COPYRIGHT, 1925, BY THE DIAL PRESS, INC. PRINTED IN U. 8. A. THE VAIL-BALLOU PRESS The purpose of this essay is to present a moral philosophy in the form of what may be called a philosophy of life. It is not my purpose to offer a "constructive system", such as to display an increasing conclusiveness as it approaches completion. What I will present is a point of view; which becomes necessarily less distinct, and raises ever deeper questions, as it broadens towards the horizon. And a point of view, because I believe that nothing in philosophy, however truly objective (and it is my purpose to offer something objective), is either intelligent or intelligible except as the expression of a point of view, in the last analysis inevitably personal. For this reason I have not hesitated to speak in the first person, to draw upon personal experience, or to give expression to personal opinion, taste, or feeling, whenever this would best convey my meaning. Somewhat for the same reason the book is not addressed exclusively, or perhaps primarily, to students of philosophy. It has been my hope to speak intelligibly to every cultivated man; to every person curious about the meaning of human life as presented, not in philosophy only, but in literature, art, and science. To those acquainted with my "Individualism", printed in 1911, I would suggest that the point of view of the present volume is a further development (and therefore, I hope, a juster and more mature expression) of the point of view of the former volume. There I was interested in པ tracing the consequences of self-consciousness in social and political relations; here in the working of self-consciousness throughout human life. The present volume is an attempt to follow the motif of self-consciousness-not to the end, for there is no end-but until I can follow it no further. I take the opportunity of expressing my obligations to the friends who have given me the benefit of their judgment; to Mr. Herbert Agar and Mrs. Agar, whose criticism convinced me of the necessity of rewriting some more important passages; to Professor Charles W. Hendel, Jr. of Princeton University, Dr. Laurence Buermeyer of The Barnes Foundation, and Professor S. McClellan Butt of the University of North Carolina, former pupils and sometime colleagues, who have helped me by their counsel in matters innumerable. It will be understood that the author alone is responsible for the views expressed in the essay. Princeton University June, 1925 W. F. § 6. Orthodox morality and the moral standard. § 7. The moralities of race, class, and occupa- tion. 8. Differing moral tastes. § 9. The § 10. The odiousness of comparisons. § 11. The moral standard and the business point of view. § 12. Social utility in law and orthodox moral- § 14. The categorical imperative. § 15. The basis of authority. § 16. The authoritarian § 20. The order of reverence. § 21. The utility of the reverential order. § 22. The ordered society and the biological species. § 23. Or- dered relations vs. social relations. § 24. The § 27. The forward-looking attitude. § 28. An- ticipation vs. retrospection. § 29. Imagination § 31. Intelligence and the serpent. § 32. The moral fault and the intellectual. § 33. The clever rogue and the simple honest man. § 34. The critical life and the question of intelligence. § 35. Intelligence vs. intellect, mathematical § 37. Aesthetic taste and moral law. § 38. The experience of beauty and virtue. § 39. The § 43. Judgment vs. criticism. § 44. Objectivity and rationality. § 45. The illusion of delib- erate wickedness. § 46. "Tout comprendre" § 48. The Epicurean attitude. § 49. An Epi- curean confession. § 50. Epicurus and Pater. § 51. Enjoyment and imagination. § 52. The |