a 112 PERFECT AND IMPERFECT RIGHTS. right to elect or appoint magistrates, to impose taxes, decide disputes; a right, in few words, possessed by one man or a particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the rest. 255. In regard to alienable and unalienable rights, the former are those which may be transferred to another person; the latter may not. The right to most of those things which we call property, is alienable; the right of a prince over his people, of a husband over his wife, is unalienable. The natural rights may, however, be forfeited by crime. A man may be deprived of liberty to prevent his injuring others. 256. Perfect rights are those which may be asserted by force, or, what in civil society comes into the place of private force, by course of law; imperfect rights may not. 257. A man's right to his life, person, house, are examples of perfect rights: for if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by instant violence, or punish the aggressor by law; a man's right to his estate, furniture, and all ordinary articles of property: for if they be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the author of the injury to make restitution or satisfaction. 258. Of imperfect rights the following examples are adduced :— In elections or appointments to offices, the best qualified candidate has a right to success; yet, if he be rejected, he has no remedy. He can neither seize the office by force, nor obtain redress at law; his right therefore is imperfect. A poor neighbor has a right to relief, yet if it be refused him, he must not extort it. A benefactor has a right to returns of gratitude from the person he has obliged; yet, if he meet with none, he must acquiesce. Children have a right to affection and education from their parents; and parents, on their part, to duty and reverence from their children; yet, if these rights be on either side withholden, there is no legal compulsion by which they can be enforced. 259. There are cases in which a person may have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means necessary to obtain it. By reason of the indeterminateness either of the object or of the circumstances of the |