end of the creation, which could be no other but the glory of God from the obedience of his creatures; preserving all things in the order and state wherein he had made and placed them. 2d, Of the dependance of the creature on God, which consisted in his moral obedience unto him according to the law. And, 3d, It was introductory of a state of things utterly opposite unto the universal rectitude of the nature of God. Only the right of God to rule the sinning creature unto his own glory, abode with him, because it belongs unto him as God. And this represents the state of things between God and the sinning creature: wherein we say that upon a supposition of all these antecedaneous free acts, and of the necessary continuance of God's righteousness of rule and judgment, it was necessary that the sinning creature should be punished according to the sentence of the law. Only observe, that I say not that this righteousness of judgment, as to the punitive part or quality of it, is a peculiar righteousness in God, or an especial virtue in the divine nature, or an especial distinct righteousness; which the schoolmen generally incline unto; for it is only the universal rectitude of the nature of God, sometimes called his righteousness, sometimes his holiness, sometimes his purity, exercising itself not absolutely, but on the suppositions before laid down.

§ 8. On this state of things, on the necessary exercise of this righteousness of God upon the suppositions mentioned, depends both the necessity and especial nature of the priesthood of Christ. Designed it was in grace, as we have before proved, on supposition that God would save sinners; but it was this justice that made it necessary, and determined its especial nature. For this was that which indispensably required the punishment of sin, and therefore it was necessary that he who would save sinners should undergo for them the punishment that was due to them. This was therefore to be done by the Son of God, in the interposition that he made with God on the behalf of sinners. He was to answer the justice of God for their sin. But because this could not be done by mere suffering or enduring punishment, which is a thing in its own nature indifferent, the will and obedience of Christ in the manner of undergoing it was also required. This made his priesthood necessary; whereby whilst he underwent the punishment due to our sins, he offered himself an acceptable sacrifice for their expiation. This is that therefore which is now distinctly proposed unto confirmation; namely, that the justice or righteousness of God, as exercised in the rule and government of his rational creatures, did indispensably and necessarily require that sin committed should be punished, whence ariseth the especial nature of the priesthood of Christ. And this I shall do, 1st, By premising some obser

vations, making way unto the true stating and explication of the truth. 2d, By relating the judgment or opinion of the Socinians, our professed adversaries, in and about these things, 3d, By producing the arguments and testimonies whereby the truth contended for is established, by which the objections of the adversaries unto them shall be removed out of the way.

§ 9. First, There are some attributes of God which as to their first exercise ad extra, require no object antecedently existing unto their acting of themselves, much less objects qualified with any sort of conditions. Such are the wisdom and power of God, which do not find but produce the objects of their først actings ad extra. These therefore in these actings must needs be absolutely and every way free, being limited and directed only by the sovereign will and pleasure of God. For it was absolutely free to God whether he would act any thing outwardly or not; whether he would make a world or not, or of what kind. But on the supposition of the determination of his will so to act in producing things without himself, it could not be but he must of necessity, by the necessity of his own nature, act according to those properties, that is, infinitely powerfully, and infinitely wisely. But herein were they no way limited by their first objects, for they were produced and had being given unto them by themselves. But there are properties of the divine nature which cannot act according unto their nature, without a supposition of an antecedent object, and that qualified in such or such a manner. Such are his vindictive justice, and his pardoning mercy. For if there be no sinners, none can be punished or pardoned. Yet are they not therefore to be esteemed only as free acts of the will of God. For not their existence in him, but their outward exercise only, depends on and is limited by the qualification of their objects. So then,

Secondly, The rule of God's acting from or by his vindictive justice, is not a mere free act of his will, but the natural dominion and rule which he hath over sinning creatures, in answer to the rectitude and holiness of his own nature. That is, he doth not punish sin, because he will do so merely, as he made the world because he would, and for his pleasure; but because he is just and righteous and holy in his rule, and can be no otherwise, because of the holiness and rectitude of his nature. Neither doth he punish sin as he can, that is, to the utmost of his power, but as the rule of his government, and the order of things in the universe disposed unto his glory, doth require.

Thirdly, This justice exerted itself in one signal act antecedent unto the Son of man; namely, in the prescription of a penal law; that is, in the annexing of the penalty of death unto the transgression of the law. This God did not merely because he would do so, nor because he could do so; but because the

order of all things with respect unto their dependance on himself as the supreme ruler of all, did so require. For had God only given men a law of the rule of their dependance on him and subjection unto him, and not inseparably annexed a penalty unto its transgression, it was possible that man by sin might have cast off all his moral dependance on God, and set himself at liberty from his rule, as it was some such thing that was aimed at in the first sin, whereby man foolishly hoped that he should make himself like unto God. For having broke and disannulled the sole law of his dependance on God, what should he have had more to do with him? But this case was obviated by the justice of God, in predisposing the order of punishment to succeed in the room of the order of obedience, if that were broken. And that this provision should be made, the nature of God did require.

Fourthly, This justice of God required a punishment of sin as a punishment. Hereunto do belong the way and degree, the time, season and manner of it; but these things are not necessarily stated in the justice of God. The asignation and determination of them, belongs unto his sovereign will and wisdom. So would things have been ordered in the execution of the sentence of the law on Adam, had it not been taken off by the interposition of the Mediator. Whatever therefore God doth in this kind, when he hasteneth or deferreth deserved punishments, in the aggravation or diminution of penalties, it is all in the disposal of his holy will.

Fifthly, Whereas upon the supposition mentioned, I do affirm that it is necessary, on the consideration of the nature of God, and his natural right to govern his creatures, that sin should be punished; yet I say not that God punisheth sin necessarily, which would express the manner of his operation, and not the reason of it. He doth not punish sin as the sun gives out light and heat, or as the fire burns, or as heavy things tend downwards by a necessity of nature. He doth it freely, exerting his power by a free act of his will. For the necessity asserted doth only exclude an antecedent indifferency upon all the suppositions laid down. It denies that on these respects it is absolutely indifferent with God whether sin be punished or no. Such an indifferency, I say, is opposite unto the nature, law, truth, and rule of God, and therefore such a necessity as excludes it must herein be asserted. It is not then indifferent with God, whether sin or the transgression of his law be punished or not; and that because his justice requireth that it should be punished; so far therefore it is necessary that so it should be. But herein is God a free agent, and acts freely in what he doth, which is a necessary mode of all divine actings ad extra. For God doth all things according to the counsel of his own

will; and his will is the original of all freedom. But suppose the determination of his will, and the divine nature necessarily requireth an acting suitable unto itself. It is altogether free to God whether he will speak unto any of his creatures or not. But supposing the determination of his will, that he will so speak, it is absolutely necessary that he speak truly. For truth is an essential property of his nature; whence he is God that cannot lie. It was absolutely free to God whether he would create this world or not. But on supposition that so he would do, he could not but create it omnipotently and wisely; for so his nature doth require, because he is essentially omnipotent and infinitely wise. So there was no absolute necessity in the nature of God, that he should punish sin; but on supposition that he would create man, and would permit him to sin, it was necessary that his sin should be avenged; for this his righteousness and dominion over his creatures did require.

§ 10. It is objected that on the same suppositions it will be no less necessary that God should pardon sin, than that he should punish it. For mercy is no less an essential property of his nature than justice. And if on supposition of the proper object of justice and its qualification, it is necessary that it should be exercised, that is, that where sin is, there also should be punishment; why then on the supposition of the proper object of mercy, and its qualifications, is it not necessary that it also should be exercised; that is, that where there is sin and misery, there should be pity and pardon? And whereas one of these must give place unto the other, or else God can act nothing at all towards sinners, why may we not rather think that justice should yield as it were to mercy, and so all be pardoned, than that mercy should so far give place to justice as that all should be punished?

Answ. 1st, We shall make it fully appear that God hath in infinite wisdom and grace so ordered all things in this matter, that no disadvantage doth redound either to his justice or his mercy, but that both of them are gloriously exercised, manifested and exerted. That this was done by the substitution of the Son of God to answer divine justice in the stead of them, who were to be pardoned by mercy, and that it could be done no otherwise, is that which we are in the confirmation of. And those by whom this is denied, can give no tolerable account why all are not condemned, seeing God is infinitely righteous; or all are not pardoned, seeing he is infinitely merciful. For what they fancy concerning impenitency will not relieve them. For if God can forgive any sin without satisfaction to his justice, he may forgive every sin, and will do so because he is infinitely merciful; for what should hinder or stand in the way, if justice do not? But,

2d, There is not the same reason of the actual exercise of justice and mercy. For upon the entrance of sin, as it respects the rule of God, the first thing that respects it is justice, whose part it is to preserve all things in their dependance on God, which without the punishment of sin cannot be done. But God is not obliged unto the exercise of mercy, nor doth the forbearance of such an exercise. any way entrench upon the holiness of his nature, or the glory of his rule. It is true, mercy is no less an essential property of God than justice; but neither the law, nor the state and order of things wherein they were created, nor their dependance on God as the supreme governor of the whole creation, raise any natural respect or obligation between mercy and its object. God, therefore can execute the punishment which his justice requireth, without the least impeachment of his mercy. For no act of justice is contrary to mercy. But absolutely to pardon, where the interest of justice is to punish, is contrary to the nature of God.

3d, It is denied that sin and misery do constitute the proper object of mercy. It is required that every thing contrary to the nature of God in sin and the sinner be taken out of the way, or there is no proper object for mercy. Such is the guilt of sin unsatisfied for. And moreover faith and repentance are required to the same purpose. Socinus himself acknowledgeth that it is contrary to the nature of God to pardon impenitent sinners. These none can have but on the account of an antecedent reconciliation, as is evident in the fallen angels. And on these suppositions, even mercy itself will be justly exercised, nor can it be otherwise.

§ 11. These things are premised, to give a right understanding of the truth which we assert and contend for. It remains that we briefly represent what is the opinion which the Socinians advance in opposition unto this foundation of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ. For they are awake unto their concern herein, and there is none of them but in one place or other attempt an opposition unto this justice of God, and the necessity of its exercise upon the supposition of sin; though the defence of it hath been unhappily and causelessly by some deserted. The judgment of these men is expressed by Socinus, Prælec. Theol. Cap. 16. lib. 1. de Jesu Christo Servator. Cap. 1. Lib. 3. Cap. 1. Catech. of Racov. Cap. 8. Q. 19. Oscorod. Institut. Cap. 31. Volck. de Ver. Relig. Lib. 5. Cap. 21. Crellius, Lib. de Deo, Cap. 28. Vindic. Socin. ad Grot. Cap. 1. de causis mortis Christi, Cap. 16. Smalcius adv. Franzium, Disputat. Quarta. Gitichius ad Lucium. Woolzogen. Compend. Relig. Christianæ, § 48. The sum of what they all plead, is, That there is no such thing as justice in God, requiring that sin be punished. That the cause and fountain of punishment in God, is anger,