which in our nature they are allied, so that, where considerations of duty and expediency are regarded, their indulgence is accompanied by other and higher sources of enjoyment. [See Dewar, vol. i. pp. 363-368.]

The proper regulation of appetite is the triumph of civilization and religion. There are many circumstances which clearly show it to be the intention of the Creator, that our appetites should be indulged with moderation, and under those restraints which reason prescribes.

97. What is meant by the term appetite?

98. What are the strongest of these appetites? 99. What other appetites may be mentioned ?

100. Are the animal appetites to be indulged without restraint?

CHAPTER IV.

THE AFFECTIONS.

101. THE affections are tendencies or cravings directed toward persons as their immediate objects; while appetites are directed toward things. The direct and ultimate effect of the affections, is the communication either of enjoyment or of suffering to any of our fellow-creatures; and hence by some authors they are distinguished into benevolent and malevolent; by others into benevolent and defensive. They lead us to a particular conduct toward other men without reference to any principle except the intuitive impulse of the emotion itself.

102. Affection and passion are the same in kind; but they are different in degree. Affection is exercised with decency and moderation; but passion is affection carried to such excess, that it disturbs our reason, lessens, or entirely takes away from us our power of self-command, agitates even the body, and hurries us to action by an almost irresistible impulse.

103. The affections consist of two classes, the Benevolent, and the Defensive or Irascible. These, for the sake of brevity, may be designated by the terms Love, and Anger.

101. What are the affections?

102. How is an affection distinguished from a passion? 103. What are the principal affections?

BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

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SECTION I.-THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

THE term Love is sometimes used to describe the bodily desires, as when we talk of a love of wine, or a love of the pleasures of the table. But the more direct and proper sense of the word is that in which it denotes an affection toward a person.

104. Love is variously modified according to the persons to whom it is directed: thus, there is conjugal love, the love of husband and wife; parental (paternal and maternal) love; filial love, the love of children toward their parents; fraternal love, the love of brothers and sisters toward each other; other kinds of family affection; friendship, the love by which friends are especially drawn to each other; public spirit, or the love of our fellow-citizens; patriotism, the love of our fellow-countrymen ; universal benevolence, or philanthropy, the love that is borne to the whole human race, and to every member of it; love to God, or piety.

The benevolent affections are spoken of, figuratively, as the heart. A man's heart is hard or cold, when these affections are feeble and dull in him; he is warm-hearted, when they are strong; and open-hearted, when they are readily bestowed on those around him.

105. The exercise of all our benevolent affections is accompanied with an agreeable emotion, which shows that the design of the Creator is to communicate happiness to his intelligent creatures in connection with the exercise of virtuous dispositions. The object of the Deity in connecting agreeable emotions with the exercise of benevolence is, to induce us to cultivate, with peculiar care, a class of our active principles so immediately subservient to the happiness of human society.

106. It has been questioned whether there be in man any feeling of pure benevolence, which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one's self.

By doing good to others, it is true, indeed, that we do most effectually gratify ourselves; for what can give a person more pleasure, than to reflect that he has been instrumental in promoting a fellow-creature's happiness? Yet every good man may be sensible that he often does good, and wishes well, to others, without any immediate C

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BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

view to his own gratification, nay, without thinking of himself at all.

In fact, if we had not feelings purely benevolent, we could not gratify ourselves by doing others good. Children have been known to sacrifice their inclinations to the happiness of those they loved, when they themselves believed that their own interest would, in every respect, suffer by doing so.

It is not asserted, indeed, that all children, or all men, are so disinterested: it is only asserted that pure benevolence is to be found in human nature; a doctrine, which, though to many it may seem self-evident, has been much controverted, and which there are men in the world, who, judging of all others by themselves, will never heartily acquiesce in.

107. When a benevolent affection turns our attention upon its object in a tranquil manner, it is regard. The affection, in a more marked form, is love. When it implies a sensitive and vigilant solicitude for the good of its object, it is tenderness; when it absorbs the thought, so that reason is disregarded, it is fondness; when this is the case, the affection is no longer a virtue; still less is it so, when love becomes doting, overweening, passionate.

108. When benevolent feeling is exercised toward a person in view of some good received from him, the words by which such feeling is expressed are thanks. A better expression of the feeling consists, however, in doing acts of gratitude, in returning good for good.

109. Gratitude itself is a natural and virtuous affection; but the acts which it prompts must be limited by rules of duty. A man who does what is wrong in nature for benefits received, makes his benefactor the director of his actions, instead of directing them himself as morality requires. Hence he is said to sell himself; and to be venal.

110. Benevolent affections regarding a particular person, and not necessarily leading to action, are good-will; when they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they are good-humor; when they lead a man to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek to give them pleasure, we have good-nature.

When this disposition is shown on the part of a su perior, we term him gracious and benign. When a person's good-nature makes it easy to address him, he is

BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

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affable. If, in his behavior, he avoid all that may give offense to others, he is courteous. From the supposed prevalence of such habits in cities, they are characterized by the terms urbanity (from urbs, a city) and civility. The opposite of these are rudeness, rusticity (from rus, the country).

111. When benevolent feeling exists under provocation, it is distinguished by such names as gentleness, mildness, meekness; the opposites of resentment and malice.

112. We naturally share in the emotions which we witness in men: we then have a fellow-feeling, a sympathy, with them. When this disposition leads us to feel pain at the sight of pain, it is compassion: we commiserate the object. This feeling, being strongly confirmed by piety, came to be called pity.

Such a disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to the pain felt, is mercy, or clemency; as it prompts us to remove the pain or want which we see, it is charity. But this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judging unfavorably of other men.

All these affections lead to the performance of the duties of benevolence. [Beattie; Whewell.]

104. How is this affection modified according to the persons to whom it is directed?

105. What law of our nature may here be noticed with regard to the benevolent affections?

106. Has it not been questioned whether there be in man any feeling of pure benevolence which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one's self?

107. What terms are employed to denote love in various degrees of intensity?

108. When does our benevolent feeling obtain the name of gratitude? 109. What limits must be applied to acts of gratitude?

110. What names are given to the manifestations of the benevolent affections, in their influence on the external behavior?

111. When benevolent feeling exists under provocation, by what names is it distinguished?

112. How are the benevolent affections modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object?

SECTION II.-THE IRASCIBLE OR MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

113. THE irascible affections are, for the most part, opposed to the virtue of benevolence; and so far they are to be repressed and controlled. Yet these affections, in their original, uncorrupted form, have a moral office, and give rise to virtues.

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IRASCIBLE AFFECTIONS.

This is the case when they act as a defense against harm and wrong; and hence, in their various modifications, they may be termed defensive affections.

As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are resentment; as directed against wrong, they are indig

nation.

Their proper object is, primarily, a sense of blamable conduct in others; and they lead us to use proper measures for protecting ourselves against such conduct.

114. Such sentiments are a necessary part, not of benevolence, strictly speaking, but of justice. Without indignation against cruelty, fraud, falsehood, disorder, the virtues have not their full force in the mind. But anger, in order to be virtuous, must be directed solely against moral wrong.

While we disapprove of the character and conduct of men in certain circumstances, we are led, by our feelings of justice and benevolence, to take part with the injured and oppressed, against the oppressors; or to protect those who are threatened with injuries, by measures for defeating the schemes of their enemies.

A still more refined exercise of this class of feelings leads us to seek the reformation of the offender, and to convert him from an enemy into a friend.

115. The irascible affections are vicious when they are directed against persons, not against moral wrong.

Antipathy, dislike, aversion to any person, independently of his bad character and conduct, are vicious. It is vicious to be displeased, irritated, incensed, exasperated at any person, merely because his actions interfere with our pleasures and desires. The proneness to such anger is irascibility.

116. Our angry emotions become especially vicious when they swell into rage and fury, or settle into malice and hatred.

The term rancor denotes a fixed hate, which, by its inward working, has, as it were, diseased the soul in which it exists. Spite implies a vigilant desire to depress and mortify its object.

117. Moderate anger, arising from pain inflicted on us, is offense, which term is also used for the offensive act. A person commits an offense or offends, in the latter sense; and takes offense, or is offended, in the former.