CHAP. but that of keeping together his mercenary troops, and perhaps of enriching himself by the plunder which he shared with them. When therefore Iphicrates, whether in consequence of such representations, or through jealousy of his connexion with Cotys', was deprived of his command, it was to be expected that Timotheus should be appointed to succeed him; and we are not surprised that he should have been left at liberty to carry on the war either before Amphipolis, or in the Chersonesus, as might seem to him most advisable. His commission, with an apparently unlimited discretion, included both theatres of war.2 It was probably in the year 365 that he arrived on the coast of Thrace. The treachery of Charidemus in the surrender of the Amphipolitan hostages, seems to have deterred him from immediately renewing the attempt upon Amphipolis, especially as he could not induce that chief to remain any longer in the Athenian service. Charidemus carried away his troops, in vessels with which he had been furnished by the Athenians, to Cotys. Demosthenes chooses to suppose that his motive for this proceeding was his desire to injure Athens as much as possible, by entering the service of a prince whom he knew to be already hostile to her. But another equally probable explanation may be found in his wish to follow the fortunes of his old commander Iphicrates, who, after his dismissal, retired to the dominions of his royal father-inlaw. Timotheus deeming his forces for the present unequal to the reduction of Amphipolis, turned his arms toward another quarter, where he saw a fairer prospect of success. The intervention of Olynthus 1 As Rehdantz conjectures, p. 139., and Weissenborn, p. 184. * Dem. Aristocr. § 174. 176. ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ιφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ' επ' Αμφίπολιν καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγόν . καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ τὸν πρὸς ̓Αμφίπολιν πόλεμον πρότερον πολεμεῖν εἵλετο Τιμόθεος τοῦ πρὸς Χεῤῥόνησον. 3 u. s. ὃν ἀκριβῶς ᾔδει τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων ἐχθρότατα ὑμῖν διακείμενον. had been the main obstacle to the recovery of Amphipolis. And Timotheus seems to have thought that, by carrying the war into Chalcidice, he might at once deprive Amphipolis of the succour of her most powerful ally, and might make several important additions to the dependencies of Athens. In this new field of operations he had also reason, as the event proved, to calculate on Macedonian aid. Timotheus himself was a hereditary friend of the royal family, and Olynthus, which in the reign of Amyntas had nearly become mistress of the kingdom, and though humbled by Sparta had begun to recover her strength, and probably to resume her ambitious designs, was still an object of greater jealousy to the Macedonian government than Athens. We have therefore no reason to distrust the statement, though transmitted to us by writers of little authority', that Perdiccas co-operated with Timotheus in his attacks on the Chalcidian towns. The war appears to have been uninterruptedly successful on the Athenian side, though its results may have been greatly exaggerated by Isocrates, who says that Timotheus subdued all the Chalcidians2; and another account which makes the like assertion with regard to Olynthus 3, must either be rejected altogether, or understood to mean 1 Polyæn. III. 10. 14. (of iv. 10. 2.) and Ulpian on Dem. Olynth. 11. § 14. It has been supposed (see Voemel on this passage of Demosthenes) that this war may have been one waged several years earlier by Amyntas, and that Perdiccas only acted as his lieutenant. But from the description of schines it appears that Perdiccas, even at the time of his father's death, was scarcely old enough to have commanded an army. It is proper to remark that this passage of Demosthenes (who only says: Macedonia furnished a considerable addition to our forces under Timotheus against Olynthus,) is the only ground that has been alleged for the assertion, that it was Philip who aided Timotheus, and enabled him to take Potidæa and Torone. Yet on this assertion, which contradicts all the testimonies of the ancients on this subject, and if received would create inexplicable confusion in the history of this period, its author has not scrupled to found a charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, whom he represents as inflicting a grievous injury on Philip (of which we shall speak shortly) at the very time that he was making conquests for them. Mr. Clinton, who now and then corrects this writer's chronological errors in less important points, passes over this matter in silence. π. ἀντιδ. § 119. Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας κατεπολέμησεν. 3 Nepos. Tim. 1. 2. Olynthios et Byzantios bello subegit. CHAP. XLII. CHAP. nothing more than that Olynthus was worsted in the contest, and unable to protect her allies. What is most certain is, that Timotheus conquered Potidea and Torone. Isocrates, to enhance his hero's merit, reminds his readers that the siege of Potidæa, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, had cost Athens 2400 talents, whereas Timotheus had supplied the whole expense of his conquest by ways and means of his own contrivance, and from the contributions levied on the Thracian towns.' It may however easily be supposed that these two places were specified as being the most important, and a great number of others which were less in condition to offer an effectual resistance, must have shared the same fate. The reduction of Torone and Potidea is assigned by Diodorus2 to the first year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad. But it may very well have taken place in the first half of 364. In the course of the same Olympic year-the Archonship of Timocrates-and probably in the latter half of 364, we find Timotheus recommencing hostilities against Amphipolis. On this occasion however he did not take the command in person, but despatched an officer named Alcimachus, Timotheus of course with only a division of his forces. We can hardly account for this movement unless on the supposition, that he was himself still fully occupied in Chalcidice, and that he had received intelligence which seemed to justify the hope that a small body of troops would be sufficient to carry Amphipolis. The fragmentary record from which we derive all our knowledge of this expedition, only enables us to see that it totally failed, and that Alcimachus, with his whole force, was reduced to surrender to the Thracians, probably those of the adjacent region, whose interpo repulsed at Amphipo lis. 1 π. ἀντιδ. u. S. 2 xv. 81. 3 Schol. Æschin. p. 755. Reisk. ὄγδοον, ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Τιμοσθένους (Τιμοθέου Bekker) ̓Αλκίμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ παραδόντος αὐτὸν (αὑτὸν) Θραξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους ̓Αθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος. sition appears to have saved Amphipolis on a previous CHAP. occasion.' It is certain however that this defeat did not prevent Timotheus from conducting another expedition in person against Amphipolis. For the fact, and for some of the attendant circumstances, we have the evidence of Demosthenes 2: but the date is involved in much doubt; as the account which professes to fix it with the greatest exactness, seems to assign the event to a period more than three years later, the year in which Philip mounted the throne. But this supposition is beset with insurmountable difficulties; and if the transactions hitherto related have been correctly arranged, since we are informed by Demosthenes that Timotheus, when he was sent to supersede Iphicrates, determined to prosecute the war with Amphipolis before he engaged in that of the Chersonesus, it can hardly be doubted that he made his last attempt on Amphipolis before he proceeded again to the Hellespont; and as we learn that he came to the relief of Cyzicus in the same Olympic year (Ol. civ. 1.) in which he took Torone and Potidea1, we conclude that his final expedition against Amphipolis cannot have taken place later than the beginning of the year 363. We know that it was not more successful than the preceding one, but are as little informed as to the precise mode and causes of its failure. It appears that Olynthus, notwithstanding the losses she had suffered, made preparations for defending Amphipolis, and invited Charidemus, then in the Chersonesus, to enter her service. He accepted the offer, and em Schol. Æschin. u. s. (according to Bekker's MSS.) ßdoμov &те Пpwróμaxos ἀπέτυχεν, Αμφιπολιτῶν αὑτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμόροις Θραξίν. Aristocr. § 176. 3 Schol. Eschin. u. s. ἔννατον Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμίωνος ἄρχοντος. 4 Diodor. xv. 81. Τιμόθεος ὁ ̓Αθηναίων στρατηγὸς, ἔχων δύναμιν πεζικήν τε καὶ ναυτικὴν, Τορώνην μὲν καὶ Ποτιδαίαν πολιορκήσας εἷλε, Κυζικηνοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις XLII. CHAP. barked his troops at Cardia; but in the passage fell into the hands of Timotheus, and, to avoid worse consequences, consented to serve under him.' Yet it seems that notwithstanding his co-operation Timotheus was surprised by the unexpected appearance of the enemy in greatly superior force, and was fain to set fire to his galleys in the Strymon and to make a hasty retreat by land." His loss however cannot have amounted to that of his whole fleet, as he appears to have returned to the Hellespont in the spring, or early in the summer of 363, and to have been engaged during the remainder of that year in a series of successful operations against Cotys and his allies 3, which may have soothed any displeasure that might be felt at Athens on account of the check he had received at Amphipolis.* To these we shall have occasion to revert hereafter. 1 Dem. Aristocr. § 175-179. It was in the voyage, πλéwv èkeîσe, not after he had actually entered the Olynthian service, that he was captured by the Athenian galleys. Polyæn. III. 10. 8. We know of no other period to which the story can be referred. Nepos. Timoth. 1. 2. Almost all authors who have had occasion to discuss the chronology of this period have adopted the correction Kaλλμýdovs for Kaλaμíwvos in the Scholiast of Æschines, so as to refer the repulse of Timotheus at Amphipolis to the latter half of 360. Weissenborn, who has devoted one of the miscellaneous essays of his Hellen (which was published in the year before the work of Rehdantz) to illustrate the Scholiast's enumeration of the nine disasters which befell the Athenian arms in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis, passes over the repulse of Timotheus in a very few words, as presenting no difficulty, and fixes its date, in conformity with the received emendation, in the spring of 359. The proposed change of the Greek text is certainly very slight and easy, and there could hardly be a doubt about its propriety, if it was true, as Mr. Clinton states (F. H. 360 B. c.), that the course of events enumerated by Demosthenes in the Aristocratea, and the information we possess from other sources, concurred with this date. But it is because these facts appear to me to be at variance with the date, that notwithstanding the speciousness of the emendation, I find myself unable to acquiesce in it, or at least in the date. Rehdantz seems to have been the first, and hitherto, as far as I know, the only writer who has perceived the difficulties which attend the common supposition; though that which he proposes to substitute for it appears to me likewise inadmissible. 1. He points out (p. 151.) the improbability of Timotheus having followed Callisthenes in the command at Amphipolis, and having received aid from Perdiccas after Perdiccas had been engaged in hostilities with Callisthenes; and he cites a passage of Aristotle (Rhet. 11. 3. 13.) which proves that the trial of Callisthenes took place the day before that of Ergophilus, who was superseded in September, 362 (Dem. Aristocr. § 122. Polyel. § 15.), and therefore warrants the conclusion that these two generals were appointed at no great interval of time from one another. And this is quite consistent with the language of schines (De F. L. |