doms maketh him feel his own power; so the multiplying of our loves and affections made him to feel our griefs. For the arguments or reasons, they were five in number, which his lordship used for satisfying us why their lordships might not concur with us in this petition. The first was the composition of our House, which he took in the first foundation thereof to be merely democratical, consisting of knights of shires and burgesses of towns, and intended to be of those that have their residence, vocation, and employment in the places for which they serve: and therefore to have a private and local wisdom, according to that compass, and so not fit to examine or determine secrets of estate, which depend upon such variety of circumstances; and therefore added to the precedent formerly vouched, of the seventeenth of King Richard II., when the Commons disclaimed to intermeddle in matter of war and peace; that their answer was, that they would not presume to treat of so high and variable a matter. And although his lordship acknowledged that there be divers gentlemen, in the mixture of our House that are of good capacity and insight in matters of estate; yet that was the accident of the person, and not the intention of the place; and things were to be taken in the institution, not in the practice. His lordship's second reason was, that both by philosophy and civil law, "ordinatio belli et pacis est absoluti imperii," a principal flower of the crown; which flowers ought to be so dear unto as, as we ought, if need were, to water them with our blood for if those flowers should, by neglect, or upon facility and good affection, wither and fall, the garland would not be worth the wearing. His lordship's third reason was, that kings did so love to imitate "primum mobile," as that they do not like to move in borrowed motions; so that in those things that they do most willingly intend, yet they endure not to be prevented by request: whereof he did allege a notable example in King Edward III., who would not hearken to the petition of his Commons, that besought him to make the Black Prince Prince of Wales: but yet, after that repulse of their petition, out of his own mere motion he created him. His lordship's fourth reason was, that it might be some scandal to step between the king and his own virtue; and that it was the duty of subjects rather to take honours from king's servants and give them to kings, than to take honours from kings and give them to their servants: which he did very elegantly set forth in the example of Joab, who, lying at the siege of Rabbah, and finding it could not hold out, writ to David to come and take the honour of taking the town. His lordship's last reason was, that it may cast some aspersion upon his majesty; implying, as if the king slept out the sobs of his subjects, until he was awaked with the thunderbolt of a parliament. But his lordship's conclusion was very noble, which was with a protestation, that what civil threats, contestation, art, and argument can do, hath been used already to procure remedy in this cause; and a promise, that if reason of state did permit, as their lordships were ready to spend their breath in the pleading of that we desire, so they would be ready to spend their bloods in the execution thereof. This was the substance of that which passed. NOTES OF A SPEECH CONCERNING A WAR WITH SPAIN. THAT ye conceive there will be little difference in opinion, but that all will advise the king not to entertain further a treaty, wherein he hath been so manifestly and so long deluded. That the difficulty, therefore, will be in the consequences thereof; for to the breach of treaty, doth necessarily succeed a despair of recovering the palatinate by treaty, and so the business falleth upon a war. And to that you will apply your speech, as being the point of importance, and, besides, most agreeable to your profession and place. To a war, such as may promise success, there are three things required: a just quarrel; sufficient forces and provisions; and a prudent and politic choice of the designs and actions whereby the war shall be managed. For the quarrel, there cannot be a more just quarrel by the laws both of nature and nations, than for the recovery of the ancient patrimony of the king's children, gotten from them by an usurping sword, and an insidious treaty. But further, that the war well considered is not for the palatinate only, but for England and Scotland; for if we stay till the Low Countrymen be ruined, and the party of the Papists within the realm be grown too strong, England, Scotland, of the gentleness of Spain, which suffered us to and Ireland are at the stake. go and come without any dispute. And for the latter, of Cales, it ended in victory; we ravished a principal city of wealth and strength in the high countries, sacked it, fired the Indian fleet that was in the port, and came home in triumph; and yet to this day were never put in suit for it, nor demanded reasons for our doings. You ought not to forgot the battle of Kinsale in Ireland, what time the Spanish forces were joined with the Irish, good soldiers as themselves, or better, and exceeded us far in number, and yet they were soon defeated, and their general D'Avila taken prisoner, and that war by that battle quenched and ended. Neither doth it concern the state only, but our church other kings, Papists, content themselves to maintain their religion, in their own dominions; but the kings of Spain run a course to make themselves protectors of the Popish religion, even amongst the subjects of other kings: almost like the Ottomans, that profess to plant the law of Mahomet by the sword; and so the Spaniards do of the pope's law. And, therefore, if either the king's blood, or our blood, or Christ's blood be dear unto us, the quarrel is just, and to be embraced. For the point of sufficient forces, the balancing of the forces of these kingdoms and their allies, with Spain and their allies, you know to be a matter of great and weighty consideration; but yet to weigh them in a common understanding, for your part, you are of opinion that Spain is no such giant; or if he be a giant, it will be but like Goliath and David, for God will be on our side. But to leave these spiritual considerations: you do not see in true discourse of peace and war, that we ought to doubt to be overmatched. To this opinion you are led by two things which lead all men; by experience, and by reason. For experience; you do not find that for this age, take it for 100 years, there was ever any encounter between Spanish and English of import ance, either by sea or land, but the English came off with the honour; witness the Lammas day, the retreat of Gaunt, the battle of Newport, and some others: but there have been some actions, both by sea and land, so memorable as scarce suffer the less to be spoken of. By sea, that of eighty-eight, when the Spaniards, putting themselves most upon their stirrups, sent forth that invincible armada which should have swallowed up England quick; the success whereof was, that although that fleet swam like mountains upon our seas, yet they did not so much as take a cock-boat of ours at sea, nor fire a cottage at land, but came through our channel, and were driven, as Sir Walter Raleigh says, by squibs, fire-boats he means, from Calais, and were soundly beaten by our ships in fight, and many of them sunk, and finally durst not return the way they came, but made a scattered perambulation, full of shipwrecks, by the Irish and Scottish seas to get home again; just according to the curse of the Scriptures, "that they came out against us one way, and fled before us seven ways." By land, who can forget the two voyages made upon the continent itself of Spain, that of Lisbon, and that of Cales, when in the former we knocked at the gates of the greatest city either of Spain or Portugal, and came off without seeing an enemy to look us in the face. And though we failed in our foundation, for that Antonio, whom we thought to replace in his kingdom, found no party at all, yet it was a true trial And it is worthy to be noted how much our power in those days was inferior to our present state. Then, a lady old, and owner only of England, entangled with the revolt of Ireland, and her confederates of Holland much weaker, and in no conjuncture. Now, a famous king, and strengthened with a prince of singular expectation, and in the prime of his years, owner of the entire isle of Britain, enjoying Ireland populate and quiet, and infinitely more supported by confederates of the Low Countries, Denmark, divers of the princes of Germany, and others. As for the comparison of Spain as it was then, and as it is now, you will for good respects forbear to speak; only you will say this, that Spain was then reputed to have the wisest council of Europe, and not a council that will come at the whistle of a favourite. Another point of experience you would not speak of, if it were not that there is a wonderful erroneous observation, which walketh about, contrary to all the true account of time; and it is, that the Spaniard, where he once gets in, will seldom or never be got out again; and they give it an illfavoured simile, which you will not name, but nothing is less true: they got footing at Brest, and some other parts in Britain, and quitted it: they had Calais, Ardes, Amiens, and were part beaten out, and part they rendered: they had Vercelles in Savoy, and fairly left it: they had the other day the Valtoline, and now have put it in deposit. What they will do at Ormus we shall see. So that, to speak truly of latter times, they have rather poached and offered at a number of enterprises, than maintained any constantly. And for Germany, in more ancient time, their great Emperor Charles, after he had Germany almost in his fist, was forced in the end to go from Isburgh, as it were in a mask by torch-light, and to quit every foot of his new acquests in Germany, which you hope likewise will be the hereditary issue of this late purchase of the Palatinate. And thus much for experience. For reason: it hath many branches; you will but extract a few first. It is a nation thin sown of men, partly by reason of the sterility of their soil, and partly because their natives are exhaust by so many employments in such vast territories | causes of poverty and consumption. The nature as they possess, so that it hath been counted a of this war, you are persuaded, will be matter kind of miracle to see together ten or twelve of restorative and enriching; so that, if we go thousand native Spaniards in an army. And al- roundly on with supplies and provisions at the though they have at this time great numbers of first, the war in continuance will find itself. miscellany soldiers in their armies and garrisons, That you do but point at this, and will not enyet, if there should be the misfortune of a battle, large it. they are ever long about it to draw on supplies. They tell a tale of a Spanish ambassador that was brought to see their treasury of St. Mark at Venice, and still he looked down to the ground; and being asked the reason, said, "he was looking to see whether the treasure had any root, so that, if that were spent, it would grow again; as his master's had." But, howsoever it be of their treasure, certainly their forces have scarcely any root, or at least such a root as putteth forth very poorly and slowly; whereas, there is not in the world again such a spring and seminary of military people as is England, Scotland, and Ireland; nor of seamen as is this island and the Low Countries: so as if the wars should mow them down, yet they suddenly may be supplied and come up again. A second reason is, and it is the principal, that if we truly consider the greatness of Spain, it consisteth chiefly in their treasure, and their treasure in their Indies, and their Indies, both of them, is but an accession to such as are masters by sea; so as this axle-tree, whereupon their greatness turns, is soon cut a-two by any that shall be stronger than they at sea. So then you report yourself to their opinions, and the opinions of all men, enemies or whosoever; whether that the maritime forces of Britain and the Low Countries are not able to beat them at sea. For if that be, you see the chain is broken from shipping to Indies, from Indies to treasure, and from treasure to greatness. The third reason, which hath some affinity with this second, is a point comfortable to hear in the state that we now are: wars are generally Lastly, That it is not a little to be considered, that the greatness of Spain is not only distracted extremely, and therefore of less force; but built upon no very sound foundations, and therefore they have the less strength by any assured and confident confederacy. With France they are in competition for Navarre, Milan, Naples, and the Franche County of Burgundy; with the see of Rome, for Naples also; for Portugal, with the right heirs of that line; for that they have in their Low Countries, with the United Provinces; for Ormus, now, with Persia; for Valencia, with the Moors expulsed and their confederates; for the East and West Indies, with all the world. So that, if every bird had his feather, Spain would be left wonderful naked. But yet there is a greater confederation against them than by means of any of these quarrels or titles; and that is contracted by the fear that almost all nations have of their ambition, whereof men see no end. And thus much for balancing of their forces. For the last point, which is the choice of the designs and enterprises, in which to conduct the war; you will not now speak, because you should be forced to descend to divers particulars, whereof some are of a more open, and some of a more secret nature. But that you would move the House to make a selected committee for that purpose; not to estrange the House in any sort, but to prepare things for them, giving them power and commission to call before them, and to confer with any martial men or others that are not of the House, that they shall think fit, for their advice and information: and so to give an account of the business to a general committee of the whole House. CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING A WAR WITH SPAIN. INSCRIBED TO PRINCE CHARLES, ANNO MDCXXIV. Your highness hath an imperial name. It was a | if the king shall enter into it, is a mighty work : Charles that brought the empire first into France; it requireth strong materials, and active motions. a Charles that brought it first into Spain; why He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according should not Great Britain have its turn? But to lay to knowledge. But, nevertheless, Spain is no such aside all that may seem to have a show of fumes giant, and he that thinketh Spain to be some and fancies, and to speak solids: a war with Spain, great overmatch for this estate, assisted as it is, VOL. II.-26 and may be, is no good mintman; but takes greatness of kingdoms according to their bulk and currency, and not after their intrinsic value. Although, therefore, I had wholly sequestered my thoughts from civil affairs, yet, because it is a new case, and concerneth my country infinitely, I obtained of myself to set down, out of long continued experience in business of estate, and much conversation in books of policy and history, what I thought pertinent to this business; and in all humbleness present it to your highness: hoping that at least you will discern the strength of my affection through the weakness of my abilities: for the Spaniard hath a good proverb, "De suario si empre con la calentura;" there is no heat of affection, but is joined with some idleness of brain. To a war are required, a just quarrel; sufficient forces and provisions; and a prudent choice of the designs. So, then, I will first justify the quarrel; secondly, balance the forces; and lastly, propound variety of designs for choice, but not advise the choice; for that were not fit for a writing of this nature; neither is it a subject within the level of my judgment; I being, in effect, a stranger to the present occurrences. But positively and resolutely; that it is impossible an elective monarchy should be so free and absolute as an hereditary; no more than it is possible for a father to have so full power and interest in an adoptive son as in a natural; "quia naturalis obligatio fortior civili." And again, that received maxim is almost unshaken and infallible; “Nil magis naturæ consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissolvantur, quibus constituuntur." So that if the part of the people or estate be somewhat in the election, you cannot make them nulls or ciphers in the privation or translation. And if it be said, that this is a dangerous opinion for the pope, emperor, and elective kings; it is true, it is a dangerous opinion, and ought to be a dangerous opinion, to such personal popes, emperors, or elective kings, as shall transcend their limits, and become tyrannical. But it is a safe and sound opinion for their sees, empires, and kingdoms; and for themselves also, if they be wise; "plenitudo potestatis est plenitudo tempestatis." the chief cause why I do not search into this point is, because I need it not. And in handling the right of a war, I am not willing to intermix matter doubtful with that which is out of doubt. For as in capital causes, wherein but one man's life is in question, “in favorem vitæ❞ the evidence ought to be clear; so much more in a judg ment upon a war, which is capital to thousands. I suppose therefore the worst, that the offensive war upon Bohemia had been unjust; and then make the case, which is no sooner made than resolved; if it be made not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously. It is this" in thesi." An offensive war is made, which is unjust in the aggressor; the prosecution and race of the war carrieth the defendant to assail and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimony of the first aggressor, who is now turned defendant; shall he sit down and not put himself in defence? Or if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poor of judgment as will affirm it. The castle of Cadmus was taken, and the city of Thebes itself invested by Phoebidas the Lacedæmonian, insidiously, and in violation of league: the process of this action drew on a re-surprise of the castle by the Thebans, a recovery of the town, and a current of the war even unto the walls of Sparta. I demand, was the defence of the city For the asserting of the justice of the quarrel, of Sparta, and the expulsion of the Thebans out for the recovery of the Palatinate, I shall not go so of the Laconian territories, unjust? The sharing high as to discuss the right of the war of Bohe- of that part of the duchy of Milan, which lieth mia; which if it be freed from doubt on our part, upon the river of Adda, by the Venetians, upon then there is no colour nor shadow why the Pala- contract with the French, was an ambitious and tinate should be retained; the ravishing whereof unjust purchase. This wheel set on going, did was a mere excursion of the first wrong, and a pour a war upon the Venetians with such a temsuper injustice. But I do not take myself to be pest, as Padua and Trevigi were taken from them, so perfect in the customs, transactions, and privi- and all their dominions upon the continent of Italy leges of that kingdom of Bohemia, as to be fit to abandoned, and they confined within the salt handle that part: and I will not offer at that I waters. Will any man say, that the memorable cannot master. Yet this I will say, in passage, recovery and defence of Padua, when the gentle : Wars, I speak not of ambitious predatory wars, are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice, where there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause and they are, as civil pleas are, plaints, or defences. There are therefore three just grounds of war with Spain: one plaint, two upon defence. Solomon saith, "A cord of three is not easily broken:" but especially when every of the lines would hold single by itself. They are these the recovery of the Palatinate; a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate; a just fear of the subversion of our church and religion. For, in the handling of the two last grounds of war, I shall make it plain, that wars preventive upon just fears are true defensives, as well as upon actual invasions: and again, that wars defensive for religion, I speak not of rebellion, are most just though offensive wars for religion are seldom to be approved, or never, unless they have some mixture of civil titles. But all that I shall say in this whole argument, will be but like bottoms of thread close wound up, which, with a good needle, perhaps, may be flourished into large works. verified by a number of examples; that whatsoever is gained by an abusive treaty, ought to be restored "in integrum:" as we see the daily experience of this in civil pleas; for the images of great things are best seen contracted into small glasses: we see, I say, that all pretorian courts, if any of the parties be entertained or laid asleep, under pretence of arbitrement or accord, and that the other party, during that time, doth cautelously get the start and advantage at common law, though it be to judgment and execution; yet the pretorian court will set back all things "in statu quo prius," no respect had to such eviction or dispossession. Lastly, let there be no mistaking; as if when I speak of a war for the recovery of the Palatinate, I meant, that it must be "in linea recta," upon that place for look into "jus faciale," and all examples, and it will be found to be without scruple, that after a legation" ad res repetendas," and a refusal, and a denunciation or indiction of a war, the war is no more confined to the place of the quarrel, but is left at large and to choice, as to the particular conducing designs, as opportunities and advantages shall invite. men of Venice, unused to the wars, out of the love of their country, became brave and martial the first day, and so likewise the re-adeption of Trevigi, and the rest of their dominions, was matter of scruple, whether just or no, because it had source from a quarrel ill begun? The war of the Duke of Urbin, nephew to Pope Julius the Second, when he made himself head of the Spanish mutineers, was as unjust as unjust might be; a support of desperate rebels; an invasion of St. Peter's patrimony, and what you will. The race of this war fell upon the loss of Urbin itself, which was the duke's undoubted right; yet, in this case, no penitentiary, though he had enjoined him never so strait penance to expiate his first offence, would have counselled him to have given over the pursuit of his right for Urbin; which, after, he prosperously re-obtained, and hath transmitted to his family yet until this day. Nothing more unjust than the invasion of the Spanish Armada in 88 upon our seas: for our land was holy land to them, they might not touch it; shall I say, therefore, that the defence of Lisbon, or Cales, afterwards, was unjust? There be thousands of examples; utor in re non dubia exemplis non necessariis:" the reason is plain; wars are "vindictæ," revenges, reparations. But revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And, therefore, when a voluntary offensive war, by the design or fortune of the war, is turned to a necessary defensive war, the scene of the tragedy is changed, and it is a new act to begin. For the particular actions of war, though they are complicate in fact, yet they are separate and distinct in right: like to cross suits in civil pleas, which are sometimes both just. But this is so clear, as needeth no farther to be insisted upon. And yet if in things so clear, it were fit to speak of more or less clear in our present cause, it is the more clear on our part, because the possession of Bohemia is settled with the emperor. For though it be true, that "non datur compensatio injuriarum;" yet were there somewhat more colour to detain the PalatiConcerning the former proposition, it is good nate, as in the nature of a recovery, in value or to hear what time saith. Thucydides, in his compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were inducement to his story of the great war of still the stage of war. Of this, therefore, I speak Peloponnesus, sets down in plain terms, that the As for the title of proscription or for- true cause of that war was the overgrowing greatfeiture, wherein the emperor, upon the matter, ness of the Athenians, and the fear that the hath been judge and party, and hath justiced Lacedæmonians stood in thereby; and doth not himself, God forbid but that it should well endure doubt to call it, a necessity imposed upon the an appeal to a war, For certainly the court of Lacedæmonians of a war; which are the words heaven is as well a chancery to save and debar forfeitures, as a court of common law to decide rights; and there would be work enough in Germany, Italy, and other parts, if imperial forfeitures should go for good titles. no more. Thus much for the first ground of war with Spain, being in the nature of a plaint for the recovery of the Palatinate: omitting here that which might be the seed of a larger discourse, and is To proceed therefore to the second ground of a war with Spain, we have set it down to be, a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate. So, then, the war is not for the Palatinate only, but for England, Scotland, Ireland, our king, our prince, our nation, all that we have. Wherein two things are to be proved: The one, that a just fear, without an actual invasion or offence, is a sufficient ground of a war, and in the nature of a true defensive: the other, that we have towards Spain cause of just fear; I say, just fear: for as the civilians do well define, that the legal fear is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem virum" in private causes: so there is "justus metus qui cadit in constantem senatum, in causa publica;" not out of umbrages, light jealousies, apprehensions afar off, but out of clear foresight of imminent danger. of a mere defensive: adding that the other causes were but specious and popular. "Verissimam quidem, sed minime sermone celebratam, arbitror extitisse belli causam, Athenienses, magnos effectos et Lacedæmoniis formidolosos, necessitatem illis imposuisse bellandi: quæ autem propalam ferebantur utrinque cause, istæ fuerant, &c." "The truest cause of this war, though least voiced, I conceive to have been this; that the Athenians, |