CHAP. XXXVIII.

Negotiation

Athens and

Sparta.

Platea. They were forced to evacuate their city, which was also rased to the ground1; but the main part of the inhabitants appear to have occupied a strong-hold named Ceressus, situate on a rocky spur of mount Helicon, where they maintained themselves until after the battle of Leuctra, when the place was stormed by Epaminondas.2 In the meanwhile their B. C. 371. complaints and supplications helped to rouse the indignation of the Athenians against Thebes. The people decreed that an embassy should be sent to negotiate a peace with Sparta; but to avoid the appearance of breaking with their present allies, invited the Thebans to become parties to the treaty. Callias, the Torchbearer, on account of the relation between his family and Sparta, was placed at the head of the embassy; he was accompanied by six colleagues, and by Callistratus, who appears to have attended without the title of an ambassador. His presence seems to have been very much needed; for, of three speeches reported by Xenophon as delivered on this occasion. by the Athenian envoys, his is the only one which was not grossly irrelevant and unseasonable. Callias was chiefly anxious to impress his hearers with a due sense of his own dignity, and glancing slightly at the events of the day, grounded his argument in favour of peace on the legends of Triptolemus and Hercules. He was followed by Autocles in a speech not equally absurd, but much more misplaced, being full of invectives against the hypocrisy or inconsistency of the Spartans, who, professing to be the champions of

1 Xen. H. vi. 3. 1.

Pausan. Ix. 14. 2. 4. This is perhaps the easiest way of reconciling Xenophon and Pausanias. Pausanias does not seem to be aware, that the Thespians had been expelled from their city before the battle of Leuctra. According to him it was not until after the battle that they quitted the city, and took refuge in Ceressus. And Sievers (p. 248.) adopts this statement, so far as regards the time of their occupying Ceressus, but without attempting to explain what became of them in the interval which had elapsed since their expulsion. It seems most likely that a part at least sought shelter in the ancient fortress, where they had formerly defied the attacks of the Thessalians, as soon as they were driven from their homes.

CHAP.

XXXVIII.

Treaty of

peace.

ence.

liberty and independence, exerted a despotic authority over their allies, oppressed the weaker cities with tyrannical governments of their own appointment, and in the seizure of the Cadmea had directly violated the treaty which they pretended to enforce. Charges, no doubt, very well founded, but which so urged at such a time could only serve to defeat the purpose of the speaker's mission; and they manifestly produced general surprise and embarrassment, and gave great offence to the Spartan part of the audiCallistratus however judiciously remedied the effects of his colleague's indiscretion, acknowledging that there had been faults on both sides which called for mutual forbearance, and endeavouring to show that the interests of both states, properly understood, would be best promoted by an amicable agreement between them on the footing which the Peace of Antalcidas professed to establish. We learn from an allusion in this speech, that Antalcidas was at this time absent on a mission to the Persian court; and the orator thinks it necessary to notice an insinuation which it appears had been thrown out by some who were averse to peace, that Athens had been impelled to these overtures by the apprehension that Antalcidas might return with a supply of Persian gold for the prosecution of the war.

The terms of the treaty were then discussed and adjusted. It was agreed that the Spartans should withdraw their harmosts from the towns which they now occupied that the armies should be disbanded on both sides, and the fleets laid up; and that every state in Greece should be left to the enjoyment of independence. Yet if we may rely on a statement of the orator Eschines, in a speech delivered nearly thirty years later, a very important exception to this last fundamental article was allowed in favour of the Athenians: it was declared that it should not prejudice

their claims to Amphipolis. Eschines seems even to say that the congress came to a vote, by which it pledged itself that all the states represented in it should unite their efforts to restore Amphipolis to Athens.1 This sounds hardly credible; and the Athenians had reason to be satisfied with the public recognition of their right, which was probably more than Sparta would have conceded, if she had not been anxious to detach Athens, almost at any price, from the Theban alliance. Among the deputies was one from Amyntas, king of Macedonia, who was on very friendly terms with Athens, and made no great sacrifice in renouncing his own claims to Amphipolis2, which he had little prospect of being ever able to enforce. But if he really engaged to join in asserting those of Athens by arms, it must have been because he was well assured that no such attempt would ever be made. It may be added that no ministers could have deemed themselves authorised to make such a stipulation on behalf of their governments, without special powers for the purpose. A clause was added, which provided that if the treaty should be infringed to the injury of any of the contracting parties, any of the rest should be at liberty, though not bound, to aid in obtaining redress by arins. This article, of so sinister an aspect, seems to have been inserted chiefly with a view to Thebes, and to indicate a suspicion which was soon confirmed. The Athenian embassy had been accompanied or followed by envoys from Thebes, with Epaminondas, who was distinguished among his countrymen by his eloquence, no less than by his other attainments, at their head. The treaty was ratified by the Spartan government in the name of the whole Peloponnesian confederacy: Athens and

1 De F. L. p. 32. § 35. ; Αμφίπολιν τὴν ̓Αθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν Αθηναίοις. Böhnecke (Forschungen, 1, p. 141.) translates this, to conquer Amphipolis for Athens. 1àréorη, Esch. ibid. § 36.

CHAP.

XXXVIII.

СНАР, XXXVIII.

her allies were introduced as distinct parties; and so, according to Xenophon, the name of Thebes was at first inserted without any further explanation.' But the next day the Theban envoys demanded that it should be erased, and the name Baotians substituted in its stead. This brought the question to a point. A debate ensued, in which Agesilaus and Epaminondas, whose speech on this occasion seems to have gained great celebrity, took the principal parts. Agesilaus put an end to it, by asking whether the Thebans would permit the Baotian towns to ratify for themselves. Not, replied Epaminondas, until we see the provincial towns of Laconia annexing their oaths to the treaty. Agesilaus upon this, starting from his seat, angrily rejoined that he would allow the name of Thebes to stand there on no other condiThebes ex- tion, and bade them take their choice. They persisted cluded from in their resolution, though it must be owned that there was little analogy between the two cases, even if the counter-demand of the Thebans had been confined to Messenia 3; and, as neither side would give way, the negotiation ended with the exclusion of Thebes, which was thus left alone exposed to the hostility of all parties. This result gave great pleasure at Athens, where, according to Xenophon, hopes were entertained that the penalty which Thebes had

the treaty.

1 Lachmann, Gesch. p. 309. treats this as a low artifice of Agesilaus, designed to move the Thebans to compliance. But it seems far from clear how it could serve that end; and the supposition is at least unnecessary.

Plut. Ages. Nepos, Ep. vi. 4. Maxime ejus eloquentia eluxit Sparta, legati ante pugnam Leuctricam. I have not hesitated to refer the altercation between Agesilaus and Epaminondas, related by Pausanias 1x. 13. 2., to this occasion, though the author himself assigns it to the epoch of the Peace of Antalcidas, since he supposes it subsequent to the battle of Mantinea, in which Epaminondas was wounded. Diodorus also speaks of the eloquence displayed by Epaminondas on this occasion (xv. 38.)—as appears from the mention of Callistratus — though he also assigns a wrong date. I find myself here supported by the concurrence of Sievers, Gesch. p. 236. and of Arn. Schæfer in Schneidewin's Philologus 1. p. 197., who observes that the demand of the Thebans was probably understood to refer especially to the Messenians, and hence both so much irritated Agesilaus, and appeared to Xenophon too delicate a point to touch upon. It may be worth noticing that Xenophon himself (Hell. vi. 2. 31.) describes a part of the Messenian coast as τῆς Λακωνικῆς περὶ τὰς Σφαγέας. So v. Raumer, Vorlesungen 11. p 51. 2nd edition.

XXXVIIL

incurred during the Persian wars might still be CHAP. exacted. The public joy displayed itself in an extraordinary manner, by the institution of a yearly sacrifice at the altar of the goddess Peace.2

1

The Athenians forthwith executed their part of the treaty withdrew their garrisons, and recalled Iphicrates, ordering him to restore all that he had taken since the ratification. The Spartans also withdrew their harmosts and garrisons; but a question then arose, whether Cleombrotus, who it would seem had continued with his army in Phocis from 374, should be recalled. Opinions were divided on the subject in the Spartan assembly. A person named Prothous seems to have been the organ of a moderate party, which was desirous that the conditions of the treaty should be faithfully executed, and perhaps was secretly inclined to favour Thebes. He proposed that Cleombrotus should evacuate Phocis, but that a fund

1 See Vol. II. p. 305. 393.

That the sacrifice was instituted on this occasion, and not on that of the short-lived peace of 374, seems hardly to admit of a doubt: though Isocrates (de Antid. § 176.) and Nepos (Timoth. c. 2.) represent the treaty which was thus com. memorated as a fruit of the successes of Timotheus in the West, and they are followed by Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. 1. p. 252. where, however, there was nothing to draw his attention to this question), Sievers (p. 228.), and Rehdantz (p. 71.) without any apparent distrust. On the other hand Lachmann (p. 310.) assumes it as unquestionable that the peace of 371 was the occasion of the anniversary, and does not even deign to notice the other opinion. But we know nothing as to the terms of the first peace, that should lead us to suppose that it excited such lively feelings of joy at Athens: the slight notice taken of it by Xenophon indicates a different estimate of its importance; whereas with regard to the later peace, he expressly states (vi. 3. 20.) that it filled the Athenians with hopes of witnessing what they ardently desired the humiliation of Thebes. And the evidence of Isocrates, when more closely considered, points as much to the later as to the earlier treaty, though allowance must undoubtedly be made for rhetorical exaggeration. But he speaks of the peace as having reduced the power of Sparta both by sea and land, and as having thus led to the reverse of Leuctra. This statement, if referred to the peace of 374, can hardly be reconciled with the facts known to us: but it agrees very well with Xenophon's account of the conditions of the peace of 371 (vi. 3. 28.), and with that of Diodorus (xv. 38.). The allusion in Demosthenes c. Androt. § 18. is too vague-as Rehdantz himself observes, p. 65. n. 64. to be referred to any particular epoch of the war: and in the passage which he cites from the Scholiast on Aristides, p. 178. 5., even if the writer's authority were greater, the confusion between Timotheus and Iphicrates, whom he describes as having gained the victory at Leucas, would throw much doubt upon the effect of his testimony, especially as the Scholiast C. on p. 177. 20. seems to represent the operations of the two generals on the western coast as simultaneous.