REGARD TO OUR OWN HAPPINESS. 143 of good dispositions, and the suppression of the bad, and the formation of those habits that will prepare for the successful discharge of the duties of life. It will not be attempted to enumerate here the different habits, to the formation of which we should give our attention. The subject will be introduced again in the next chapter, and has been considered in Book II. chap. II. sect. III. 332. Industry is specially important. This is of the greatest value to man in regard to everything that tends to elevate him in goodness, in greatness, or in happiness. "All is the gift of industry: Whate'er exalts, embellishes, and renders life delightful." [Dewar, vol. ii. p. 500.] * * * 330. Whence arises to man the obligation to form good habits? 331. What then should be the principal object of education? 332. But what habit is there which deserves special notice, from its direct influence on our religious and moral improvement, on the equability of our temper, and on the permanence of our happiness? CHAPTER VI. PRUDENCE, OR A SUITABLE REGARD TO OUR OWN SECTION I.-NATURE OF THE DUTY, AND THE MANNER OF 333. THE virtue of prudence implies a steady regard, in the conduct of life, to the happiness and perfection of our own nature, and a diligent study of the means by which these ends may be attained. 334. It is merely a constitutional principle, and insep-arable from the nature of man as a rational and sensitive being. Its moral character depends on the direction it is allowed to take, and its deference to higher principles and rules of action. It is regarded by all men as a duty to promote their own happiness, and we censure those who neglect to do this. The sanctions of law, both human and divine, imply an obligation to regard our own happiness. This 144 THE SOVEREIGN GOOD. duty is implied in the fundamental law of morality, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It is therefore our duty to promote our own happiness no less than that of our neighbor. It is also an inspired injunction, "Do thyself no harm." It must also be considered right to exercise any of our constitutional principles, under certain restrictions. 335. If we could at once gratify all the propensities of our nature, that would be our highest possible happiness, and what we might call our sOVEREIGN GOOD; but that cannot be; for our own propensities and desires are often inconsistent, so that if we comply with one, we must contradict another. He who is enslaved to sensuality, cannot at the same time enjoy the more lofty pleasures of science and virtue; and he who devotes himself to science or adheres to virtue, must often act in opposition to his inferior appetites. The ambitious man cannot labor for the acquisition of power, and taste the sweets of indolence at the same time. The miser, while he indulges himself in the contemplation of his wealth, must be a stranger to the pleasures of beneficence. The gratification of all our appetites and desires at once is, therefore, impossible. 336. Since all the desires and appetites of our nature cannot be gratified at once, it is necessary for us to form to ourselves or to adopt some plan or system of conduct, in subordination to which all other objects are to be secured. To ascertain what this system ought to be, is a problem which in all ages employed the speculations of philosophers. Among the ancients, the question concerning the sovereign good was the principal subject of controversy which divided the schools; and it was treated in such a manner as to involve almost every other question of ethics. It is obvious, from what has been said above, that some degree of self-denial must be practiced by every man, whether good or bad-by the ruffian as well as the saint; and man's greatest possible happiness must be, at least in the present state, not a complete gratification of all our propensities, but the most comprehensive gratification of which we are capable. EPICUREAN SYSTEM. 333. What is implied in the duty of prudence? 145 334. Has the desire of happiness (the principle of self-love) any moral character is it an object either of approbation or of blame? 335. Is happiness to be attained by giving every appetite and desire the gratification they demand? 336. Since all the appetites and desires of our nature cannot be gratified at once, how is the largest amount of happiness to be secured? SECTION II.-SYSTEMS OF THE GRECIAN SCHOOLS, IN RELATION TO HAPPINESS. 337. THE opinions entertained by the ancients respecting the sovereign, or supreme good, may all be reduced to three: those of the Epicureans, of the Stoics, and of the Peripatetics. To one or other of these three opinions may be referred all merely human schemes of happiness. 338. The fundamental principle of the Epicurean system was, that bodily pleasure and pain were the sole ultimate objects of desire and aversion. These were desired and shunned on their own account; other things were desired and valued according to their tendency to procure the one of these, or to save us from the other. This system placed happiness in ease of body and tranquillity of mind, but much more in the latter than in the former, insomuch that Epicurus affirmed a wise man might be happy in the midst of bodily torments. It is a system which tends avowedly to recommend a life of indolent and selfish indulgence, and a total abstraction from the concerns and duties of the world. Hence many of the disciples of Epicurus brought so much discredit on their principles by the dissoluteness of their lives, that the word Epicurean came gradually to be understood as characteristical of a person devoted to sensual gratifications. The influence of these principles on the manners of the later Romans has been remarked by many writers, and was foreseen, ages before, by their virtuous and enlightened ancestors. This fact, which has not been sufficiently attended to, deserves the serious consideration of those who call in question the effect of speculative opinions on national character. [D. Stewart's Works, vol. v. pp. 494, 495.] 339. In opposition to the Epicurean doctrine already stated, the Stoical system placed the supreme good in rectitude of conduct, without any regard to the event. It did not, however, as has been supposed, recommend G 146 STOICAL AND PERIPATETIC SYSTEMS. an indifference to external objects, nor a life of inactivity and apathy. On the contrary, it taught that nature pointed out to us certain objects of choice and of rejection, and among these some to be more chosen and avoided than others; and that virtue consisted in choosing and rejecting objects according to their intrinsic value. The Stoical system, so far from withdrawing men from the duties of life, was eminently favorable to social and active virtue. Its peculiar and distinguishing tenet was, that our happiness did not depend on the attainment of the objects of our choice, but on the part that we acted; but this principle was inculcated not to damp our exertions, but to lead us to rest our happiness only on circumstances which we ourselves could command. Their system inculcated that prudence and propriety should be consulted and followed, and then we should give ourselves no trouble about the consequences, but be satisfied with any that might ensue, and submit to the will of the higher powers. They believed that whatever happens is calculated to produce the highest good of the universe. 340. The Epicurean system was one of selfishness and prudent indulgence, which placed happiness in a seclusion from care, and in an indifference to all the concerns of mankind. By the Stoics, on the contrary, virtue was supposed to consist in the affectionate performance of any good office toward their fellow-creatures, and in full resignation to Providence for everything independent of their own choice. 341. The Peripatetic system maintained that it was not the mere possession, but the exercise of virtue that made men happy; and for the proper exercise of virtue they thought that prosperity was as necessary as light is for the exercise of the faculty of sight. All these three sects acknowledged the necessity of virtue, or allowed that, in every well-directed pursuit of happiness, the strictest regard to morality was required. The Stoics alone maintained that this regard itself was happiness; or that to run the course of an active, strenuous, wise, and beneficent mind, was itself the very good which we ought to pursue. It is obvious also, from the opinions now reviewed, that happiness arises chiefly from the mind, and not from the external circumstances of man. INFLUENCE OF TEMPER ON HAPPINESS. 147 337. What opinions were entertained by the ancients respecting the sovereign or supreme good? 338. What was the fundamental principle of the Epicurean system? 339. What was the opinion of the Stoics? 340. How may the Epicurean and Stoical systems be compared? 341. What was the doctrine of the Peripatetics? SECTION III-INFLUENCE OF TEMPER UPON OUR HAPPINESS. 342. OUR happiness is influenced by our temper, imagination, opinions, and habits. 343. The word temper is here used to denote the habitual state of a man's mind in point of irascibility, or, in other words, to mark the habitual predominance of the benevolent or malevolent affections in his intercourse with his fellow-creatures. There is a secret charm annexed by the Creator to every exercise of good-will and of kindness; while He has imposed a check on all the discordant passions, by connecting with them agitation and disquietude. Hence our happiness must very much depend on which of these kinds of affection we most indulge. There is nothing in which our temporal happiness is so much in our power as in the formation of temper, and nothing will more conduce to our future welfare than wise exertions on this point. A proud, irritable, discontented, and quarrelsome person can never be happy. He has within himself, and he employs, sure means to imbitter life, whatever may be his external circumstances. 344. Some persons render themselves wretched by dwelling too much on the follies and vices of the age; by censorious thoughts and feelings in respect to others; by a jealous and suspicious examination of the motives which influence the conduct of their neighbors. That favorable opinions of our species, and those benevolent affections toward them which such opinions produce, are sources of exquisite enjoyment to those who entertain them, cannot be disputed. While we do what we can to reform mankind, our chief business is to watch over our own characters. The great secret of present happiness is, to study to accommodate our own minds to things external, rather than to accommodate things external to ourselves, especially in our intercourse with our fellow-creatures. So far as we fail in our endeavors to make them what |