INTRODUCTION.

I. WHAT are commonly called the Sciences find severally a limit and a scope in the ascertainment of relations between things finite and temporal: the relations which subsist between all these and the Infinite and Eternal Being fall under the cognizance of a Science which I have denominated Fundamental. It will thus be apparent that, in adopting this title for the present treatise, I at once declare myself at issue with the agnostic, and it will be correctly inferred that the two philosophies we respectively profess are antipodal to one another. In his view the science whose principles are here sketched out is impossible; for he holds that the category of the knowable excludes all assumed substrata and fundamental causes of the things which come under the cognizance of the senses. It will be seen that I agree with him to the extent of conceding what in fact admits of no dispute-that everything which lies beneath or beyond such indications of being as are received through the senses transcends the imagination, namely, the human mind's capacity for creating those pictorial representations which are never wholly absent while it is conscious, and apart from which it cannot exercise the power of thought. But I distinguish between the imaginable and the conceivable, holding that the former

is but a species of the latter, and that a concept for which mental imagery supplies all the requisite materials may contribute to the suggestion of a concept in which imagery has no place. The ground covered by concepts comprises, it is evident, both the superficial stores of the intellect and its abstruse contents-all that may be called signs, as well as those deeper things which they signify.

2. The distinction I have thus indicated is easily overlooked; but, as bearing upon the question at issue, its recognition is of manifest importance; for it involves the admission that the subject-matter of knowledge is by no means limited to the category of the imaginable. No effort of imagination can present to the intellect a square or circle adequately adapted to fulfil the stringent requirements of a geometrical demonstration. The reason demands, and, to all practical intents and purposes—namely, so far as regards the process of ratiocination—is able to conceive, something of which no mental picture can possibly be formed. Hence it will appear that an unimaginable quantity is not as a matter of course an unknown quantity. Its import and value, relatively to the calculation in which it is taken into account, may be clearly understood: it is indeed something in taking cognizance of which some kind of representation to the mind's eye is requisite; as, for instance, in arithmetic figures are indispensable, and in algebra letters of the alphabet in addition to figures; but it does not therefore follow that the appropriate letter is x. We assume at all times that something actually exists: we never can for a moment rid ourselves of the conception of real being. Yet what is it like? We cannot tell: for, considered simply as being, it is an absolute blank to the mind's eye. Such notions as that it is the subject or substratum of attributes, or that it is a bandage by which

properties so called are held together, thus constituting, as it were, bundles or parcels-these are obviously contributions which reason, in the discharge of certain of its loftier functions, has levied upon the imagination: the thing itself eludes all attempts to imagine what it is like. But it is not on this account conceived of as indeterminate, conjectural, or problematical. No one, it is true, can pretend to be fully acquainted with it; but whosoever thinks about it at all has the conception of an entity whose characteristics include at least an aptitude for generating in him those impressions out of which his intellect rises to the apprehension that something really and truly exists. Now this apprehension amounts to an irrepressible conviction, and one that leaves no room whatever for discussion or inquiry : if therefore its testimony is to be received as conclusive, he has a right to affirm that something unimaginable is in existence, and, more than this, that he is acquainted with it to some extent.

3. Let it now be supposed that the path of ratiocination has been followed as far as the conception of an existence indeterminable by measures and relations of either time or space. Here something is contemplated which still farther transcends the imagination, namely, considered not only and in the first place simply as being, but also and in the second place in respect to certain of its attributes. The effect of any attempt to picture it to the mind's eye will necessarily be an intensified sense of inability. But again it is evident that inability to imagine is quite compatible with ability to conceive. It may seem a question whether

The conception of the Infinite and a variety of considerations involved in the distinction here made between conception and imagination are treated of in the first chapter and in the notes. Those philosophers who represent to their minds the Infinite as bearing to the

the entity which is now conceived should be identified with or distinguished from that which I first supposed to be the object of intellectual apprehension. The latter hypothesis can be justified only by some necessity that may appear for assuming in phenomena the manifestation of such properties as cannot coexist with the transcendental attributes. On this hypothesis, however, of the two kinds of being which are supposed, one is finite and temporal, the other Infinite and Eternal; and hence, the original causation of everything which had been ascribed to the former is now traced up to the latter. This latter, therefore, has now assumed equal distinctness with the former; it is defined partly by the attributes which antithetically distinguish it from the other, and partly as accounting, only, unlike the other, primarily and completely, for the manifold testimonies we have that something really and actually is. We cannot imagine it in the slightest degree. But what then? Our inability to do this is no acknowledgment on the part of our intellect that for us it is indeterminate, nor any hindrance to the enlargement of our conception of it or to the discovery of further attributes. It will never finite a quantitative relation have fallen into the error of striving to conceive of the former as being connatural with the latter. Necessarily failing in the attempt, they precipitately conclude that the Infinite is inconceivable, and hence, absolutely unknowable. If the relation were quantitative, it is plain that the finite by increasing would approach the Infinite; but a moment's reflection must render it apparent to any one who gives his mind to the subject, that the existing universe, if circumscribed by space, is, in relation to the Infinite, on a par with a grain of sand, or with one of those animalcula of which myriads can find room in a single drop of water. The conception of the Infinite is that of Something which is necessarily presupposed in the existence of the finite-it is the conception, not indeed of any imaginable magnitude, but of an Entity which, as being both unimaginable and incomparable, has a determinate value, and may, for any reason that can be alleged to the contrary, be possessed of attributes through which a further cognition of it is attainable by the human intellect.

vitiate any calculations we may make, so far as the conception in which they are grounded is legitimate and the discoveries through which they grow are real: this unimaginable entity is not the r of some insoluble equation in the algebra of philosophy; it has a value which from a practical point of view may be discovered by all who are willing to work out patiently the greatest problem that has ever been set before mortal man, and may be rendered unmistakably apparent.

4. The agnostic tolerates-he may be one who even approves and himself adopts-the persuasion that man is answerable for his conduct to an invisible Ruler who favours right action and sets himself against all iniquity, and, moreover, that there is a life to come, in which it will go well with those who have done well, while such persons as have done evil will fare badly. But he maintains that this persuasion has a purely subjective ground, and affords not the slightest warrant for saying, "I know." Will this doctrine bear examination? A man may believe, it is alleged, not indeed everything, but certain things, without being able to aver that he knows them either as certainties or even as probabilities-he may believe them on grounds that have no pretence whatever to be called scientific. Well, does the agnostic who specifies the articles of faith insist that his dictum or his sanction is sufficient authority? It is to be presumed he does not. In respect to these articles, on the strength of reasons we are left to discover for ourselves, it is taken for granted that a self-sustaining faith is sound. But, having this sort of faith, I may wish to test it. The agnostic cannot pretend that he has proved the unreasonableness of such a desire. What then am I to do? I need not ask how I am to prove that things which are equal to the same are equal to one another this truth