is one of which I have a clear perception; I feel sure that I know it by immediate intuition, and no one in his senses would dispute my right to say that I know it. If therefore it should occur to me to ask myself why I believe it, I at once perceive, or at any rate may perceive, that I have an answer which should perfectly satisfy me. Why do I believe it? Because I know it. The answer is conclusive, on the supposition that the assertion is correct. But what conclusive answer can I find if I call in question a belief I hold respecting the Unknowable? May I have recourse to intuition, as in the case I have just supposed? Assuredly not; for intuition implies knowledge: indeed, it is the foundation of all knowledge; no science can be named which does not rest upon it. If this were removed, the whole structure would fall and not a vestige of it remain standing. Well then, what am I to do? Let it be supposed that, ignoring intuition, except in so far as it yields knowledge to the student of the physical sciences, I proceed empirically, investigating and ascertaining facts, with a view to discover whether my belief sufficiently fulfils the conditions of probability to warrant me in retaining it and acting upon its suggestions. But will the agnostic tell me what the facts are which it will avail me to observe, and how I am to make use of them? Will he also kindly explain to me-for I am really at a loss to understand the view he holds as to the pertinency of facts in this matterhow it is that they can authorize belief without supplying knowledge? He will not allow that the order and arrangements observable in the universe evince design; the teleological theory he assumes to have been quite exploded; and if I argue that the course of events is inexplicable, except as presupposing Superintendence, Foreknowledge, and Purpose, he still holds that I am labouring under a delusion; for since it is his fixed opinion that the Original

and Fundamental Force is absolutely unknowable, he is compelled to protest if I seem to be ascribing to it Mind and Character. If I confine my attention to the observable tendencies of human actions, I find, it is true, that our views in some respects coincide. Actions conformable to benevolence, equity, temperance, and veracity, are unmistakably conducive to well being: they are, indeed, far from guaranteeing either bodily health or outward prosperity, yet they appear to react favourably upon the mental condition of the doer; they evidently tend to promote peace of mind and a sense of security. On the other hand, the tendency of their opposites is plainly the reverse. But many a righteous man has had to suffer much for righteousness' sake, and many a wicked man has led a seemingly easy life, and has died in his bed, full of years, and to all appearance without fear or remorse. Were I to entertain a doubt as to whether it has fared better with Christ and His Apostles, than with Caiaphas, and Herod, and Pontius Pilate, what could an agnostic say that might remove it? He would be forced to admit that, for anything he knows, the present condition of them all is the same; in other words, that it is a sleep from which there is no awaking. His notions leave ample room for the suspicion that such is indeed the case; he is aware of no facts by which it may be refuted. So much, then, for facts, on the supposition that the agnostic is to be their interpreter, and that I have recourse to them with a view to test the validity of my faith.

5. What now remains that may be taken into account? My faith itself, considered as a psychical affection, doubtless claims attention; but I can perceive nothing else which it would be relevant to the question at issue to subject to examination. Of course it seems to me to be the sort of faith that becomes a righteous man: perhaps I go so far

as to think that without it no one can be truly righteous. But shall I be permitted to say that I know this? Assuredly not the mere opinion would bring upon me the charge of bigotry. No, I am forbidden to assume that the expectation of a retribution after death and the hope of immortality are essential to the righteous character. To allow me to test the validity of my faith by its quality would be contrary to the first principles of agnosticism; indeed, it would be to leave an obviously unguarded opening to the most unscientific notions as to the stability of purely subjective bases of belief. The considerations, however, which prohibit me from feeling satisfied with my belief on account of its quality are plainly no less applicable on the supposition that I expect to find a sufficient criterion in its degree. My belief may be a firm persuasion: but what of that? Swedenborg was firmly persuaded that in describing

The doctrinal statement, if such it may be called, which will be found embodied in the following words, is, it appears to me, profoundly instructive in reference to the alleged validity of firm persuasions that rest on nothing more substantial than subjective grounds :-"All those persons who have taken the trouble to read what I have written in the National Reformer for some years past, and also published in pamphlets, will know what my opinions on death and immortality were. Those views were formed when I was in perfect health, and after years of reflection and inquiry. I am now about to state how my views remain after protracted suffering. Christians constantly tell Freethinkers that their principles of 'negation,' as they term them, may do very well for health; but when the hour of sickness and approaching death arrives, they utterly break down, and the hope of a 'blessed immortality' can alone give consolation. In my own case I have been very anxious to test the truth of this assertion, and have therefore deferred till the latest moment I think it prudent to dictate these few lines. . . . I do not believe in a heaven, or life of eternal bliss after death. There is nothing in this world to induce me to give credence to the possibility of such a state of human existence. Wherever there are living organisms there are suffering and torture amongst them; therefore analogy would go to prove that if we lived again we should suffer again. To desire eternal bliss is no proof that we shall ever attain it; and it has long seemed to me absurd to

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Heaven and Hell, and also in making dogmatic assertions in reference to the condition of certain planets in the solar system, he was detailing information he had received from inhabitants of the spirit world and of those heavenly bodies. Does the strength of his belief preclude the suspicion that he may have been mistaken, and neutralize the evidence to that effect which subsequent astronomical discoveries have brought to light? Nay, was it, regarded simply by itself, believe in that which we wish for, however ardently. I regard all forms of Christianity as founded in selfishness. It is the expectation held out of bliss through all eternity, in return for the profession of faith in Christ and Him crucified, that induces the erection of temples of worship in all Christian lands. Remove this extravagant promise, and you will hear very little of the Christian religion. . . . As I have stated before, my mind being free from any doubts on these bewildering matters of speculation, I have experienced for twenty years the most perfect mental repose; and now I find that the near approach of death, the 'grim King of Terrors,' gives me not the slightest alarm. I have suffered, and am suffering, most intensely, both by night and day; but this has not produced the least symptom of change of opinion. No amount of bodily torture can alter a mental conviction. Those who, under pain, say they see the error of their previous belief, had never thought out the problem for themselves" (Austin Holyoake's "Sick-room Thoughts," April 8th, 1874-quoted in "Heterodox London," by C. M. Davis, vol. ii. p. 399).

• Vid. "Myths and Marvels of Astronomy," by R. A. Proctor, p. 105. Swedenborg, in reporting, as he believed, information conveyed to him by inhabitants of certain of the planets in the solar system, has made statements which were in accordance with theories accepted by the astronomers of his day, but have since been proved beyond doubt to be erroneous.

His doctrines and assertions touching the relation which the world of sense bears to that of spirit I pass over without comment; they could not be fairly and adequately dealt with in a cursory allusion. But it must be solely on their own merits that they are accepted or rejected they find no support in his impression that he was the recipient of privileged communications from the higher spheres of spiritual existence; he has made it unmistakably evident that the exciting cause of the cerebral conditions under which he experienced the impression may have been at any time the mere workings of a lively imagination.

entitled to be received in evidence at all? In strength it may have been quite on a par with any belief I hold: I should be rash were I to assume that it was not. But let it be granted that I have in this respect a superior faith: what is to determine the degree of intensity which a persuasion must reach before the individual by whom it is entertained may reasonably assure himself that it is sound and trustworthy? To this question agnosticism, so far as I can discover, has provided no answer.

6. What room, then, we may ask, does the economy of rational life and activity afford for a faith which professes not to be grounded either on immediate intuition or on probable inference from facts, and whose subjective basis, if we put out of view mere phantasy and variable emotion, depending upon cerebral conditions and the state of the animal spirits, is absolute vacuity? The agnostic, if his sentiments incline towards piety, expects me to hold a religious belief which, if I understand him rightly, involves faith in God and the expectation of a life after death; but the moment I attempt to give a reason for the hope that is in me, however temperately and reverentially, he assures me that what I call God is something which can never be known, and in respect to which, if I would speak with reverence, I must, in effect, limit my assertions to the admission that it is inconceivable; and not only does he maintain that my expectation is unwarranted by any evidence whatsoever, but he insinuates that, were I to renounce it, there would be no proof that I had violated any law implied in the constitution of my nature. It is plain that, unless materialism pure and simple can be vindicated, scientific caution has betrayed him into an erroneous view of the conditions and limitations of Knowledge. The proper

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I leave it to the agnostic to expound in his own words the faith