dignity in his intercourse with his inferiors. But to Philip, the great king, the conqueror, the restless politician, these intervals of relaxation occurred so rarely, that they might strengthen his influence with the vulgar, and could never expose him to contempt. From that he was secured by the energy of will, which made all his faculties and accomplishments of mind and body, and even his failings, as well as what may be called in a lower sense his virtues-his affability, clemency, and generosity-always subservient to the purposes of his lofty ambition. A moral estimate of such a man's character is comprised in the bare mention of this ruling passion, and cannot be enlarged by any investigation into the motives of particular actions; and it is scarcely worth while to consider him in any other light than as an instrument of Providence for fixing the destiny of nations. The time had come, when all these qualities and attainments were to be called forth into action, and were to be matured in a new and harder school of practical experience. The situation in which he was placed by his brother's death was one of great apparent difficulty and danger. As the nearest kinsman of the royal infant he of course immediately took charge of the government; it is possible indeed that it was committed to him by Perdiccas, when he set out on his expedition. The throne which he had to defend was threatened by enemies in many quarters. The Illyrians had not taken advantage of their victory to carry their arms farther into the country. The main body at least had returned home with their booty. But they were said to be collecting their forces for a fresh invasion, and from the language of Diodorus' it would even seem as if they still retained possession of some Macedonian districts or towns adjacent to their frontier. The western CHAP. XLI. CHAP. XLI. Difficulties tion. provinces lay at their mercy. The Pæonians, the nearest neighbours of Macedonia toward the north, seized the opportunity to make an inroad for plunder. At the same time the juncture invited two pretenders to put forward their claims to the crown, or rather to use them as a pretext for seizing it by means of B. C. 359. foreign aid. Pausanias, no doubt the competitor of Perdiccas, who, as we have seen, had been expelled by Iphicrates, obtained promises of aid from the king of Thrace, perhaps Cotys, whose dominions included most of the maritime provinces of the Odrysian empire; and he might reckon on finding many partizans in Macedonia, where he had been so strongly supported but a few years before. Argæus too, the old adversary of Amyntas, appears to have revived his pretensions, unless he had transmitted them to a younger claimant of the same name. Argæus, whoever he may have been, appears to have gained the Athenians over to his interest, by a promise of some concessions with regard to Amphipolis, which had been during the last reign the main subject of contest between the republic and Macedonia. Mantias, an Athenian general, had been sent with a considerable squadron, and a force including 3000 heavy-armed, to support him. This was the antagonist immediately the most formidable: both as having disciplined troops at his command, and as being enabled, with the help of the Athenian navy, to threaten the most important provinces, and the seat of government. A war with Athens, while the kingdom was exposed to so many other enemies, was of itself greatly to be dreaded. There was however one advantage which Philip drew from his alarming and embarrassing position. The evils of civil war and foreign invasion, with which the country was either threatened, or actually assailed, turned all eyes toward him as the man on XLI. to mount whom the hopes of the nation rested. The infant CHAP. king was generally overlooked, and he was encouraged immediately to direct his views to the crown, and was perhaps regarded by many from the first as his brother's successor. The law of succession, though, in peaceful times and ordinary cases, it recognised the principle of lineal representation, seems not to have been more precisely determined, or at least more inflexible, in Macedonia than in the Greek monarchies of the Homeric ages. Still it appears that Philip did not attempt at once to set his nephew aside, or assume the regal title, which would have been impolitic, while there were two other pretenders to the crown, powerfully supported from without. But he took his measures that, as soon as these com- He prepares petitors should be removed, he might execute his purpose without opposition. If we may believe Justin', a prophecy was circulated, which, if it was really current at this period, must have been fabricated by his emissaries with this object: that Macedonia should flourish exceedingly under one of the sons of Amyntas. And we may collect from Diodorus 2, that he was at great pains to gain the affections of the army, and frequently exerted his eloquence for this purpose; though the annalist speaks of his numerous harangues as if they were only designed to infuse courage into his troops. The admiration excited by this rare talent served at least to strengthen the impression produced by his person and manners, and by the affability with which he tempered the strictness of military discipline. The forces which he was able to collect would probably have been scarcely sufficient to sustain so many different attacks as now threatened him at once and his genius inclined him to try other means the throne. CHAP. XLL of averting the danger. The Paonian chief, whose only aim appears to have been to enrich his people with booty, having partly accomplished his purpose, was easily induced by an embassy, which carried presents and promises to him and his leading men, to withdraw his army. The king of Thrace, a weak luxurious prince, who was hardly master of his reason, was persuaded by a negotiation similarly conducted, to abandon the cause of Pausanias; and this pretender had no other means of enforcing his claims. Philip was thus left at liberty to direct his whole attention to the Athenians and Argæus : and he would gladly have rid himself of them by like methods. It was the hope of recovering Amphipolis, as Diodorus expressly observes', not any wish to place Argæus on the throne, that had induced Athens to interfere; and Philip seems to have hoped, by satisfying her on this point, to detach her from the side of his rival. The language of Diodorus would of itself lead the reader to suppose that Amphipolis was at this time occupied by a Macedonian garrison, and that Philip, before hostilities had been begun by the Athenian armament under Mantias, withdrew his troops from the place, and publicly renounced his claims to it. Polyænus still more distinctly intimates that this was the state of the case3: and if we may believe-on still inferior authority that Philip received divine honours at Amphipolis before he became finally master of it, this extravagant display of gratitude would seem to require the supposition of some solid and extraordinary benefit, something therefore beyond a mere verbal recognition of its independence. On the other 1 Χνι. 3. Θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς ̓Αθηναίους ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν ̓Αμφίπολιν ἀνακτήσασθαι τὴν πᾶσαν φιλοτιμίαν εἰσφερομένους, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κατάγοντας τὸν ̓Αργαῖον ἐπὶ τήν βασιλείαν. 2 XVI, 3. IV. 2. 17. ἑκουσίως ἐξεχώρησε τῆς πόλεως, ἀφεις αὐτὴν αὐτόνομον. Philip while still at war with the Illyrians — being required by the Athenians to restore Amphipolis, οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν, ἀλλ ̓ ἀφῆκεν ἐλευθέραν. Aristides, 1. p. 715. Dindorf. CHAP. XLI. hand we have no express information, nor any other reason to conjecture, that Perdiccas had ever become so far master of Amphipolis: and to suppose that Philip parted with so important a place, on the chance of being able to recover it as soon as the immediate object of the sacrifice should have been attained, would be to imagine a finesse, not indeed too deep for his character, but still requiring stronger evidence than the fact rests on. A suspicion indeed will readily suggest itself to any one acquainted with Diodorus, that he has here mentioned the step which Philip took a little later with regard to Amphipolis, prematurely. But it is not at all unlikely that, before any blow was struck, he should have endeavoured to deprive Argæus of Athenian support, by a declaration which cost him nothing. It may indeed have been framed with studied ambiguity, so as to admit of being explained to the Amphipolitans as a recognition, implying a guarantee of their independence, and to the Athenians as a pledge of neutrality, by which they were relieved from all fear of interruption, on the part of Macedonia, in their future attempts upon Amphipolis. Nor does it seem to have been even at the time altogether ineffectual. Mantias indeed arrived at Methone, on the Thermaic gulf, with the pretender: but he seems to have done nothing. Argæus, who was accompa- Attempt of nied by a number of Macedonian exiles, hoped to find Argus. partisans in the country; and it is remarkable that the place where he expected to be most favourably received, was no other than the ancient capital Ægæ. In that direction he set out at the head of a body of mercenaries-whether collected by himself or brought by Mantias, does not appear. Mantias remained at Methone; but he suffered some of the Athenian troops to accompany his ally. The attempt on Ægæ totally failed: no one ventured to declare himself in the pretender's favour; and he was so disheartened by this |