I. LET me suppose that, lighting upon a collection of tablets, each of which has been inscribed with a letter of the alphabet, I observe that, instead of lying in a confused heap, they are disposed in regular series: the suggestion that I see nothing but what might be accounted for on the hypothesis of a so-called chance distribution I could not for a moment entertain. I of course presume that some person has arranged these letters, or, what is the same thing, their relative positions disclose to me a mind. If, on closer inspection, I perceive that they are grouped in successive combinations resembling words, I see somewhat more of the mind they indicate. If I find these combinations to be words which I can read, the indications they give become still more significant and perhaps instructive. Yet certain words, it may be, remain unintelligible to me, as will easily happen if they belong to a language with which I am not familiar, or to some art or science with which I am imperfectly, if at all, conversant; and thus perchance I may fail to make out fully and satisfactorily the sense or drift of the whole. But to discover what the words before me signify is, just so far, to make acquaintance with a mind.

2. Now, no conceivable combinations of alphabetical characters are a surer index of mind than the visible universe must be admitted to be. And if this assertion is sufficiently warranted by a mere passing phase of the phenomena open to our observation, much more are we entitled to make it when we embrace in one view all that has been ascertained of the history of the vast Cosmos from the beginning until now. For thus all discovered evolutions in their recognized successive stages, all manifestations of progress of whatever kinds in the inexpressible complexity of their reciprocal relations, and all effects of confessedly mental operation are perceived to be comprehended in One Plan. To investigate it is to peruse a work composed by One Author, and to which apparently He invites our

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• Knowledge in respect to the Divine Being is, according to Kant, absolutely unattainable. “No one, no doubt, will be able to boast again that he knows that there is a God and a future life. For the man who knows that is the very man whom I have been so long in search of. As all knowledge, if it refers to an object of pure reason, can be communicated, I might hope that, through his teaching, my own knowledge would be increased in the most wonderful way. No, that conviction is not a logical, but a moral certainty; and, as it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say that it is morally certain that there is a God, etc., but that I am morally certain, etc. What I really mean is, that the belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment, that there is as little danger of my losing the former, as there is any fear lest I should ever be deprived of the latter" ("Critique of Pure Reason," translated by Max Müller, vol. ii. p. 711).

If the principles of Pure Reason are really such as to forbid my laying claim to a knowledge of God, it seems to me that they leave me very little indeed that I can boast of knowing. For how do I know that the opinions expressed in the passage just cited are those of Kant? How do I know that the individual so-named ever existed? My conviction on this point is, presumably, allowed to be equivalent to a moral certainty; but I should like to be informed in what way it is shown to be a logical certainty, in the sense in which Kant seems to use the phrase. I feel sure that the opinions in question were conceived by some mind: I am equally certain that mind is not

attention; for He has laid the volume before us unclasped. "Tolle, lege," a voice within us seems to whisper, suggesting to all who are desirous of knowing for what purpose they exist, and what they have in prospect, that the Original and All-ruling Mind is waiting to disclose Itself to them.

3. To prove, however, that we have a record before us is not necessarily to adduce reasons which would justify the expectation of being able to interpret it. The reality of a meaning is one thing, the discovery is another; and we are not at liberty to take for granted that those persons who are persuaded of the former will allow that the latter is feasible. The Sinaitic Inscriptions are universally believed to be what their designation indicates: it never occurred to any one to account for them by suggesting that, like glacier marks, they might be due to the operation of natural forces; that Time, using the elements for graving

my own. If this conviction does not amount to knowledge, then what knowledge have I of Kant? What do I know about anything, but that I am the subject of such and such experiences of sensation and mental impression? Taking for granted, however, that I am permitted to credit myself with the knowledge that the "Critique of Pure Reason " had an author, and moreover with some knowledge of his mental characteristics, I hold myself at liberty, notwithstanding his protest, to say of the book of Nature," I know that it has an Author, and I am in some measure acquainted with the Mind it reveals." If the Author of the universe may be termed an object of pure reason, then, with equal propriety, may this be predicated also of the subordinate originator of those impressions which I represent to myself as having been stamped upon my mind by the perusal of a book called "Critique of Pure Reason." And thus, if any one were to entertain the opinion that the book owed its origin to some inexplicable miracle, he might insist upon the subjective character of my belief respecting it, and challenge me to communicate to him my so-called knowledge. In attempting this I might fail; the arguments with which I exposed the extravagance of his opinion might possibly prove ineffectual; but in any case they could not be more convincing than those I am able to command in demonstrating the existence of God.

tools, might have sculptured them on the rocks. Wide differences of opinion, however, among learned men, as to their meaning, may seem perhaps to leave it an open question whether any have yet succeeded in deciphering and translating even portions of them here and there; and the results of the efforts that have been made may appear to have admitted room for doubting whether the task will ever be satisfactorily accomplished. There are persons in whom a similar cause gives rise to similar doubts, when their attention is directed to the Divine Record. But even

were all interpreters agreed and their views universally adopted, it would still be incumbent on us to consider whether we have good reason for believing ourselves capable of becoming acquainted with the Mind that originated and governs all things.

4. It will, of course, be readily admitted that, through suitable indications, an inferior mind may gain some acquaintance with a superior. But it is by no means

necessary that they should be nearly on a level: even when the difference in capacity is immeasurable, a degree of cognition on the part of the inferior is still possible. Human beings have thoughts, and desires, and purposes, and sympathies, which none of the lower animals, however sagacious, are capable of apprehending; but, notwithstanding this intellectual disparity, the latter are not absolutely shut out from intercourse with the former. And although, generally speaking, a man has incomparably more aptitude than a brute for divining what is passing in the mind of a fellow man, yet, in some cases and in certain respects, the inferior animal may be in this particular, owing to some special keenness of sense, his equal, if not his superior. The dog, to all appearance, has an intellectual horizon which admits of no comparison with that of the dullest of

rational creatures: there is no way of imparting to him even the most rudimentary notions regarding his nature and destiny, the world in which he lives, and the course of events, or of exciting in him the faintest desire for information. His curiosity and inquisitiveness are merely such as urge him on the track of objects of sense they are never directed towards mental acquisitions. But in all

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I am not prepared to assert with Locke ("Essay on the Human Understanding," chap. ii. § 10) that brutes are totally destitute of the "power of abstracting." It is quite certain that they are not incapable of observing and retaining in memory, while distinguishing individual objects, attributes wherein they agree. There are dogs that seem to recognize a beggar as such-that is to say, as one of a class. But classification presupposes abstraction. The sort of discrimination they thus evince cannot be accounted for by ascribing to the canine instinct an unreasoning antipathy to ragged clothing and a sordid aspect; for a person of this description may easily attach to himself one of these animals, and may find that he has secured a faithful and devoted servant. We must presume that in the other case some of the characteristics which constitute the class beggar, and which the word is or may be understood to connote, are observed by the sagacious creature, and, in the course of that experience which renders him a valuable sentinel, are associated with mischievous designs. But can any reason be assigned why mental impressions of generic characteristics should be necessarily accompanied by the desire to communicate distinctly what is felt, or by any perception of the utility of corresponding signs? It must be allowed that not all the lower animals have been denied the organs requisite for articulate utterance; it is well known that some can even produce sounds which simulate almost to perfection human speech; and yet none can be credited with the use of any kind of language properly so called. In this particular the most intelligent are on a level with the least. They utter no sounds but such as are plainly the mere ejaculatory indications of appetites or emotions, or may be set down to some imitative propensity; they exhibit no gestures which have any higher intellectual significance. The sound or gesture may indeed thus convey information but it admits of no resolution into subject and predicate; it is determined by no thought which yields itself to grammatical analysis; it has a character which allows of its being easily discriminated from the simplest and most rudimentary specimens of syntactical ability to be found in human speech. Nevertheless, the reception of

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