tion it, that it froze in England last winter, or that they saw swallows there last summer, the fact would be nearly as certain as demonstration. Our assent, in this case, which is the highest degree next to absolute knowledge, may be called moral certainty, or assurance.

The second degree of assent is where the testimony of mankind concurs with our own experience as to the general (but not never-failing) conformity of the particular fact with similar facts, and where the particular fact is vouched by undoubted witnesses. Thus, for example, the general experience of mankind testifies that most men sacrifice the public good to their private advantage. Now if all historians who write of Tiberius agree that he did so, it is extremely probable. In this case, our assent rises to that degree which may be called confidence.

The third case is, where a particular fact is of an indifferent kind, or which cannot be reduced to any general rule, as that a bird should fly this way or that way, that it should thunder to the right or the left, and such like. In this case the general experience of mankind cannot be taken into account, and our assent rests wholly upon the testimony as to the particular fact. As an instance of this may be given, the existence of Julius Cæsar, 1700 years ago, the existence of the city of Rome, &c.

From these degrees downwards, through belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, &c. the shades of assent and dissent are innumerable, and change with various degrees of accuracy and credibility of the witnesses.

Traditional testimony becomes weaker the more removed it is from its original source. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than the received doctrine that opinions become venerable by their age. No probability can rise higher than its first original, and every remove from this weakens its force.

In matters of speculation the only ground of probability is analogy, since they are not capable of testimony,

being never the subjects of experience of ours others. Such are

1o. The existence, nature, and operations material beings without us, as spirits, angels, or the existence of material beings not by reason either of their remoteness or minu 2o. Concerning the manner of operatio of the works of nature, wherein, although sible effects, yet their causes are unknow ceive not the way whereby they are pro There is but one case where contr not diminish the force of the testim case of miracles. These, when we command our assent for themselves propositions, which it would be vɛ” strate by human reason.

The testimony of revelation monstration, because he who err; it is necessary, however. lation, and that we understa

LECTURE XXVI.

Of Reason and Faith.

THE word reason, in the English language, has four different significations:

1o. It signifies true and clear principles.

2o. Clear and fair deductions from these principles.

3o. The cause, and particularly the final cause.

4°. That faculty by which man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

There are two faculties employed in reasoning, sagacity and illation.

Sagacity is the faculty of discovering the intermediate ideas necessary to establish the connexion between any two ideas proposed. Illation is that faculty by which we perceive the connexion in each step of the deduction.

In reason Locke distinguishes these four degrees : 1o. The highest is the discovery of proofs.

2o. Disposing them so as to make their connexion plainly and easily perceived.

3o. The perception of their connexion.

4°. Drawing a right conclusion.

In treating of reason Locke takes occasion to refute

the received opinion, that the syllogism of the old logicians is one of its most efficient instruments.

and not for the love of truth, and who will therefore not scruple to deny the truth of any proposition, however self-evident, it is necessary to have those established maxims which are supposed to be granted in all disqui

sitions.

In the use of maxims, even in this way, we should be cautious lest by the ill use of language we should be led into contradictions. He that with Des Cartes shall frame in his mind an idea of what he calls body, to be nothing but extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum by this maxim, "what is, is;" for his idea of body being mere extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without body is certain.

In the application of maxims to complex ideas, we are peculiarly liable to error, because men generally mistake, thinking that where the same terms are preserved, the propositions are about the same things, though the ideas they stand for are in truth different; therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound ́and appearance are contradictory propositions.

LECTURE XXIV.

Trifling Propositions.

THERE is an extensive class of Universal Propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such Proposition may be reduced to three heads: 1. Identical Propositions. 2. Those in which a part of a complex idea is predicated of the whole. 3. Those in which words are used unsteadily.

Identical Propositions are those in which a term is affirmed of itself, or two synonymes of one another. Such Propositions are contained under the general one, what is, is; and they are manifestly trifling.

The second class is where a part of a definition is predicated of the word defined. This only teaches the signification of words, but gives no real knowledge. This is most usual in our ideas of substances, In fine, Propositions purely verbal or trifling, may be known by these marks: 1. Predication in the abstract. 2. A part of the definition predicated of a term,

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Existence of God.

It has been observed that we have a three-fold knowledge of existence: 1. Our own existence, which is in