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right, the permission of force in this case would in its consequence lead to the permission of force in other cases, where there existed no right at all.

A poor man has a right to relief from the rich; but the mode, season, and amount of that relief, who shall contribute to it, or how much, is not ascertained. Yet these points must be ascertained before a claim to relief can be prosecuted by force. For to allow the poor to ascertain these points for themselves, would be to expose property to so many of these claims, that it would lose its value, or rather, would cease to be property.

The same observation holds of all other cases of imperfect rights; not to mention that in the instances of gratitude, affection, reverence, and the like, force is excluded by the very idea of the duty, which must be voluntary, or it cannot be performed at all.

260. Where the right is imperfect, the corresponding obligation is imperfect also in the sense already explained. I am under obligation to relieve the poor, to be grateful to my benefactors, take care of my children, and reverence my parents; but, in all these cases, my obligation, like their right, is imperfect.

261. The epithets perfect and imperfect, thus applied, are liable to objection. They seem to be ill-chosen on this account, that the use of them leads many to imagine that there is less guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation than of a perfect one; whereas, an obligation being perfect or imperfect determines only whether force may or may not be employed to enforce it, and determines nothing else.

Religion and virtue find their principal exercise among the imperfect obligations; the laws of civil society take pretty good care of the rest. [Paley's Moral Philosophy.]

262. According to Dr. Channing, man's rights belong to him as a moral being, as capable of perceiving moral distinctions, as a subject of moral obligation. As soon as he becomes conscious of duty, a kindred consciousness springs up that he has a right to do what the sense of duty enjoins, and that no foreign will or power can obstruct his moral action without crime. That same inward principle which teaches a man what he is bound to do to others, teaches equally, and at the same instant, what others are bound to do to him. That same voice which

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forbids him to injure a fellow-creature, forbids every fellow-creature to do him harm.

In answer to the question, What rights belong to human nature? he observes: They may all be comprised in the right, which belongs to every rational being, to exercise his powers for the promotion of his own and others' happiness and virtue. These are the great purposes of his existence. He is bound to make himself and others better and happier according to his ability; and others are equally bound to allow him to accomplish this grand purpose of existence, unmolested. He has a right, therefore, to use the means given by God for this purpose. He has a right to be respected according to his moral worth; a right to be protected by impartial laws; a right to be exempted from coercion, stripes, and punishment, as long as he respects the rights of others. He has a right to an equivalent for his labor. He has a right to sustain domestic relations, to discharge their duties, and to enjoy the happiness which flows from fidelity in these and other relations.

These and other human rights are not to be given up to society as a prey. On the contrary, the great end of civil society is to secure them. The great end of government is to repress all wrong. It is said that in forming civil society, the individual surrenders a part of his rights. It would be more proper to say that he adopts new modes of securing them. He consents, for example, to desist from self-defense, that he and all may be more effectually defended by the public force. He consents to submit his cause to an umpire or tribunal, that justice may be more impartially awarded, and that he and all may enjoy more enduring freedom. He consents to part with a portion of his property in taxation, that his own and others' property may be the more secure. He submits to certain restraints, that he and others may enjoy more enduring freedom. He expects an equivalent for what he relinquishes, and insists on it as his right.

The authority of the state to impose laws on its members, is cheerfully allowed; but the state is equally restrained with individuals by the moral law. For example, it may not, must not, on any account, put an innocent man to death, or require of him a dishonorable or criminal service. It may demand allegiance, but only on the

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ground of the protection it affords. It may pass laws, but only impartial ones, framed for the whole, and not for the few. It must regard every man, over whom it extends its authority, as a vital part of itself, as entitled to its care, and to its provisions for liberty and happiness.

That government is most perfect, in which policy is most entirely subjected to justice, or in which the supreme and constant aim is to secure the rights of every human being. This is the beautiful idea of a free government, and no government is free but in proportion as it realizes this. Liberty must not be confounded with popular institutions. A representative government may be as despotic as an absolute monarchy. In as far as it tramples on the rights of many or of one, it is a despotism.

To states, as to individuals, rectitude is the supreme law. It was never designed that the public good, as disjoined from this, as distinct from justice and reverence for all rights, should be comprehended and made an end. The good of the individual is more important than the outward prosperity of the state.

[These important positions have been eloquently defended by the late Dr. Channing in the second chapter of his work on Slavery.]

252. How has Dr. Paley divided rights, when applied to persons?

253. How are natural rights defined?

254. How are adventitious rights defined and illustrated?

255. How are alienable and unalienable rights explained?

256. What are the rights which are denominated perfect and imperfect?

257. What examples of perfect rights are given?

258. What examples does Dr. Paley also furnish of imperfect rights? 259. How can a person have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means necessary to obtain it?

260. Where the right is imperfect, is the corresponding obligation imperfect also?

261. Are the epithets perfect and imperfect, thus applied, liable to objection?

262. What view has Dr. Channing taken of human rights?

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FORMS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER III.

THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT.

263. THE desire of civil society is a powerful spring of human action; and man cannot exist as man except he exist in civil society under the sway of rules of action really enforced by some of the members of the community, who for this purpose are invested with the rights of government, and possess authority in the community.

264. The rights of government are exemplified,(1.) Even in the family, and especially in families where the paternal power is most ample.

(2.) When the children of such a family grow up, and when they themselves marry and have children, we may still conceive the habit of obedience to the head of the family to remain. As the family extends, it becomes a family in a wider sense: a house, a tribe, a clan, a nation; but it may still continue to recognize a supreme right to obedience in the common parent. Such is a patriarchal government.

(3.) The patriarchal form of society being broken up, the mixture of families, their migrations and various fortunes, still further loosen and destroy the bonds of patriarchal government, and form men into nations, according to various conditions of race, dwelling-place, and history. The national government then takes the place of the patri

archal.

265. The supreme authority of a nation may reside in one person, or in many. In most nations there is a difference of ranks connected more or less closely with the ex

ercise of the supreme power. These have certain rights with reference to each other. This constitutes the political structure of society. The laws which determine the structure of the government and the duties of its officers, are the constitution of the nation.

266. The various forms of civil government are―

(1.) Absolute monarchy, or despotism, in which the supreme authority and legislative power is vested in one individual.

(2.) An aristocracy, in which it is exercised by a body

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of men, in the election of whom the people are not consulted.

(3.) A democracy, or republic, in which the supreme power is exercised, either collectively in person, or, as in the United States, through their agents or representatives, chosen by them at stated periods for this purpose.

(4.) A mixed monarchy, partaking of all the above forms, yet differing essentially from each. This form is adopted in England and France.

267. The various branches of a well-regulated civil government are, the legislative or law-making, whose office it is to remove out of the laws all that is unjust, so as to make them more and more just; the judicial, which decides disputed questions that arise among its citizens concerning their rights and obligations; and the executive, which executes existing laws, and judicial decisions.

268. Offenses against the rights of government are, rebellion, when subjects openly and by force resist their rulers; treason, when by combination and contrivance they seek to dispossess them; sedition, when they strive to transfer some of the functions of government to other hands than the regularly constituted authorities.

In many free states, where the citizens have a considerable share in the government, they are divided into parties, which act upon opposite or different maxims in the administration of the state.

When a party acts not for the good of the state, but for its own advantage as a party, it is a faction.

269. Law is distinguished into the law of nature (jus natura), embracing that which is common in the views and determinations of all civilized countries in regard to rights and obligations; and into civil or municipal law (jus civile, or jus municipale), that which is peculiar in the law of a particular state or city.

There is also international jus, or law of nations, which defines and enforces the rights which nations may claim against each other.

270. The obligation of law has been distinguished into moral and natural. We are under a moral obligation, that is, we are bound, in conscience, to obey every good law. We are under a natural obligation, that is, we are determined by prudence, to obey even those bad laws which we cannot transgress without incurring a penalty.