vantage or the comfort either of communities or of individuals.

165. The desire of praise becomes criminal when it becomes the ruling spring of our conduct; when the regard which we pay to the opinions of men encroaches on that reverence which we owe to the voice of conscience and the sense of duty. The proportion which this desire holds to other principles of action is what renders it either innocent or criminal. The crime charged by our Savior upon the Jewish rulers was, not that they loved the praise of men, but that they loved it more than the praise of God.

Even in cases where there is no direct competition between the praise of men and the praise of God, the passion for applause may become criminal by occupying the place of a better principle. We know that good deeds, done merely to be seen of men, lose their reward with God. If, in determining a doubtful question concerning our conduct, the first question which occurs to us be, not whether an action is right in itself, and such as a good man ought to perform, but whether it is such as will find acceptance with the world, and be favorable to our fame, the conclusion is too evident, that the desire of applause has obtained an undue ascendant. What a wise and good man ought to study, is to preserve his mind free from such solicitude concerning praise as may be in hazard of overcoming his sense of duty. The approbation of men he may wish to obtain, as far as is consistent with the approbation of God. But when both cannot be enjoyed together, there ought to be no suspense. He is to show that, in the cause of truth and virtue, he is superior to human opinion.

[Dr. Blair.]

166. Regard to the opinion of others is the origin of our respect to character in matters which do not come under the higher principle of morals, and is of extensive influence in promoting the harmonies, proprieties, and decencies of society. It is thus the foundation of goodbreeding, and leads to kindness and accommodation in little matters which do not belong to the class of duties. It is also the source of what we usually call decorum and propriety, which lead a man to conduct himself in a manner becoming his character and circumstances, in regard to things which do not involve any higher principle.

DESIRE OF PRAISE.

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There are many actions, not really wrong, by which a man may render himself despised and ridiculous.

[See Dr. Dewar, vol. i. pp. 414-417.] 167. The following considerations may serve to restrain within due bounds our desire for human praise :—

(1.) The applause of the world is not always the reward of merit, but is too often lavished upon the despicable and

the vile.

(2.) It is important to consider from whence popular applause generally proceeds: it is not from the discerning few, and the good, but from a mixed multitude who in their whole conduct are guided by humor and caprice far more than by reason; who inquire superficially and judge rashly, and often erroneously.

(3.) The applause of men, unlike that of the Supreme Being, proceeds from a view of external actions only, and may therefore be wrongly placed, and worthless.

(4.) Consider how narrow and circumscribed, as to place, and time, and persons, that fame is, which the vainglorious man so eagerly pursues.

(5.) An excessive love of human praise never fails to undermine the regard due to conscience, and to corrupt the heart. It turns off the eye of the mind from the ends it ought chiefly to have in view; and sets up a false light for its guide. It frequently impels men to actions which are directly criminal. It obliges them to follow the current of popular opinion wheresoever it may lead them, and hence shipwreck is often made of a good conscience.

[Dr. Blair.]

(6.) How trifling in our estimation would seem the praise of man, did we allow ourselves more constantly to believe that to love it more than the praise of God is one of the greatest crimes, and that its possession cannot prevent the wicked, at a future period, from rising to shame and everlasting contempt!

168. Imperishable fame is to be obtained, not in the pursuit of the praise of men, but in the faithful performance of our duty.

138. How do the desires differ from the appetites?

139. What is necessary to a sound moral condition of the desires?

140. May not the desires be ill-regulated and vicious, while the outward conduct is blameless?

141. What are our principal desires?

142. How is the desire of safety manifested in man?

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GENERAL REMARKS.

143. How is the desire of property manifested in man?

144. What gives moral character to the pursuit of wealth?

145. What is frequently the progress of men's habits in the pursuit of wealth?

146. In what prominent forms does the desire of society appear?

147. What other spring of action is intimately connected with the existence of society, and in some measure implied in what has been said? 148. Is the desire of superiority and the desire of power an identical desire?

149. What illustrations of this desire in man may be mentioned? 150. How does the desire of knowledge operate?

151. To what actions does the desire of knowledge impel us?

152. How should this desire be regulated?

153. What desire is nearly allied to the desire of acquiring knowledge? 154. What is the nature and tendency of the desire of moral improvement?

155. What is the nature of the desire of action?

156. What is the obvious design of the Creator in the implantation of this desire?

157. What facts may be explained by a reference to this desire of ac. tion?

158. What is the nature of the desire of happiness?

159. What should be the influence of a sound and rational self-love? 160. What relation does self-love bear to our other active powers? 161. What difference with respect to virtue, is to be made between the desire of esteem, and the desire of admiration?

162. What vicious disposition is allied to, and produced by, the desire of admiration?

163. What desire is nearly allied to the desire of esteem?

164. When may the desire of esteem and of approbation be regarded as virtuous?

165. Beyond what limits does the desire of praise become criminal? 166. What good influence may the love of approbation exert upon the social intercourse of men?

167. What consideration should serve to restrain within due bounds our desire for human praise?

168. What is the only true basis of an imperishable fame?

[Abercrombie; Whewell; Dewar.]

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLES ALREADY CONSIDERED.

169. WE consider our reason, rather than our desires and affections, as being ourselves. We speak of desire, love, anger, as mastering us, or of ourselves as controlling them. Further, we apply to desire and affections, when uncontrolled by reason, the term passion, as if man in such cases were passive and merely acted on; and as if he were really active only when he acts in conformity with his reason.

Still it is to be maintained that man, under the influence of such passions, is not really passive. When he acts under such influences he adopts the suggestions of desire or affection, and rejects the control of reason; but this he does in all violations of reasonable rules. To say that passion is irresistible, is to annihilate reason, and to exclude the most essential condition of human action.

170. The act of volition is ordinarily the result of the following process:-We desire an object, or we experience one of the affections or springs of action; the next mental act is proposing to ourselves the question, Shall we gratify the desire-shall we exercise the affection? Then follows the process of considering or deliberating. We perceive, perhaps, a variety of motives, considerations, or inducements, some of which are in favor of gratifying the desire or exercising the affection, others opposed to it. We therefore proceed to weigh the relative force of these opposing motives, with the view of determining which of them we shall allow to regulate our decision. We at length make up our mind on this, and resolve, we shall suppose, to do the act; this is followed by the mental condition of willing, or simple volition.

171. It is necessary that the individual on whom motives are expected to operate should be fully informed in regard to them as truths addressed to the understanding; that he direct his attention to them with suitable intensity, and exercise his reasoning powers upon their tendency; and that he be himself in a certain healthy state of moral feeling.

172. In all our intercourse with mankind, we proceed upon an absolute confidence in the uniformity of the operation of moral causes, or motives, provided we are acquainted with the moral condition of the individual. We can foretell, for example, the respective effects which a tale of distress will have upon a cold-hearted miser, and a man of active benevolence, with the same confidence with which we can predict the different action of an acid upon an alkali and upon a metal; and there are individuals in regard to whose integrity and veracity, in any situation in which they can be placed, we have a confidence similar to that with which we rely on the course of nature. In this manner we gradually acquire, by experience, a knowledge of mankind; precisely as, by

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CONSCIENCE AN ORIGINAL FACULTY.

observation or experiment, we acquire a knowledge of the operation of physical agents.

We learn hence that different motives must be used with different individuals to influence them to the same conduct; and we proceed on the conviction that certain motives or truths have a certain uniform tendency to influence the volitions of a moral being, provided he can be induced seriously to attend to them, and is in the moral condition required for their efficiency.

[Abercrombie; Whewell.]

169. What practical distinction is made between the reason or conscience and our desires and affections?

170. What is the ordinary process by which a reflecting person comes to the act of volition or willing?

171. What is necessary to the due operation of motives or moral causes? 172. Is there an established uniformity in the operation of moral causes ?

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE MORAL FACULTY, OR CONSCIENCE, AND ITS OPERATIONS.

SECTION I.-CONSCIENCE IS AN ORIGINAL FACULTY.

173. CONSCIENCE is the faculty by which we distinguish right from wrong in regard to conduct, desires, or affections; by which we approve of what is deemed right, and disapprove of what is deemed wrong; by which we are impelled to practice what is judged to be right, and prohibited from doing what is regarded as wrong.

Some have objected to the doctrine that conscience is to be regarded as a distinct faculty of the mind, and prefer to regard it as merely the exercise of its other faculties upon a particular subject, and in a particular form. It has been pronounced to be an operation of the judgment, comparing our actions with the standard of duty, and pronouncing their agreement or disagreement.

But in favor of the first view taken it may be said, that if we attribute to the mind the faculty of understanding, because it is capable of knowledge; the faculty of judgment because it compares; the faculty of will, because it chooses and refuses; there seems to be no good reason why we should not attribute to it also the faculty of con