-not in respect of the nature of the conveyance or instrument, though sometime in respect of the interest granted they are: whereas declarations are evermore countermandable in their natures.

[20 Eliz.]

19 H. 6. f. 62.

And therefore if I grant unto you that, if you enter into an obligation to me of one hundred pounds and after do procure me such a lease, that then the same obligation shall be void; and you enter into such an obligation unto me, and afterwards do procure such a lease: yet the obligation is simple, because the defeasance was made of that which was not.

So if I grant unto you a rent charge out [27 Ed. 8.] of white acre, and that it shall be lawful for you to distrain in all my other lands whereof I am now seised and which I shall hereafter purchase; although this be but a liberty of distress, and no rent save only out of white acre, yet as to the lands afterwards to be purchased the clause is void.

So if a reversion be granted to I. S., and [24 Eliz.] I. D. a stranger by his deed do grant to I. S. that, if he purchase the particular estate, he doth atturne to the grant; this is a void atturnment, notwithstanding he doth afterwards purchase the particular estate.

20, 21 Eliz.

But of declarations the law is contrary: as [13, 14 Eliz. if the disseisee make a charter of feoffment 25 Eliz.] to I. S. and a letter of attorney to enter and make livery of seisin, and deliver the deed of feoffment, and afterwards livery of seisin is made accordingly; this is a good feoffment: and yet he had nothing other than in right at the time of the delivery of the charter; but because a deed of feoffment is but matter of declaration and evidence, and there is a new act which is

[M. 38. et 39 Eliz.]

[37 Eliz.

the livery subsequent, therefore it is good in law.

So if a man make a feoffment to I. S. upon Dacre's case.] condition to enfeoff I. N. within certain days, and there are deeds made both of the first feoffment and the second, and letters of attorney according, and both these deeds of feoffment and letters of attorney are delivered at a time, so that the second deed of feoffment and letter of attorney are delivered when the first feoffee hath nothing in the land; yet if both liveries be made according, all is good.

So if I covenant with I. S. by indenture, that before such a day I will purchase the manor of D. and before the same day I will levy a fine of the same land, and that the same fine shall be to certain uses which I express in the same indenture; this indenture to lead uses, being but matter of declaration and countermandable at my pleasure, will suffice, though the land be purchased after; because there is a new act to be done, namely the fine.

But if there were no new act, then other[25 Eliz. 87 Eliz.] wise it is as if I covenant with my son in consideration of natural love to stand seised to his use of the lands which I shall afterwards purchase, and I do afterwards purchase; yet the use is void: and the reason is, because there is no new act, nor transmutation of possession following, to perfect this inception ; for the use must be limited by the feoffor, and not by the feoffee, and he had nothing at the time of the

covenant.

den.

Brett v. Rig- So if I devise the manor of D. by special Plow. f. 340. name, of which at that time I am not seised, and after I purchase it; except I make some new pub

lication of my will, this devise is void: and the reason is, because that my death, which is the consummation of my will, is the act of God, and not my act; and therefore no such act as the law requireth.

But if I grant unto I. S. authority by my deed to demise for years the land whereof I am now seised or hereafter shall be seised; and after I purchase lands, and I. S. my attorney doth demise them; this is a good demise because the demise of my attorney is a new act, and all one with a demise by myself.

:

But if I mortgage land, and after covenant [21 Eliz.] with I. S. in consideration of money which I receive of him, that after I have entered for the condition broken I will stand seised to the use of the same I. S. and I enter, and this deed is enrolled, and all within the six months; yet nothing passeth; because this enrolment is no new act, but a perfective ceremony of the first deed of bargain and sale. And the law is more strong in that case, because of the vehement relation which the enrolment hath to the time of the bargain and sale, at what time he had nothing but a naked condition.

So if two joint tenants be, and one of them Bro. Tit. Faits bargain and sell the whole land, and before Enroll. pl. 9. the enrolment his companion dieth; nothing passeth of the moiety accrued unto him by survivor.

REGULA XV.

In criminalibus sufficit generalis malitia intentionis cum facto paris gradus.

ALL crimes have their conception in a corrupt intent, and have their consummation and issuing in some particular fact; which though it be not the fact at which the intention of the malefactor levelled, yet the law giveth him no advantage of that error if another particular ensue of as high a nature.

Sander's case.

Therefore if an impoisoned apple be laid in Plow. f. 474. a place to poison I. S., and I. D. cometh by chance and eateth it; this is murder in the principal that is actor and yet the malice in individuo was not against I. D.

So if a thief find the door open, and come in the night and rob a house, and be taken with the manner, and break a door to escapes, this is burglary: yet the breaking of the door was without any felonious intent; but it is one entire act.

So if a caliver be discharged with a murderous intent at I. S. and the piece break and strike into the eye of him that dischargeth it, and killeth him, he is felo de se; and yet his intention was not to hurt himself: for felonia de se and murder are crimina paris gradus. For if a man persuade another to kill himself, and be present when he doth so, he is a murderer.

But quære, if I. S. lay impoisoned fruit for some other stranger his enemy, and his father or mother come and eat it, whether this be petty treason; because it is not altogether crimen paris gradus.

REGULA XVI.

Mandata licita recipiunt strictam interpretationem, sed illicita latam et extensam.

Dy f. 337. pl.

37.

IN the committing of lawful authority to another, a man may limit it as strictly as it pleaseth him; and if the party authorised do transgress his authority, though it be but in circumstance expressed, it shall be void in the whole act. But when a man is author and mover to another to commit an unlawful act, then he shall not excuse himself by circumstance not pursued. Therefore if I make a letter of attorney to I. S. to deliver livery of seisin in the capital messuage, and he doth it in another place of the land; or between the hours of two and three, and he doth it after or before; or if I make a Dy. f. 283. pl charter of feoffinent to I. D. and I. B. and 30. express the seisin to be delivered to I. D. and my attorney deliver it to I. B.; in all these cases the act of the attorney, as to execute the estate, is void: but if I say generally to I. D. whom I mean only to Dy. f. 62. enfeoff, and my attorney make it to his attorney, it shall be intended; for it is a livery to him in law. But on the other side, if a man command I. s. to rob I. D. on Shooters-hill, and he Plow. f. 475. doth it on Gads-hill; or to rob him such a day, and he doth it the next day; or to kill I. D. and he doth it not himself but procureth I. B. to do it; or to kill him by poison, and he doth it by violence; in all these cases, notwithstanding the fact be not executed in circumstance, yet he is accessory nevertheless.

Sander's case,

But if it be to kill I. S. and he killeth I. Ibidem.