This distinction Brown seems to have failed to perceive; Indeed, he seems to have no distinct idea of the principle of causality; and everything plausible and true in his analysis of the notion of cause into that of "immediate and invariable antecedence," applies merely to the ulterior question concerning the particular cause in a given phenomenon, or to the application of the necessary idea of cause and the principle of causality to particular phenomena. It seems, however, not once to have occurred to Brown, that without the previous principle of causality, potentially existing in the mind, ready to develop and apply itself to experience, there would be no ground or reason why the mind should be curious to observe and seek this "immediate and invariable antecedence;" consequently it would never be led to decide upon the particular cause in a given sequence ;-for merely to see successive phenomena, is not the same thing as experimentally observing and deciding upon the immediate and invariable connection of particular phenomena. It should be remembered, too, that the "immediate and invariable" antecedence into which Brown resolves the idea of Cause, is not an absolute immediateness and invariableness— but relative merely to human observation; so that the decisions which experience leads us to make in regard to the particular causes of particular phenomena, however satisfactory they may be to the mind, and however safe they may be for the practical guidance of life, can never have the absolute character which belongs to the general idea of cause, or rather to the principle of causality.-We perceive a particular instance of change, or of antecedence and consequence. The change, the antecedence and consequence, is all that is phenomenal, all that appears; but it is not all that we believe. Besides the antecedence which we see, there is something else which we do not see but which we believe, namely a cause. That there is a cause of that change, is, for us, a necessary and absolute truth. Whether that particular antecedent is the cause of that particular consequence, may or may not be believed, according as observation shall lead us to decide; but this belief does not express a necessary and absolute truth as in the first case.-TR.] CONTENTS OF CHAPTER V. Examination of the second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding continued. Of the idea of Good and Evil. Refutation. Conclusions of the second Book. Of the formation and of the mechanism of ideas in the understanding. Of simple and complex ideas. Of the activity and passivity of the mind in the acquisition of ideas. The most general attributes of ideas.-Of the Association of ideas.-Examination of the third Book of the Essay on the Uuderstanding, concerning words. Credit due to Locke.-Examination of the following questions: 1. Do words derive their first origin from other words significant of sensible ideas? 2. Is the signification of words purely arbitrary? 3. Are general ideas nothing but words ? Of Nominalism and Realism. 4. Are words the sole cause of error, and is all science only a well-constructed language ?—Examination of the third Book concluded. Ir is an undeniable fact, that when we have done right or wrong, when we have obeyed the law of justice, or have broken it, we judge that we merit either reward or punishment. It is moreover a fact that we do indeed receive reward or punishment; 1, in the approbation of conscience or in the bitterness of remorse; 2, in the esteem or blame of our fellow. men, who, themselves moral beings, judge also of good and bad as we do, and like us judge that right and wrong merit reward and punishment; and who do punish and reward according to the nature of our actions, sometimes by the moral sentence of their esteem or blame, sometimes by physical punishments and rewards, which positive laws, the legitimate interpreters of the law of nature, hold ready for actions; 3, and finally, if we raise our thoughts beyond this world, if we conceive of God as we ought, not only as the author of the physi cal world, but as the Father of the moral world, as the very substance of good and of the moral law, we cannot but conceive that God ought also to hold ready rewards and punishments for those who have fulfilled or broken the law. But suppose that there is neither good nor evil, neither justice nor injustice in itself; suppose there is no law. There can then be no such thing as merit or demerit in having broken or obeyed it; there is no place for reward or punishment. There is no ground for peace of conscience, nor for the pains of remorse. There is no ground for the approbation or the disapprobation of our fellow-men, for their esteem or their contempt. There is no ground for the punishments inflicted by society in this life, nor in the other, for those appointed by the Supreme Legislator. The idea of reward and punishment rests, then, upon that of merit or demerit, which rests upon that of Law. Now what course does Locke take? He deduces the idea of right and wrong, of the moral law, and all the rules of duty, from the fear and the hope of rewards and punishments, human or divine; that is to say, (without dwelling here upon any other consideration,) in the strict language of scientific method, he grounds the principle upon the consequence; he confounds, not as before the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent. And from whence comes this confusion? From that same source of all the confusion we have so many times signalized, the premature inquiry after causes, before a sufficient study of effects, the inquiry after the origin of the idea of right and wrong, before carefully collecting the attributes and all the attributes of this idea. Permit me to dwell a moment upon this important topic. ment. First, then, the most superficial observation, provided it be impartial, easily demonstrates, that in the human mind, in its present actual development, there is the idea of right and of wrong, altogether distinct the one from the other. It is a fact, that in the presence of certain actions, reason qualifies them as good or bad, just or unjust. And it is not merely in the select circle of the enlightened, the reason puts forth this judgThere is not a man, ignorant or instructed, civilized or savage, provided he be a rational and moral being, who does not exercise the same judgment. As the principle of causality errs and rectifies itself in its application without ceasing to exist, so the distinction between right and wrong may be incorrectly applied, may vary in regard to particular objects, and may become clearer and more correct in time, without ceasing to be with all men the same thing at the bottom. It is an universal conception of reason, and hence it is found in all languages, those products and faithful images of the mind. Not only is this distinction universal, but it is a necessary conception. In vain does the reason, after having once |