CHAP cessive days, which, as they were known to be already on their road, were fixed on the eighteenth and nineteenth of the month, leaving an interval of nine or ten days, which, it was supposed, would be sufficient for the remainder of their journey. Æschines does not mention any debate as having arisen on the motion; and yet it seems to have involved the only question on which any difference of opinion remained. The people had already determined for peace, and knew the conditions on which Philip insisted that it must abandon its claims to Amphipolis, and recognise the independence of Cardia; but it probably felt much less interest in either of these subjects than in the issue of the struggle between Thebes and Phocis. Jealousy of Thebes was still the prevailing political feeling at Athens: and though Thebes had been brought very low by the war, it was easy to foresee that the Phocians could not hold out much longer, and that if they should be forced to yield, either through the failure of their resources or by Philip's intervention, their enemy might not only speedily recover the Baotian towns which had been wrested from her, but might acquire a great addition to her power. Such an event would put an end to all the hopes which the Athenians never ceased to cherish of regaining Oropus, would endanger their possessions in Euboea, and would leave Thebes again predominant, and enable her to renew her attempts to establish her influence in Peloponnesus. The Phocian cause therefore was not to be abandoned: the triumph of Thebes was to be prevented at any risk; but it was an important and very difficult question, whether the better way of attaining the object was to make an open stand in favour of the Phocians in the pending negotiation, and to get them included in the treaty, or to trust to certain appearances, which were thought to portend a favourable termination of the contest, and to render all exertions of the Athenians unnecessary in their behalf. The decision of this question was seen to depend on Philip's intentions with regard to the contending parties; but at Athens these were still only matter for conjecture. If it had been known that he was not only hostile to the Phocians, but disposed to promote the interests of Thebes, then, if peace with him was still considered desirable, it would at least have been fit that it should be accompanied with every possible precaution against the dreaded danger. But if on the contrary Philip's views coincided as to the main point with those of Athens, if he was no less averse to the extension or restoration of the power of Thebes, then it might be unnecessary, and even impolitic, to make any stipulations on behalf of Phocis, and it might be expedient that her name should not be mentioned in the treaty. At Athens however Philip's designs could only be matter for very uncertain conjecture. Yet there were indications, which, even if they had not been interpreted by eager wishes, might have seemed to warrant a persuasion, that more was to be hoped than to be feared from him. It did not appear that his interest could be promoted by the aggrandisement of Thebes. On the contrary the same policy which induced him, as well as Athens, notwithstanding her alliance with Sparta, to take part with Messene, would, it might be supposed, lead him to protect the independence of the inferior Baotian towns. In the long contest between Thebes and Phocis he had hitherto kept aloof: for though he had repelled the Phocians from Thessaly, he had done nothing in behalf of Thebes. The letter too which he had sent by the Athenian ambassadors contained a passage, cited without contradiction by Demosthenes, which seemed to favour these hopes. It expressed a desire СНАР. XLIV. СНАР. Views of Demosthenes. for alliance as well as peace with Athens, and hinted at some important benefit which he designed to confer on her, as soon as their amicable relations were firmly cemented. But whether the expectation was reasonable or absurd, we have sufficient evidence that it existed at Athens: for even in the first Philippic Demosthenes mentions it as one of the reports of the day. And the sequel will be found to render it probable that some pains had been taken to impress the Athenian ambassadors with the same belief during their stay in Macedonia. But if such were Philip's intentions, he could not openly declare them, so long as it was convenient to him to keep up an appearance of friendship with Thebes: and to introduce an article into the treaty which would force him prematurely to disclose them, must have appeared to those Athenians who believed they were in the secret, the very way to frustrate their own wishes. Such seem to have been the views with which Demosthenes himself returned from Philip's court, and by which he was governed in all the steps which he took to hasten the conclusion of the treaty. He does not venture to acknowledge the delusion by which he had been misled, pardonable as it was, because the confession would have strengthened his adversary's plea but his conduct can hardly be explained on any other supposition. It appears likewise to furnish a key to the meaning of several statements in which the rival orators most directly contradict each other and themselves. Eschines asserts that ambassadors had been sent from Athens into various parts of Greece, to excite the Greeks against Philip, and had not yet returned when he and his colleagues reached home. He makes it the ground of a grave charge against Demosthenes, that by his precipitate measures he prevented the people from waiting for the return of these envoys, and thus deprived it of CHAP. XLIV. Congress of allies at the advantage which it would have gained if it had treated in concert with other states: he appeals to a state paper, the existence of which is attested by Demosthenes himself, and which seems at first sight conclusive evidence of the fact. The deputies of the states which still adhered to the Athenian confederacy Athens. were at this time assembled at Athens: they had probably been summoned for purposes connected with the treaty; and according to Eschines, they passed a resolution in their congress, in which they mentioned that embassies had been sent to rouse the Greeks to the defence of their liberty, and had not yet returned; and recommended that, when the ambassadors should have returned, and have made their reports, two assemblies should be held to consult on the proposed treaty with Philip. That such a congress was sitting, and that it made some proposal relating to the treaty, is admitted by Demosthenes, who asserts that he supported the same measure. But he denies that any envoys had been sent on the mission mentioned by Æschines, which, as he observes, would have been a piece of most shameless and useless treachery, if the Athenians were at the same time negotiating for peace. Yet in his accusation of Eschines one of his charges is, that, after his return from Macedonia, he made an offensive speech in the presence of the envoys who had been invited to Athens from various Greek states, on his own proposal, made before he had sold himself to Philip. Eschines in answer challenges him to produce the name of any one such envoy who was present on the occasion, and is willing to stake his cause on this fact. On the part of Demosthenes however the seeming contradiction may be resolved into a very slight exaggeration. The envoys of whom he speaks were probably not the ministers of any independent states, but the deputies of the allies of Athens, who were CHAP. tion. undoubtedly in the city at the time: so that he might consistently deny that any others were expected. But Eschines likewise, in the course of the same speech, distinctly contradicts the statement which he pretends to prove by the proposition of the congress; for he defends himself against the charge of political apostasy by a plea, which clearly implies that, after his embassy to Peloponnesus, no further attempt had been made to instigate any Greek states against Its resolu- Philip.' It is also clear that he knew of but one resolution of the congress relating to this subject: but on another occasion he gives a totally different account of its contents, according to which it made no allusion to any past embassies, but simply proposed that any Greek state might be admitted to a share in the treaty, which should apply for leave within the next three months.2 Which of these is the more correct report, is a question of little importance; the great difficulty lies in the fact, that the congress did make one or other, or both, of these propositions. That they should have proceeded from independent states in alliance with Athens, which might wish as many others as possible to be associated with them in the treaty, would indeed be easy enough to understand: but it is not so clear with what object they could have been made by the deputies of the tributary allies, who had little concern in the war with Philip, or must have wished to see it brought as soon as possible to an end: and if the measure was not their own spontaneous act, it would still remain to be explained how, and from what motive, it was suggested to them. We might perhaps have suspected that the design of its authors was merely to invite some of the northern maritime states as the Greek cities on the Hellespont to take part in the treaty, both with the view 1 De F. L. § 84. οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐπικουροῦντος τῇ πόλει, |