I have nothing to say; and, in fact, it sketches the only picture I can possibly imagine myself seeing, were any

left us free to suppose that a void which has been taken possession of by a material body might afford room for an additional occupant of the same nature, nothing would forbid the supposition that there might be accommodation for a third. But if for a third, why should we stop here? Any number ad infinitum might be conceived as finding room together within the same limits. Thus it plainly appears that, if we are to assume the existence of matter, and at the same time to ascribe to a material system mobility of parts and compressibility, we must concede that the material substratum is not continuous throughout the universe. The only admissible theory is, that the frame of nature is a congeries of material particles separated more or less by spaces absolutely void of all substance to which the epithet material could be applied. Repudiate it, and the theory that phenomena imply a substratum distinct from the Original Cause, and intermediate between it and our sensations, becomes gratuitous. If we were at liberty to conceive of matter as something which is in no respect whatever imaginable, then indeed there would not of necessity be any impropriety in identifying it with Deity; but, in doing this, we must deny the reality of any external world occupying space and realizing its existence in time; otherwise, we should be committing ourselves to a grossly Pantheistic view of Nature, discreditable to the intelligence of rational creatures.

It will be seen that I have not followed Descartes (“ The Principles of Philosophy," Part ii. § 10) in conceiving of space as differing from body only in respect to the mode of conception. With him there is no real difference between the two concepts, body, like space, conveying to our minds no further notion than that of extension in length, breadth, and depth. In the case of body, however, the extension, as it appears to him, is contemplated as particular, in that of space as generic. I myself am utterly at a loss to form any conception which the term body may fitly represent, unless I am permitted at the same time to conceive of vacuum, and to regard this as rendering body conceivable, but as implying in itself the unqualified negation of body. Descartes, in maintaining the impossibility of vacuum, argues (Id., ii. 16) that extension cannot be the property of nothing. But had he duly attended to the concept about which he thus reasons, he could not have failed to perceive the fallacy of this objection. A vacuum, or void space, it is true, we conceive to be nothing, not however absolutely, but only as implying the absence of body. A purely ideal geometrical figure, indefinite as regards size, is similarly nothing, yet

portion of the material world so magnified to my vision that I could perceive its fundamental structure. But how am I to account for what I must now accept as indisputable truth? How am I to imagine the agency by which atoms are drawn together across spaces absolutely void of all imaginable matter? Given a cause capable of operating within the gulf which separates two atoms, it is surely quite conceivable that there may be a cause which has generated these atoms. It cannot be incredible that a force such as we are under the necessity of supposing should spring from a fountain of power whose issues include in their scope all the conditions which are fulfilled in the production of phenomena.

12. To attribute to the agitations of space pervading media the various kinds of attraction and repulsion which are implied in gravitation, light and heat, electrical and magnetic action, chemical affinity, and biological influence, is only to assume the existence of material fluids, and therefore of separated molecules, or else to use phrases to which our imagination can attach no meaning, and which, instead of eliminating the stumbling-block it strikes against, leave this just where it was before. By what means, by what process, can atoms convene meetings, enforce attendance, secure order, execute manœuvres, expel and recall classes and groups? We cannot in the least imagine. But if we admit that they are doing these wonderful things, the possibility of their genesis is not so amazing as to pass belief.

it admits of properties. He contends (Id., ii. 18) that two bodies must needs touch one another if there be nothing between them. But, on the supposition that two bodies are not in contact, I grant that something is between them: there is at least the possibility of a third body. Vid. the remarks on Space in Chap. i.

13. Suppose an atom to be something which has life and intelligence, and not the senseless object we conceive it to be, it might then seem to have a better title to the high prerogative of an existence from everlasting. Yet, on that supposition, nay, even were it a miracle of intelligence and wisdom, we have no experience but would suggest the probability that it had a beginning. But whether, we may ask, is easier, to give existence to an atom, something immeasurably more insignificant than any mote that sunbeam ever rendered visible, or to create a person? The attributes of a person-what are they? Where shall we begin, if we set about to enumerate and describe them? Where shall we end? What length of time would be required to do justice to the theme? I may speak of a power of vision which at a glance takes in the ethereal dome, and surveys some starry track along which, speeding at the rate of nearly two hundred thousand miles a second, light is accomplishing a journey of myriads of years. I may speak of a mind which perceives the significance of the sublime spectacle. I may tell of mental pictures, of subtle thoughts, of intricate reasonings, comprising accumulations inherited from ages past, but stored up within that mysterious receptacle, and ready to be reproduced and spread abroad from one end of heaven to the other, and destined to last, it may be, for ever. Let it suffice if I add to this manifestly incomplete enumeration the conception of the Infinite, and the contemplation of things unseen and eternal. I am constrained to admit that the kind of being I have attempted to pourtray is but a creature; yet, assuredly no one will venture to contend that the most rudimentary of all natures and the tiniest of all occupants of space is, of the two, the more fearfully and wonderfully made.

14. But here we may leave the notion that matter consists of atoms. It was not indispensable to my argument, and it concerns the question I have been discussing only in so far as it may serve to check the impatient tendency to dogmatism in a bewildered imagination, and its selfsufficient readiness to undertake the measurement of the unfathomable resources and boundless power of an Original Cause.

CHAPTER III.

THE FUNDAMENTAL WILL.

“Άξιος εἶ, ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, λαβεῖν τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὅτι οὺ ἔκτισας τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ τὸ θέλημά σου ἦσαν καὶ ἐκτίσθησαν.” REV. iv. II.

I. HAVING assured ourselves that there is One Eternal Cause by which all other things are to be accounted for, or to express the same truth in different words-that a certain Power which may, without any qualification, be described as creative, has been from everlasting, we have now to consider the possibility of arriving at a more distinct and definite conception of it, and, if (over and above these characteristics) it possesses attributes within the range of the human intellect, to endeavour to ascertain them.

2. Now, when we regard action as simply emanating from an agent, and put out of view all extraneous concurrent causes, the conception we form of it is that which has found expression in the various words and phrases represented by the term Will. We are incapable of thinking of it as being otherwise than spontaneous. True, its character must needs be determined by that of the agent ; but if the notion of spontaneity is nullified by the supposition that the action takes place in subjection to some over