of pantheism. As to the speculations about the creation considered as the necessary product of the divine activity : I should suppose it would be readily admitted by any thinker, that if God had never created anything, he would never have exerted his power out of himself, never have manifested himself. I should suppose it would be equally admitted to be natural to the human mind to conceive that God, as an infinite personal cause, a free potential activity, would put forth or actualize his power in some determinate, and therefore finite production, that is to say, would create. I do not understand Cousin as asserting that creation is necessary in any other sense than this, relative, namely, to our conception of an infinite cause personal and free. If he intended the assertion as absolute, I should not adopt it; but certainly I should never dream of considering it pantheism: it has no more to do with pantheism than with polytheism; and as to the rest is perfectly harmless.*-Finally, as to the expressions relating

not

* In saying that I should not adopt it, I do not mean that it may be so, or that there is not some ground for it in the idea on which it rests. For our conception of the human will as an active power, a power of volition, involves naturally the conception that it is a power which, when the conditions of its activity are supplied must pass into action in the production of volitions-yet without destroying the free personality of man. Even the necessarians who make these conditions to be causes ab extrâ do, still, many of them, maintain the free personality of man.

With respect to the human will we all admit that there must be conditions of its activity; that these conditions are external to the will, and primarily external even to the mind. But prior to the first creative act of the Divine will, there existed nothing but God; and

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to the all-pervading presence and energy of God in the universe: they are the same sort of expressions as those in which all elevated meditation on the Divine Being naturally utters itself; and the charge of pantheism would lie equally against nine tenths of the most accredited devotional poetry, and against the Holy Scriptures themselves, which speak of God as “all in all” and of creatures as "living, moving and having their BEING IN HIM," etc. etc.

I repeat then, summarily, that the person who wrote the article in question has imputed to Cousin doctrines directly the

consequently the conditions of the passing into activity of the Divine will (if such there were) must have been entirely within the nature itself of the Divine Being.

Now with respect to Cousin's speculation about creation: it certainly is true that the Divine will has passed into activity and created the universe; and it may be true that there was in the very nature of the Divine will a necessity of its passing into activity, an activity which must also be creative-a necessity equally eternal, groundless, and unfathomable to our comprehension as the necessity of the Divine existence itself. I certainly would not venture either to assert or deny that it is absolutely so; for I am reverently averse to all speculations which go back of the attributes of God and seek to penetrate his nature, or which proceed upon ideas with respect to his nature not given or warranted by revelation. "Who by searching can find out the Almighty to perfection ?"-But I should like to know what there is in such a speculation that has the remotest connection with pantheism.

At the same time I consider the necessity of creation spoken of by Cousin to be a purely hypothetical necessity, not absolute but relative to our limited conceptions; necessary, that is, unless we would conceive God to remain eternally solitary and inactive.

opposite of those which he explicitly and positively teaches, doctrines which he distinctly and strenuously opposes: and the mode in which he endeavors to justify his imputations involves a perversion of thought and language scarcely less incredible. A parallel argument equally valid might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, Bishop Butler an infidel, and Mr. Thomas Paine a christian believer.

The article also attempts to confound Cousin with certain German philosophers. As to this I have only to say that the system of Cousin is distinguished from each and all those German systems by fundamental differences of principle. A professed exposition of modern German philosophy is also given in this article, putting it in as odious a light as possible, for the sake of casting accumulated odium upon Cousin and (perhaps chiefly) upon myself. Not adopting any of those German systems, nor sympathizing with their theological spirit and tendency, I do not here feel concerned to correct the mistakes of this exposition. Besides, no person tolerably well informed on the subject needs be told what a superficial and insufficient account it is. It has every appearance of being an assemblage of scraps gathered at second and third hand from encyclopedias, reviews, and incidental notices. A moment's glance is sufficient to satisfy any competent judge that it was never formed by a discriminating philosophical mind from a careful examination of the original sources.

These are the leading and only material points in the article. Almost every page of it, however, abounds with particular instances of bad spirit and deficient capacity. Its arro

gance and flippant personalities, its numerous perversions and blunders both in logic and fact, taken in connection with the falsehood of its leading positions, form a combination equally pitiable and ludicrous. But I have said enough, and perhaps more than enough, respecting an article so little entitled, either for its matter or its spirit, to the respect of any true philosopher; and whose only value to the genuine Christian, who is at the same time thoroughly acquainted with its subject, is in the example it furnishes how far from truth and propriety one may be led who attempts, under the banner of religion, to excite the odium theologicum against another by presuming on the ignorance and appealing to the prejudices of those whom he addresses.

As to myself, I may be permitted to observe that my own philosophical and religious opinions, and the character of my instructions are well known, by my friends, colleagues and pupils, to be diametrically opposite to any of the false and dangerous principles with which my humble name is attempted to be connected and I might add that they may be gathered distinctly enough by the public even from the few things which I have printed on these subjects.* I am not appre

:

* In an article published in the Literary and Theological Review in 1834, which was devoted to showing the impossibility of any absolute system of philosophy, of any speculative solution of the great problems of the human mind, and the necessity of leaping by faith alone, the chasm which separates the infinite from the finite-and expressly condemning the great modern German systems. Also, in an article in the same journal for 1835, defending the essential and

hensive that the attempt to represent me as introducing knowingly or ignorantly into public instruction a work calculated to subvert the proper belief in God, in the essential difference of right and wrong, and in the moral accountability of man, will have its intended effect with competent judges. Attempts like that of my assailant, as they never in the long run do harm to the party assailed, so neither do they do the assailant any good, and (which is of much greater importance) they will never in the long run promote the sacred cause of truth and of God.

Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.

immutable difference of right and wrong, on the grounds of Cudworth and Butler, against the principles of the selfish system. Just before the appearance of the article in the Princeton Review, I had also printed, in connection with Whewell's Sermons on the Foundations of Morals (a work written in the spirit of Butler), several pieces containing views respecting the Divine existence and the nature of moral distinctions, directly in contradiction with those which I am represented as promoting by the publication of Cousin's examination of Locke. I take leave to say that in my opinion I have done no such wicked or foolish thing as wilfully or ignorantly to promote the subversion of my own fundamental principles on points of such vital importance; and I cannot but add that so far as a mere opinion on such subjects is worth anything, fifteen years devoted to philosophical studies and for a considerable portion of the time in the way of professional duty, may perhaps entitle my opinion to as much provis ional force as that of the individual who has seen fit to become my assailant. It is not pleasant thus to speak of one's own opinions and writings; and I should not presume to refer to my slight productions, but for the attempt made in the article to connect my name with opinions so diametrically opposite to those I hold.

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