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INFLUENCE OF REASON ON MORAL DECISIONS.

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188. While it thus appears that a man ought to make his conduct conform to his conscience, and that he is guilty if he act against his moral judgment of what is right, is a man, on the other hand, who acts according to his conscience, always right?

189. What practical direction may guide us in obeying the voice of conscience?

190. What error in the treatment of this subject has been committed by writers, in the main correct?

191. What evidence is there that conscience has, in common with other powers, suffered depravation?

192. Since it appears that conscience is an incompetent and unsafe guide to correct conduct, what becomes necessary?

SECTION VI.-INFLUENCE OF REASON ON OUR MORAL DECISIONS.

193. (1.) THE office of reason appears to be, to judge of the expediency, propriety, and consequences of actions, which do not involve any feeling of moral duty.

(2.) In regard to the affections a process of reasoning is often necessary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising them, but also, in many cases, in deciding whether we shall exercise them at all.

(3.) In cases in which an impression of moral duty is concerned, an exercise of reason is still, in many instances, necessary for enabling us to adapt our means to the end which we desire to accomplish.

(4.) Reason is employed in some cases in which one duty appears to interfere with another; likewise in judging whether, in particular instances, any rule of duty is concerned, or whether we are at liberty to take up the case simply as one of expediency or utility.

(5.) Reason is also concerned in judging of a description of cases in which a difference of moral feeling arises according to the circumstances in which an individual is placed. Thus we attach a difference of moral sentiment to the act of taking away the life of another,-when this is done by an individual under the impulse of revenge, by the same individual in self-defense or by a judge in the discharge of his public duty.

(6.) We often speak of man as acting upon reason, as opposed to passion. This only means, that he acts upon a calm consideration of the motives by which he ought to be influenced, instead of being hurried away by a desire or an affection which has been allowed to usurp undue influence. [Abercrombie.]

193. What is the influence and office of reason in guiding us to a just decision with regard to our moral conduct?

84 DISTINCTIONS OF RIGHt and wrong IMMUTABLE.

BOOK III.

THE PRINCIPLES AND RULE OF MORAL ACTION AND OBLIGATION.

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CHAPTER I.

THE DISTINCTIONS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IMMUTABLE AND ETERNAL.

THE being and perfections of God having been proved, it follows that He is the proprietor of all things, and that He is the supreme moral governor of all we have also shown that there are in the human constitution, in the history of the world, or in the acts of divine providence, abundant intimations of a supreme moral government to which we are accountable.

[See further, Dewar, Moral Phil. vol. ii. pp. 1-25.] In the preceding chapters it has been shown that man has been made capable of approving certain actions as right, and of disapproving others as wrong. From the constitution of our nature we cannot but mark a difference between virtue and vice, and approve of the one as morally good, and disapprove of the other as morally evil.

194. It is alleged by many skeptical writers, that the distinctions of virtue and vice are mere perceptions or emotions of the mind, and have no existence separate from it. There are also some authors, professedly friendly to the interests of religion, who deny the immutability of moral distinctions, and maintain that they have their sole origin in the enactments of will and power.

Of this description is Dr. Paley, who has followed some writers who preceded him in their most dangerous statements, and has deduced from these statements their most exceptionable consequences.

195. Dr. Paley's system advocates the following principles: Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it. Actions are to be estimated by their tendency. To be obliged to do an action, according to his view, is

DR. PALEY'S SYSTEM.

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to be urged to it by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another. This motive, he tells us, can be only self-love, as we are under no obligation to do anything which does not contribute to our interest; so that on the supposition of there being no future state, an action by which we could get nothing would be perfectly indifferent to us. What makes the difference, according to him, between prudence and duty is, that in the one case we consider what we shall get or lose in this world, and in the other, what we shall get or lose in the next. A man, therefore, who does not believe in a future world, or who does not carry his views to it, can have no perception of duty.

196. His system has contributed much to the prevalence of a loose and unscriptural morality. It has led men to disregard the law of God as the only measure and rule of morals, and to substitute, in room of it, their own views of expediency.

197. This question, therefore, whether the distinctions of right and wrong are necessary and inevitable, is to be regarded as fundamentally important in relation to the interests of morality and religion; and is to be answered in the affirmative—that is, it is to be maintained that moral distinctions have a real existence, independent of our perceptions.

198. The argument in favor of this position may be briefly stated thus: The Deity is as necessarily holy and good, as he necessarily exists; he cannot do what is at variance with his infinite goodness and rectitude.

By the will of Deity must be understood, not anything arbitrary, but the act of a mind possessing infinite intelligence as well as power, infinite rectitude as well as goodness. His will does not create moral distinctions, but is the expression of distinctions which eternally and unchangeably exist, and which are founded in his own naThe boundless perfection of his nature is not the effect of his will, but his will is the effect, and, when revealed, the announcement of his supreme and necessary moral excellence.

ture.

This is the view which is everywhere given of God in Scripture.

To suppose then that the will of God is the sole origin of the distinctions of right and wrong, shows that the

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BASIS OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

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framers of such a supposition have erroneous views of the necessary and eternal excellence of the divine nature. such distinctions were erected, and depended, on mere power and enactment, would it not follow, that had God so willed it, what we regard as the differences between moral actions would have been entirely reversed, and good would be put for evil, and evil for good? According to this scheme, there is no justice, no truth, no benevolence essentially in God or in the universe; and the attempt of ascertaining what are the moral attributes of the Deity is rendered unnecessary, since whatever he is, is determined by an act of his will.

How contrary this is to Scripture and to enlightened reason, it is needless to say. It is because the moral excellences of his nature are infinite and unchangeable, that it is the duty of every intelligent creature, antecedent to all law and all enactment, to love him supremely; and it is on the same ground that His will must ever be the expression of what is holy, and just, and good. He is, indeed, so absolute that he can do whatever he pleases; but so just that he cannot be pleased to do any unrighteous thing.

We are formed capable of perceiving, and of feeling moral truth; but it is truth which has an existence independently of our perceptions and feelings. Every theory therefore which represents moral distinctions as having no existence apart from the mind that perceives them: that is, which teaches us to regard morality as altogether a matter of sensation or feeling, appears to have a skeptical and dangerous tendency. That a being endowed with certain powers is bound to love and obey the Creator and Preserver of all, is truth, whether I perceive it or not; and we cannot conceive it possible that it can ever be reversed. [Dewar, vol. ii. pp. 26-33.]

194. Are these distinctions of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, which are thus observed and felt by the human mind, founded in the nature of things and consequently immutable and eternal-in other words, are they included in necessary truth, which is as independent of my constitution, as the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles?

195. What principles are at the foundation of Dr. Paley's system of morals?

196. What, consequently, has been the influence of Dr. Paley's system of moral philosophy

197. The question returns: Are the distinctions of right and wrong necessary, immutable, and founded in the nature of things?

198. What briefly is the argument in favor of this position?

RULE OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

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CHAPTER II.

RULE OR LAW OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

199. THE rule, or law, of moral obligation, is the rule or standard by which human conduct ought to be regulated, and conformity to which is virtue or rectitude.

200. This Rule may be ascertained by answering the fundamental question, whether man be a subject of the government of the Deity? If the moral government of God be granted, and the consequent subjection of man to that government, it evidently follows, without an intermediate link of reasoning, that the rule by which his conduct is to be regulated must be THE WILL OF THE SUPREME GOVErnor.

The two propositions, indeed, that man is a subject of the Divine Governor, and that the will of the Divine Governor is his law, must be regarded as of the same import. If there be a God, he must rule; and if he rules, His will must be law.

201. So far as the law, or rule, of duty is concerned, the only legitimate inquiry is, what is the true way, or ways, of ascertaining, with certainty and correctness, the will of the Supreme Legislator.

202. The moral rectitude or virtue of a subject of God's moral government consists in conformity of principle and conduct, of heart and life, to the will of the Governor; a governor who is necessarily supreme, and whose will, to all his intelligent creatures, is infallible and unimpeachable law.

In accordance with this statement the sacred scripture asserts that "sin is the trangression of law," the law of God; of course virtue must consist in conforming to that law. It also asserts that "to fear God and keep his commandments is the whole duty of man.” "Thus saith the Lord," is regarded as a sufficient and final law.

It also asserts that the will, or command of God is the rule of obedience to all intelligent creatures. It is the rule to angels; "Bless the Lord, ye his angels, that excel in strength, that do his commandments, hearkening unto the

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