I.

APPENDIX question. These have received some additional light from each successive investigation which has been bestowed upon them; and there is no reason to despair of their being still further cleared up, until the opinions of learned men shall converge to the same result. But nothing can tend more to retard this desirable consummation than the method which Böhnecke has adopted in this inquiry; setting up an arbitrary standard, and then straining his ingenuity to bring all other testimony into apparent conformity with it.

APPENDIX II.

ON THE UNITY AND DATE OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.

IN the present miserably imperfect state of our information concerning the times of Philip, the unity and date of the first Philippic are questions of considerable importance for the history of that portion of his reign which is comprised within the 107th Olympiad. Seebeck (in Zimmermann's Zeitschrift, 1838, No. 91-97.), was the first to draw attention to a view of the contents of the speech, which, if it be admitted, supersedes all further inquiry as to the first point, and leaves no room to doubt that the first Philippic is not an original whole, but has been made up of two distinct orations, or parts of orations, which are separately enumerated by Dionysius, and must have been delivered at an interval of probably not less than a year from one another. The ground on which Seebeck rests this conclusion is very simple and patent to the judgement of every intelligent reader. It is that the plan of operations proposed in the second part of the speech is directly at variance with that which is recommended in the first part, and cannot have been brought forward at the same time. The plan unfolded in the first part consists of two distinct and independent proposals: one, which is evidently the foremost both in order and importance, is to keep an armament, consisting of 50 triremes, to be manned by Athenian citizens, horse transports for half the cavalry, and an adequate number of vessels for provisioning the fleet, in constant readiness to sail from Attica at the shortest notice, whenever it might be necessary to meet one of Philip's sudden excursions out of his own dominions, such as the expedition to Thermopyla, the Chersonesus, or Olynthus (§ 17. raūra pèv οἶμαι δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας εἰς Πύλας καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται. I cannot believe with Seebeck and others, that while the names Pylæ

II.

and Chersonesus referred to actual occurrences, that of Olynthus APPENDIX was only meant to signify a possible case). Such a state of preparation would either deter Philip from making such movements, or would enable the Athenians to counteract them, by calling him away to the defence of his own territories. The other, subordinate and complemental, branch of the plan, was to maintain a force of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry-one fourth of each arm being Athenian citizens-with an escort of ten triremes, to be continually employed in carrying on a buccaneering warfare against Philip. (§ 19. After the first part of the plan has been stated, ταῦτα μέν ἐστιν, ἃ πᾶσι δεδόχθαι φημὶ δεῖν καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι προσήκειν οἶμαι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δύναμίν τινά φημι προχειρίσασθαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἡ συνεχῶς πολεμήσει καὶ κακῶς ἐκεῖνον ποιήσει. and § 23. οὐκ ἔνι νῦν ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνῳ παραταξομένην, ἀλλὰ ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρῆσθαι τὴν рúry.) Here then we have a clear description of two forces designed for two entirely different objects: the one, remaining at home, to be sent out occasionally on great emergencies to resist Philip's enterprises; the other, to be stationed abroad in some convenient position near the coast of Macedonia, to take every opportunity of annoying the enemy by a series of petty desultory incursions: the one destined mainly for defensive, the other for aggressive purposes. But in the latter part of the speech a reason is assigned-derived from the obstacles opposed to navigation between Attica and the north of the Egean by winter storms and by the Etesian winds in summer-why no reliance can be placed on such a system of operations as is recommended in the first part, for counteracting Philip's movements by occasional expeditions, and why all hope of a successful resistance to his undertakings must rest on the maintenance of an armament, consisting both of land and sea forces, which should be always at hand, wintering in one or other of the northern islands, Lemnos or Imbros or Sciathus, to carry on the war without intermission. (§ 32. δεῖ τοίνυν ταῦτ ̓ ἐνθυμουμένους μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν—ὑστεριοῦμεν γὰρ ἁπάντων — ἀλλὰ παρασκευῇ συνεχεῖ Kai dvváμe). It may be said perhaps that we are to interpret the δυνάμει). δεῖ μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν, as if μόνον was understood-not merely with occasional succours. But in the first place, the reason alleged is equally valid, whether such succours constituted the whole or only a part of the plan and in the next place, the office assigned to this armament is manifestly the same for which the force proposed to be kept in readiness at home was destined—not piratical aggression, but resistance to Philip's enterprises. (§ 31. roç πνεύμασι καὶ ταῖς ὥραις τοῦ ἔτους τὰ πολλὰ προλαμβάνων διαπράττεται Φίλιππος, καὶ φυλάξας τοὺς ἐτησίας ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἥνικ ̓ ἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ δυναίμεθα ἐκε ἴσε ἀφικέσθαι). The result of keep

τοῖς

II.

...

APPENDIX ing an armament always close to the theatre of war, is presently afterwards stated to be, that the Athenians would no longer waste their time in ineffectual deliberations on the same subjects. (§ 33. ἂν ταῦτα πορίσητε . . . . εἶτα . . . τοὺς στρατιώτας τὰς τριήρεις τοὺς ἱππέας ἐντελῆ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν κατακλείσητε ἐπὶ τῷ πολέμῳ μένειν . . . παύσεσθ ̓ ἀεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βουλευόμενοι καὶ πλέον οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες). But how could this be the effect of such a measure, if the employment of the main force, which was to be kept at home in readiness for great emergencies, was still to depend as much as ever on the deliberations of the assembly, as well as on the accidents of the season and on the weather? The whole argument to the end of the speech tends to maintain the exclusive expediency of one kind of preparation, and that the one which, if the speech is an original whole, is represented in the first part as secondary and supplemental. Otherwise it may be supposed that Demosthenes had seen the necessity of fitting out an armament for the foreign station on a larger scale, adequate to both purposes.

For these reasons, and not in deference to the authority of Dionysius, which I am quite willing to put out of the question here as well as in the inquiry about the order of the Olynthiacs and the birth-year of Demosthenes, I find myself obliged to consider the first Philippic as compiled from two distinct orations. Böhnecke indeed dismisses Seebeck's argument with the remark, (p. xvi. note,) that any one may easily refute it by a correct explanation of the speech. It is to be lamented that he has not deigned, either in the place where he makes this assertion, or in the body of the work, where he is reporting the substance of the speech (p. 151.) and expressly treating of its unity (p. 259.), to give the slightest hint as to the nature of this correct explanation. But as it seems to have escaped the observation of a critic not inferior in sagacity to Böhnecke himself (Droysen in Rh. Mus. x. p. 433., and Ueber die Echtheit der Urkunden, &c. p. 159.), I need not be ashamed to confess that, after a repeated perusal of the speech with a view to this question, I have been unable to discover it.

As to the two orations of which the present whole is composed, Seebeck, with Dionysius, and most of the modern critics, assigns the first Philippic, ending with the Tóрov άódeikis, to Ol. 107. 1., and he supposes that the peroration, immediately following that document, may have been lost with it. As to the second oration, which apparently begins as abruptly as the former breaks off, he proposes an explanation, which however, whether satisfactory or not, can never claim any higher value than that of an ingenious conjecture. He thinks that it was delivered toward the end of 107. 2. while Demosthenes was a member of the Five Hundred, and that in the opening words, ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς δεδυνήμεθα εὑρεῖν ταῦτά

is

He

II.

ἐστιν, he is referring to the προβούλευμα, which had been adopted APPENDIX by the council, and which he had been commissioned to advocate in the assembly. The main question however is, whether either was delivered, as Böhnecke supposes to have been the case with regard to the whole, after the Olynthiacs, and in the interval between Philip's conquest of the Chalcidian towns, and his attack on Olynthus itself. Böhnecke conceives that the precise juncture was when Philip was just recovering from an illness brought on by the wound which he received in his eye before the Thracian Methone. To this illness he refers the rumours alluded to in the speech: τέθνηκε Φίλιππος ; οὐ μὰ Δί ̓ ἀλλ' ἀσθενεῖ —which all preceding writers had connected with the illness by which, we know from Demosthenes, Philip was interrupted in his Thracian expedition (Ol. πι. § 5. ἠγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεώς). And he thinks that this conjecture for it is at best nothing more confirmed by Ulpian, following a more ancient author. quotes Ulpian's words, καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀσθένεια Φιλίππου πρὸ τῆς πολιορκίας Ολύνθου, as a statement that the illness alluded to in the first Philippic happened only a little before Philip laid siege to Olynthus. If however he had transcribed Ulpian's whole note, it would have been evident that the words quoted have no such meaning, but on the contrary confirm the common interpretation of the orator's text. The note runs thus: révŋkɛ Þiλɩñños) ÉVTευ0εv ὁρμώμενοί φασιν ὅτι πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ λόγος, καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀσθένεια Φιλίππου, πρὸ τῆς πολιορκίας Ολύνθου ἀλλά φαμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπεικὸς αὐτόν τι τοιοῦτον θεῖναι ὡς ἐν παραδείγματι, κἄν ἦν τοῖς χρόνοις προγενέστερον. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἅτε ταύτα θέλοντες γένεσθαι ἐθρύλλουν. The reader will see at once that Ulpian is combating the argument of some more ancient writers, who inferred from the allusion to Philip's illness, which had given rise to rumours of his death, that the oration must have preceded the Olynthiacs; because Philip's illness the only notable one that had ever befallen him—was prior to the siege of Olynthus, which they believed to have given occasion to the Olynthiacs. Ulpian admits their premisses that the illness belonged to an earlier period than that which he would assign to the speech, but contends that Demosthenes might nevertheless have alluded to those long-past rumours, as an example of the eagerness with which the Athenians circulated news which they wished to be true. Unfortunately this is not a unique specimen of the manner in which Böhnecke sometimes treats his authorities. It is true that, in his commentary on the passage of the third Olynthiac, Ulpian does say, ἐπικινδύνως ἀσθενῆσαί φησι Φίλιππον, ὅτε τὴν Μεθώνην ἐπολιορκεῖ, and proceeds to give the story of the wound in the eye. But Böhnecke himself seems to have been aware that this testimony could not be of much service to him, and passes it over in silence.

APPENDIX

II.

The grounds which Böhnecke alleges for his opinion are partly external, partly internal. The former would no doubt, if it was simply a question of authority, decide it against Dionysius. The arguments drawn from the oration itself are always ingenious, often specious, but to my mind never convincing. I do not think it necessary to enter into an examination of them, which would lead to endless minute and inconclusive details. But there is one which I must briefly notice, as it involves a question of greater importance for the history of this period. Böhnecke (p. 240.) denies that, after the peace of 359, the Athenians were ever in a state of open war with Philip before 350, when he supposes the Olynthian War to have begun. If so, it would be clear that the first Philippic could not have been spoken sooner. But the arguments by which Böhnecke endeavours to establish his proposition are most unsatisfactory, and almost all either beg the question, or pervert the meaning of his authorities. That the Athenians were not at war with Philip when he attacked Potidæa, is proved, as Böhnecke contends, by two facts: that the Athenian succours arrived too late, and that Philip treated the Athenian garrison in a friendly manner, and sent them home without ransom. One is surprised that Böhnecke should not have observed that this last argument would prove that there was no war before the peace of 359 for Philip treated the prisoners he made from the army of Mantias with like generosity. But again, when Methone and Pagasa were in danger, the Athenians decreed to send armaments to succour them against Philip. But still the peace, Böhnecke argues, was not broken, because the towns fell before the decrees were carried into execution. In the battle with Onomarchus, Chares (as Böhnecke states, referring to Diodorus xvi. 35.) did not venture, though he was near at hand, to interpose in aid of the Phocians, but only took their fugitives on board. As to the supposed caution of Chares, whether to avoid breaking the peace or from any other motive, not a word is to be found in Diodorus or anywhere else. But at least no such scruples were felt by the Athenians, when soon after they repelled Philip's attempt to pass through Thermopylæ. Böhnecke states the fact as a part of his case, assuming that this famous expedition was not a hostile movement, but only a pacific precaution. Still less, according to Böhnecke, could the decree for the relief of Heræum be considered as an indication of a state of war, since its execution was suspended by the news of Philip's illness. This is the positive part of Böhnecke's argument. In a note he despatches the passages which have been brought forward in support of the contrary opinion with the remark, that they may be more properly referred to the Social War: to which he subjoins the startling assertion, that this war was begun for the recovery of Amphipolis. As autho