EXTORTED PROMISES. 395 not less than by language, awaken expectation in another, that is, if our conduct toward any person be such as designedly, on our part, to produce a natural expectation on his, we are as much bound by the laws of morality to fulfill this expectation, as if it had been excited by a promise in words. 818. It becomes all, therefore, as they value their own peace and respectability of character, and more especially does it become those of a warm temperament, of an ardent and generous disposition, to deliberate, to weigh well the import of their words, before making a promise, lest they be led by surprise, or good-nature, or impor-. tunity, to encourage expectations, which, without doing injustice to themselves, or to their families, or to the interests of the community, they may not be able to fulfill. When, from whatever cause, such promises are made, we find ourselves placed in trying circumstances-trying to our virtue and happiness; and though the result may not impair our integrity, it may greatly affect the estimation in which we are held, and consequently our power of doing good. 819. The question respecting the obligation of extorted promises is argued by Paley without coming to any definite decision-a necessary result of the kind of argument which he pursues. Dr. Dewar speaks with more decision; and maintains that extorted promises are binding in every case in which the thing promised is lawful—that is, when the promise is of that nature that it may be performed without infringing on my duty to God, to my neighbor, or myself. If the extorted promise refers to what is in itself unlawful, of course it ought not to be performed. 820. A promise or engagement may be highly criminal, from the time and manner in which it was made and the dispositions in which it originated, and yet it may be unlawful to break it. The illustration is given by Paley. 821. To the question, "In what cases are promises not binding," it may be briefly replied, that a man is morally bound to fulfill his engagements, whether the person to whom the promise was made, or with whom the contract was entered into, has any power, or not, to enforce the fulfillment. 396 UNLAWFUL PROMISES. He can only be released from his obligation by a physical incapacity of performing, or by the previous unlawfulness of the stipulation into which he has entered. He may, and he ought to feel the sinfulness of having promised or engaged to perform, what by no exertions on his part he can possibly accomplish; but he can have no ground for moral disapprobation for not doing that which to him is impossible. If he was aware of this impossibility at the time that he made the engagement, he is very criminal, inasmuch as he has fraudulently awakened expectations, knowing that it was beyond his power to gratify them. If it be immoral in us to perform a certain action, it cannot be lawful for us to do it; and consequently we are not bound to do it, merely because we have entered into an engagement to that effect. We may, and it is very proper that we should, suffer from remorse, for having promised or contracted to do what was in itself sinful in us in any circumstances to perform, but we can feel none in consequence of our non-performance. We have just cause to regret an error; but to fufill our engagement could only furnish an additional ground of self-condemnation. The criminality of such promises lies in making them; the sincerity of our repentance is proved by breaking them. 822. The case of Herod, of Judea, furnishes a memorable example of an unlawful promise and oath. He promised to his daughter-in-law, "that he would give her whatsoever she asked, even to the half of his kingdom." There was nothing exceptionable in the terms in which Herod made his promise. It is presumed that he had a right to give away the half of his kingdom. But he could have none to take away the lives of innocent human beings. So far, therefore, from being bound by his oath to comply with the unlawful demand of Herodias, he was laid under the strongest moral obligation, for the reasons already assigned to resist and refuse it. 823. It is the acceptance, either expressed or implied, that constitutes the obligation of a promise; and not the simple promise itself, which is merely a declaration on the part of the promiser of his willingness to be bound. If I have promised to give another a certain sum of EFFECTS OF OBSERVING THE NINTH PRECEPT. 397 money, but he declared that he would not accept it, I am released. 824. A promise is not binding which was suspended on a condition, if the condition is not performed. The promisee has lost his right, or rather had no right till his part of the stipulation shall have been fulfilled. In a word, a promise ceases to be binding when the person to whom it was made releases the promiser from his engagement. Promises that are not binding. 825. (1.) Promises are not binding, where they contradict a former promise; because the performance is then unlawful. (2.) Erroneous promises are not binding in certain cases: as where the error proceeds from the mistake or misrepresentation of the promisee; because a promise evidently supposes the truth of the account which the promisee relates in order to btain it. Again, when the promise is understood by the promisee to proceed upon a certain supposition, or when the promiser apprehended it to be so understood, and that supposition turns out to be false. Illustrations of both these cases will be found in Paley. V. Effects of a universal and complete Observance of the Ninth Commandment. 826. Were falsehood universally detested, and the love of truth universally cherished, and veracity practiced, a most desirable change would be effected in the condition of mankind. The vast host of liars, perjurers, sharpers, seducers, slanderers, tale-bearers, quacks, thieves, swindlers, fraudulent dealers, false friends, flatterers, corrupt judges, sophists, hypocrites, and impostors in a religious garb, with the countless multitude of frauds, impositions, falsehoods, and distresses which have followed in their train, would instantly disappear from among men. fidence would be restored throughout every department of social life. With beautiful simplicity and harmony would the world of trade move on in all its transactions. How many cares would vanish! how many ruinous litigations would be prevented. The tribunals of justice. would be purified from every species of sophistry and de Con 398 QUESTIONS ON THE NINTH PRECEPT. ceit. Numberless other changes, beneficial to man, would be at once introduced and perpetuated. [Professor Dick's Lectures on Moral Law; Dick's Philosophy of Religion; Secker's Lectures; Dewar's Moral Philosophy.] 777. What crime is expressly forbidden in the ninth precept? 778. What breach of this precept is next mentioned? 779, 780. In what other methods may the ninth precept be violated in courts of justice? 781. Explain the crime of slander? 782. Is speaking the truth, to the disadvantage of others, always innocent? 783. How may this precept be transgressed without speaking? 784. May this precept be transgressed even by speaking good of others? 785. What is the design of this precept? 786. How can it be shown that veracity, or the uttering of truth, is of immense importance to intelligent beings? 787. How has the Creator guarded human society against such disastrous effects? 788. How may truth be defined? 789. What is a lie? 790. What is meant by lies of malignity? 791. What are jocose lies? 792. Benevolent lies? 793. Pious lies, or frauds? 794. Lies of equivocation? 797. Lies of fear? 798. Lies falsely called lies of benevolence? 799. What are lies of convenience? 800. Practical lies? 801. Lies of mental reservation? 802. Falsehoods of history? 803. Falsehoods of scientific works? 804. Falsehoods in the literary world? 805. Falsehoods of controversy! 806. Falsehoods of commercial transactions? 807. Falsehoods of signs? 808. Falsehoods which are not lies? 809. What remarks may be offered upon this answer of Dr. Paley? 810. What is Paley's second answer to the question, "Are there falsehoods which are not criminal?" 811. What remarks should be made upon this answer? 812. What view of this difficult topic has been given by Professor Dick? 813. In what more objectionable form has Dr. Paley stated further his views? 814. How is the obligation of a promise demonstrated? 815. In what sense are promises to be interpreted? 816. By what example does Dr. Paley illustrate this position? 817. May not promises be made by signs, as well as by words? 818. In view of this position, what counsel is appropriate and important? 819. Are extorted promises binding? 820. What other case, a rare one, may be mentioned in which a promise is binding? 821. In what cases are promises not binding? 822. What memorable example of an unlawful promise and oath have we in the case of Herod, of Judea? THE TENTH COMMANDMENT. 399 823. Is a promise binding, if the acceptance has not been expressly or virtually signified? 824. Is a conditional promise binding, if the condition be not performed by the promisee? 825. What other sorts of promises are not binding? 826. Effects of a universal observance of this precept? THE TENTH COMMANDMENT. "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife; nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass; nor anything that is thy neighbor's." I. Meaning of the word Covet. 6 827. "The affection or emotion expressed by the term covet, or desire, is not in itself sinful, but becomes so by reason of the circumstances or the degree in which it is indulged. Accordingly, it is not simply and absolutely said in this commandment, Thou shalt not covet,' as in the preceding commandments, Thou shalt not kill,' Thou shalt not steal,' &c., but a variety of objects are specified, toward which, in their relations to others, this inward emotion is not to go forth. In the present connection, the word strictly signifies to desire to have as our own what belongs to our neighbor, to his loss or prejudice, or without his consent; and it implies that degree of propensity or appetence toward an object which usually prompts to the obtaining of it, or which immediately precedes a volition to that effect. "There can be no harm in desiring a neighbor to sell me his house for the real value of it; but it is wrong to desire to possess the house by means of injustice or violence. That coveting a man's wife also, which is here forbidden, is not so much the desire of an adulterous intercourse with her while she remains his wife, though this is expressly forbidden, as desiring that she may cease to be his wife (either by divorce, or death), and become the wife of the coveting person. In like manner, coveting my neighbor's house is nothing else than earnestly wishing that it may cease to be his property and become mine. The prohibition against coveting forbids also all the actual effects that legitimately flow from the harboring and cherishing the interdicted affections and passions." [Bush on Exodus.] II. Design of this Precept. 828. (1.) The direct object of this precept is not our ex |