doctrine, like the fancying of other worlds, or of living wights in the moon or stars, dissolves the whole harmony of it, and frustrates its principal design; and therefore is more carefully to be avoided, than what contradicts only some few testimonies of it. I say, that to ascribe unto God a will or purpose of sending his Son to be incarnate, without respect to the redemption and salvation of sinners, is to contradict and enervate the whole design of the revelation of God in the Scripture, as also it riseth up in direct opposition to particular testimonies without number. Origen observed this, Homil. 24. in Numer. Si non fuisset peccatum, non necesse fuerat Filium Dei Agnum fieri; sed mansisset hoc quod in principio erat, Deus verbum. Verum quoniam introiit peccatum in hunc mundum, peccati autem necessitas propitiationem requirit, propitiatio vero non fit nisi per hostiam, necessarium fuit provideri hostiam pro peccato. If sin had not been, there would have been no necessity that the Son of God should be made a Lamb, but he had remained what he was in the beginning, God the Word. But seeing that sin entered into the world, and stood in need of a propitiation, which could not be but by a sacrifice, it was necessary that a sacrifice for sin should be provided.' So Austin, Serm. 8. de verbis Apostoli, Tom. 10. Quare venit in mundum; peccatores salvos facere. Alia causa non fuit quare veniret in mundum.

§ 13. Thirdly, This opinion is destitute of spiritual reason, yea is contrary to it. The design of God to glorify himself in the creation, and by the law or covenant of it, and his design to glorify himself in a way of grace, are distinct. Yea, they are so distinct, as with reference to the same persons and times to be inconsistent. This our apostle manifests in the instance of justification and salvation by works and grace. "If it be by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace: but if it be of works, then it is no more grace; otherwise works is no more works," Rom. xi. 6. It is impossible that the same man should be justified by works and by grace too. Wherefore God, in infinite wisdom, brought the first design, and all the effects of it, into a subordination to the latter, and so he decreed to do from eternity. There being, by the entrance of sin, an aberration in the whole creation from that proper end, for following which it was formed at first, it pleased God to reduce the whole into a subserviency to the design of his wisdom and holiness in a way of grace. For his purpose was to make reconciliation, and to gather all things into a new head in his Son Jesus Christ, Eph. i. 10. Heb. i. 3. ii. 7, 8. Now, according to this opinion, the incarnation of the Son of God belonged originally unto the law of creation, and to the design of displaying the glory of God therein. And if this were so, it must with the whole old creation, and with all that

belonged to it, be brought into a subordination and subservien-cy to the succeeding design of the wisdom of God, to glorify himself in a way of grace. But this is not so, seeing this itself is the fundamental and principal part of that design. Known indeed unto God are all his works from the beginning. Therefore this great projection of the incarnation of his Son, lying in the council of his will from eternity, he did, in wisdom infinite and holy, order all the concerns of the creation in such a manner, that they might be disposed into an orderly subjection to his Son incarnate. So that, although I deny that any thing was then instituted as a type to represent him, because his coming into the world in our flesh belonged not unto that estate, yet I grant things to have been so ordered, as that in the restoration of all into a new frame by Jesus Christ, there were many things in the works of God in the old creation, that were natural types, or things meet to represent much of this unto us. So Christ himself is called the second Adam, and compared to the tree of life, of which we have discoursed in our exposition on the first chapter.

§ 14. Let us therefore now consider the arguments or reasons in particular which they plead who maintain this assertion. The principal of them were invented or used by some of the ancient schoolmen; and others have since somewhat improved their conceptions, and added some of their own. Those of the first sort are collected by Thomas, 3a P. Q. 1. A. 3. as derived from the Pelagians. I shall examine them as by him proposed, omitting his answers, which I judge insufficient in many in

stances.

His first argument, the substance whereof I have lately heard pleaded with some vehemence, is as follows: It belonged to omnipotent Power and infinite Wisdom, to make all his works perfect, and to manifest himself by an infinite effect. But no mere creature can be said to be such an infinite effect, because its essence is finite and limited; but in the work of the incarnation of the Son of God alone, an infinite effect of divine power seems to be manifested, as things infinitely distant are thus conjoined, God being made man. And herein the universality of things seems to receive its perfection, inasmuch as the last creature, or man, is immediately conjoined unto the first principle or God."

Answer. This argument hath little more in it than curiosity and sophistry. For,

1. That God made all his works good, that is perfect in their kind, before the incarnation, we have his own testimony. He saw and pronounced of the whole, that it was 7ND 21, valde bonum, every way good and complete. It was so in itself, with

out the addition of that work, which is fancied necessary to its perfection.

2. It is merely supposed, that it was necessary that divine omnipotence should be expressed to the utmost of its perfection. It was enough that it was manifested and declared in the creation of all things out of nothing.

3. It is not possible that any effect in itself infinite, should be produced by the power of God. For then would there be two infinites, the producing and the produced; and consequently two Gods, the making God and the made: for that which is in itself absolutely infinite is God, and what is produced is not infinite. Wherefore the work of the incarnation was not of itself an infinite effect, although it were an effect of infinite power, wisdom and goodness. And so also was the work of the first creation. And although they are all in themselves finite and limited, yet are they the effects of, and do abundantly declare, the infinite power and wisdom whence they were educed, Rom. i. 21, 22.

4. The perfection of the universe, or of the universality of beings, is to be determined by their state, condition and end. And this perfection they had in their first creation, without any respect unto the incarnation of the Son of God. For the perfection of all things consisted in their relation to God, according to the law and order of their creation, and their mutual regard to one another, with respect to the utmost end of the manifestation of his glory. And their perfection also consisted in their suitableness to bring that creature to the enjoyment of God in blessedness for ever, who was capable of it. And herein consisted the conjunction of the last creature to the first principle, when by the documents and helps of the creation which existed before he was formed, he was brought to the enjoyment of God. For,

4. That the conjunction of the last creature to the first principle, by way of personal union, was necessary for the good of the universe, is a fancy that every one may embrace, and every one may reject at pleasure. But it may be justly conceived, that it was more suitable unto order, that the conjunction mentioned should have been between God and the first creature, namely the angels; and reasons would have been pleaded for that order, had it so come to pass. But the Son of God took not on him their nature, because he designed not to deliver them from sin, Heb. ii. 16, 17.

§ 15. Secondly, It is further pleaded, That human nature is not become more capacious of grace by sin than it was before. But now after the entrance of sin, it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Wherefore if man had not sinned, human nature had been capable of this grace. Neither

would God have withheld any good from human nature whereof it was capable; therefore if man had not sinned, God had been incarnate.'

Answ. 1. Place angelical nature in the argument, as to that part of it which pleads that it must have all the grace which it is capable of, instead of human nature, and the event will shew what force there is in this ratiocination. For angelical nature was capable of the grace of union, and God would not withhold any thing from it whereof it was capable. But why then is it otherwise come to pass?

2. It must be granted, though indeed this argument is not very applicable either in the one way or the other, that human nature is both capable of more grace, and actually made partaker of more after the fall, than it was capable of, or did receive before. For it is capable of mercy, pardon, reconciliation with God, sanctification by the Holy Ghost, all which are graces, or gracious effects of the love and goodness of God; and of these things in the state of innocence, man was not capable. Besides, there is no difference in this matter; for the individual nature actually assumed into union was, and was considered, as pure in its first origin and creation.

3. The ground of this reason lies in this pretence, that whatever any creature was capable of, not in, by, or from itself, but by the power of God, God was obliged to do that, in it and for it. Now this is plainly to say, that God did not communicate of his goodness, and of his power to the creatures according to the counsel of his will, but producing them by the unavoidable destiny of some eternal fate, he acted naturally and necessarily, ad ultimum virium, in their production. But this is contrary to the nature and being of God, with all the properties thereof. Wherefore the creation is capable in every state of what God pleaseth, and of no more. Its capacity is to be regulated by the will of God. And no more belonged to its capacity in the state of nature, than God had assigned to it by the law of creation.

4. It is a presumptuous imagination to talk of the grace of union being due to our nature in any condition. Why then is it not due to the nature of angels? Or did our nature originally excel their's? Besides, the Scripture every where expressly mentions this union as an effect of free love, grace and bounty, John iii. 16. 1 John iv. 9, 10.

5. That by the entrance of sin, both the display of the glory of God, and the good of the creature itself, should be heightened, is an effect of infinite wisdom and grace. Nor did God permit the entrance of sin, but with a design to bring about a glory greater and more excellent than the antecedent order of things was capable of. The state of grace exceeded the state of na

ture. In brief, God permitted that greatest evil, the fall of man, to make way for the introduction of the greatest good in our restoration by the incarnation and mediation of his Son.

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§ 16. Thirdly, it is also pleaded, That the mystery of the incarnation was revealed unto Adam in the state of innocence. For upon the bringing of Eve unto him, he said, "This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh." "But this," saith the apostle," is a great mystery; but he speaks it concerning Christ and the church," Eph. v. 32. But man could not foresee nor foreknow his own fall, any more than the angels could theirs. It follows therefore that he considered the incarnation as it should have been, had the state of innocence continued.'

Answ. 1. It seems to be supposed in this argument that there was indeed a revelation made unto Adam, Gen. ii. 23. of the incarnation of Christ, so that nothing remains to be proved, but that he did not foreknow his fall; whence it would ensue that the pretended revelation belonged to the state of innocence. But indeed there is no intimation of any such revelation. For,

2. I have manifested elsewhere, how God in his infinite wisdom ordered the things of the first creation, so as they might afterwards be made to subserve in a way of representation to the new creation, or to the renovation of all things by Jesus Christ. That is, he so made them, as that they might be natural types, of what he would do afterwards. This doth not prove, that they were designed to make any revelation of Christ or of his grace, or to prefigure them; but only that they were meet to be brought into an useful subordination to them, so that from them, instructive allusions might be taken. Thus it was in the first marriage, in the law of creation. It had no other nature, use, nor end, but to be the bond of individual society of two persons male and female, for the procreation and education of children, with all mutual assistances to human life and conversation. And the making of woman out of the man, "bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh," was intended only for laying the foundation of that society, whose intimacy was to be unparalleled. But both these things were so ordered in the wisdom of God, as that they might represent another union in a state that God would bring in afterwards, namely of Christ and his church. What Adam spake concerning the natural condition and relation of him and Eve, that our apostle speaks concerning the spiritual and supernatural condition and relation of Christ and the church, because of some resemblance between them. Aquinas himself determines this whole matter, with an assertion to which it would have been for his own advantage to have attended upon other occasions. Saith he, Ea quæ ex Sola