485 APPENDIX I. ON THE BIRTH-YEAR OF DEMOSTHENES. I. THE little essay on the Birth-year of Demosthenes, which appeared APPENDIX in the Philological Museum, and which was avowedly designed chiefly to draw the attention of English scholars to the subject, may be said to have answered its main purpose, when it called forth the observations which Mr. Clinton made on it in the third edition of his Fasti. I must now, for many reasons several of which will be sufficiently evident to the readers of this volume — abandon the supposition adopted in that essay as totally untenable; though I do not assent to Mr. Clinton's conclusion, by which the birth of Demosthenes is assigned to Ol. 99. 3. Since then the question has been more fully discussed by a great number of eminent German critics, particularly by Ranke (in Ersch and Grueber's Encyclopædia, Demosthenes); Brückner (König Philipp); Seebeck (Zimmermann's Zeitschrift, 1838); Böhnecke (Forschungen), and Dröysen (Ueber das Geburts-jahr des Demosthenes in Rhein. Mus. vol. x.). It is not my intention here to reproduce this discussion, with my comments upon it, which would swell this appendix nearly to the size of the rest of the volume ; but only to notice, as briefly as may be, the leading arguments which seem to me to warrant and require the conclusion on which I have proceeded in this edition, and which has rendered it necessary to alter the arrangement of several events in Philip's reign. All the authors just mentioned agree in rejecting the date (Ol. 98. 4.) assigned by Pseudo-Plutarch for the orator's birth. But every year of the next Olympiad has its advocate among them. Ranke and Seebeck contend for Ol. 99. 1.; Droysen for Ol. 99. 2. Brückner sides with Mr. Clinton in favour of Ol. 99. 3.; Böhnecke maintains the date of Dionysius. (Ol. 99. 4.) All profess to ground their opinions on the statements of Demosthenes himself, and expressly or tacitly to admit that, if the truth cannot be deduced from them, there can be little hope of ascertaining it from any other evidence. Only Böhnecke introduces another principle into the discussion, which can hardly be reconciled either in theory or in practice with an impartial inquiry into the testimony delivered by Demosthenes. For he sets out with the assumption, that we have only to choose between the two dates-differing by a whole I. APPENDIX Olympiad — furnished by Pseudo-Plutarch and Dionysius; and he finds fault with Mr. Clinton for abandoning the one without adhering to the other — a middle course which he considers as almost always very dangerous in historical criticism. Whatever makes against the date of Pseudo-Plutarch, he treats as an argument for that of Dionysius; and at the close of his investigation he observes: After this inquiry, I consider the question of the birth-year of Demosthenes as solved, and the opinion of PseudoPlutarch as completely driven out of the field. So that if PseudoPlutarch had been silent, the authority of Dionysius must have been held to be decisive, and to supersede the necessity for further inquiry. And yet Böhnecke himself does not regard Dionysius as infallible, and does not scruple to reject some opinions of his which are apparently quite as well grounded as this about the birth-year of Demosthenes. If neither Pseudo-Plutarch nor Dionysius are entitled to such deference, then it seems clear that the right course is -as Seebeck very properly insists to keep their opinions as much as possible out of view, until it has been ascertained what conclusion results from a careful comparison of all the data furnished by Demosthenes himself. If indeed this conclusion points as it may still seem to do- more ways than one, so as to leave the inquirer at fault, and yet he is under the necessity of making a choice—as is the unhappy case of one who has undertaken to write a history of those times then he may be allowed to submit his doubts to the decision of the best authority he can find; though he cannot feel, and ought not to profess, entire confidence in the result, and should only regard it as a temporary position, subject to the issue of a future more satisfactory research. Instead of taking this, which appears to me the only safe as well as logical course, Böhnecke opens his inquiry by declaring it to be his intention, first to prove the correctness of the statement of Dionysius from the testimony of Demosthenes, and then to show that it is in harmony with the most trustworthy accounts of other ancient authors, and that it is even confirmed by a passage of Pseudo-Plutarch himself. But the reader is thus at least led to expect, that the inquiry will begin with an examination of the evidence of Demosthenes. Instead of this however, the first section is devoted to a discussion of the comparative authority of the two conflicting statements, and reasons are assigned for giving a decided preference to Dionysius, as having deduced his date, not from his own calculation or opinion, as Pseudo-Plutarchus, but from some earlier life of the orator: though, if the fact be admitted, as we know nothing whatever about this source of his information, we have no means of judging how far it deserved his confidence. The next section indeed introduces the witness of Demosthenes, but in a manner very characteristic of the unfortunate error which runs through the I. whole essay for the object of this section is to prove the correct- APPENDIX ness of the date of Dionysius from the statement of Demosthenes in the oration against Midias. That statement, we know, determines the age which he had reached when he wrote the speech. He was then, he says, thirty-two (dúo kaì тpiákovтa ëtŋ yéyova). And if we only knew the date of the speech, nothing more would be wanting to ascertain the orator's birth-year. Böhnecke indeed believes that he has determined the date of the speech. But he arrives at his conclusion by an elaborate cumulative argument, involving a number of very questionable propositions, and depending in part on his conjectures as to the contents of the lost books of Theopompus, founded on a few names of places which occur in the fragments. If the pretended proof was more solid than it is, it would still be an abuse of terms to call this deducing the birthyear of Demosthenes from his own statements. And though it is indispensable, before any hypothesis on that subject can be admitted, to show that it is consistent with the historical allusions in the Midiana, an attempt to prove this is premature and out of its place, until some substantive ground has been laid for the hypothesis in a comparison of the numerous passages bearing on the question in the speeches against Aphobus and Onetor. These however Böhnecke discusses in the last place, rather by way of complement to his main proof, than as constituting an essential part of his argument. This narrow view of the question is the more to be lamented, on account of the great general merit and value of the work, which is manifestly the fruit of a long and laborious study, and must be acknowledged to be one of the most important contributions ever made to the history of the obscure period to which it relates. And the author may be pardoned if his consciousness of the patient industry with which he has prosecuted his investigations, leads him not unfrequently to overrate the success of his labours, and to assume a tone of confidence which is not always justified by the strength of his arguments, and which is certainly raised to an indiscreet pitch, when he declares (preface, p. xix.) with regard to one of the most difficult parts of his inquiry-the pseudonym archons —that he will never give up his present conviction. In the essay on the birth-year of Demosthenes, it seems hardly to be doubted that he would have been led to a different result, if he had weighed the evidence contained in the speeches against Aphobus and Onetor with an even mind, free from all bias in favour of a particular hypothesis. The most valuable part of this essay is the learned and instructive disquisition about the time of the doкpaoía tis avopaç, in which he has, I think, clearly established the important distinction between this δοκιμασία and the ἐγγραφὴ εἰς ληξιαρχικὸν I. APPENDIX Yрaμμarɛtor, with which it has been usually confounded. But his own statements on this point suggest a different conclusion from that which he has adopted, as I shall presently endeavour to show. Here I would observe that, if Böhnecke's conclusion as to the time of the doriparia ɛiç åvôpaç be admitted, it at once disposes of the hypothesis maintained by Ranke and Seebeck. For with both the only doubt is whether that dokuaría took place in the eighteenth or nineteenth year, and therefore whether Demosthenes was born Ol. 99. 1., or Ol. 98. 4. Both, as I have said, decide in favour of the former date, but Ranke with much less confidence than Seebeck, who believes himself to have established their common opinion by more cogent reasons. His argument however is far from convincing. He assumes that Demosthenes, at his father's death, had completed his seventh year, and thinks that Mr. Clinton, - who interprets πr' érшv övra in the seventh year of my age, has done violence to the orator's words; and he alleges the passage, also cited by Ranke for the same pupose (εἰ κατελείφθην μὲν ἐνιαύσιος ἓξ ἔτη δὲ προσεπετροπεύθην ὑπ' αὐτῶν), as a decisive, though superabundant confirmation of his opinion. Böhnecke, who seems not to have seen Seebeck's essay, produces the same passage, perhaps with less propriety, in proof of the opposite assertion. But it is certainly too ambiguous, as Droysen observes, to be of any avail for either purpose. Seebeck however proceeds to argue, that as the dokμaria took place about the end of the eighteenth year, and when Demosthenes underwent that scrutiny the guardianship had not lasted quite ten years, it must be supposed that he completed his eighth year soon after his father's death. Though these errors in the premises entirely vitiate Seebeck's conclusion, his essay still deserves reading, but need not now occupy us any further. It will be found greatly to abridge our inquiry, if we proceed at once to consider that part of Böhnecke's statements and reasonings which relates to the evidence contained in the speeches against Aphobus and Onetor. There are two points which, if they were determined, would bring us to a complete solution of our question. If we knew at what age Demosthenes underwent the dokuaria which terminated his wardship, and also under what archon it took place, we should have ascertained the year of his birth. Now Böhnecke himself has collected a mass of evidence as to the legal and customary time for the dokıμaoía eiç årdpaç, which seems to leave no room for doubt as to the regular practice. He shows that this dokuaoia had reference to the termination of the period designated by the term ŋ. The biennial duration of this period is marked by the phrase ἐπιδιετὲς ἡθᾷν οι ἡβῆσαι, and its beginning is clearly defined by Solon himself in two verses cited by Böhnecke: Παῖς μὲν ἄνηβος ἐὼν, ἔτι νήπιος ἕρκος οδόντων Τοὺς δ ̓ ἑτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἕπτ ̓ ἐνιαυτοὺς, ἥξης ἐκφαίνει σπέρματα γεινομένης. It seems impossible to add anything either to the distinctness or to the force of this testimony. Böhnecke however confirms it by several others, particularly by the more detailed statement of Censorinus (De Die Nat. c. 14.), who says that the Greeks termed the boy of fourteen παῖδα, one of fifteen μελλέφηβον, one of sixteen ἔφηβον, one of seventeen ἐξέφηβον. On the whole it is certain, as he observes, that for males the age of puberty was accounted to begin at the completion of the fourteenth year. He then takes a review of the different explanations which have been given of the expression ἐπιδιετὲς ἡβᾷν οι ἡθῆσαι, by which some of the Greek grammarians understand the completion of the twentieth, others that of the eighteenth, others that of the sixteenth year. It is enough here to say that he decidedly prefers the last mentioned opinion, which, beside the natural and obvious meaning of the term, when compared with the words of Solon, is supported by the superior authority of Didymus, according to the report of Harpocration and others. Harpocration indeed apparently cites Didymus to convict him of error. Ἐπιδιετὲς ἡβῆσαι. Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Στεφάνου. (p. 1135, 1136.) Δίδυμός φησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἐὰν ἑκκαίδεκα ἐτῶν γένωνται, τὸ γὰρ ἡθῆσαι μέχρι τεσσαρεσκαίδεκά ἐστιν. (The accuracy of the quotation in this last sentence seems questionable.) ἀλλ ̓ οἱ ἔφηβοι παρ' Αθηναίοις οκτωκαιδεκαετεῖς γίνονται, καὶ μένουσιν ἐν τοῖς ἐφήβοις ἔτη δύο, ἔπειτα τῷ ληξιαρχικῷ ἐγγρά φονται γραμματείῳ. A statement erroneous in itself, quite irrelevant for the refutation of Didymus, and not in the slightest degree confirmed by the passage cited in proof of it from Hyperides: ¿v τῷ πρὸς Χάρητα ἐπιτροπικῷ· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνεγράφην ἐγὼ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ἀπέδωκε τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν καταλειφθέντων τῇ μητρὶ, ὃς κελεύει κυρίους εἶναι τῆς ἐπικλήρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπάσης τοὺς παῖδας, ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδιετὲς ἡβῶσιν. But Böhnecke himself has made this passage the ground of an argument which it certainly will not bear. He contends that it is a mistake to reckon the ἐπιδιετὲς ἡβᾷν from the beginning of the ἐφηβία, because the ἐπιδιετὲς ἡβήσαντες are here called παῖδες. But it is clear that the word waidag has no reference to age in this passage, and means not boys, but sons, as in all the others to which he refers. (Isæus de Cir. hæred. § 31. ed. Schöm. οἱ γενόμενοι παῖδες ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης, ὁπότε ἐπὶ διέτες ἥβησαν. De Arist. hæred. § 12. κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ τῶν τῆς ἐπικλήρου κύριον εἶναι, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ τοὺς παῖδας ἐπὶ διέτες ἡβήσαντας κρατεῖν τῶν χρημάτων. [Dem.] in Steph. u. p. 1135. ὁ νόμος κελέυει τοὺς παῖδας ἡβήσαντας κυρίους τῆς μητρὸς εἶναι.) On the other hand Valesius, in his note on APPENDIX |